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I argue that a straightforward account of empty names can be given which allows them to 
contribute to the expression of thoughts, as seems to be the case. But that we can offer such 
an account does not mean that we should, as it should be conceded on all sides that what is 
happening in the case of empty names is radically different from what is happening in the 
case of non-empty names. Moreover, in the case of non-conniving uses of empty names, the 
subject is under a misapprehension, and so could be under the misapprehension that they are 
expressing a thought. Nevertheless, if we want to hold on to the truth of some singular 
negative existential claims, which is recognized as a desiderata even by those hostile to the 
intelligibility of empty names, we are forced to recognize that empty names can contribute to 
the expression of thoughts. But once we make this admission we then open the door to empty 
names being used to express other thoughts too. 
 
But that we can give a coherent account of empty names and singular negative existentials 
does not mean that we should be irrealists wherever we think we see empty names and true 
singular negative existentials. And I argue that this is the case with fictional names. There are 
good reasons to be realists about fictional characters, even though there are good reasons to 
accept that fictional names sometimes fail to refer and that as a result claims such as Sherlock 
Holmes does not exist are true. The solution is to accept that fictional names are ambiguous 
having a non-referring use and referring use. Such a position is well-motivated and plausible, 
and allows the realist to capture the truth of singular negative existentials in a straightforward 
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I argue that a straightforward account of empty names can be given which allows them to 
contribute to the expression of thoughts, as seems to be the case. But that we can offer such 
an account does not mean that we should, as it should be conceded on all sides that what is 
happening in the case of empty names is radically different from what is happening in the 
case of non-empty names. Moreover, in the case of non-conniving uses of empty names, the 
subject is under a misapprehension, and so could be under the misapprehension that they are 
expressing a thought. Nevertheless, if we want to hold on to the truth of some singular 
negative existential claims, which is recognized as a desiderata even by those hostile to the 
intelligibility of empty names, we are forced to recognize that empty names can contribute to 
the expression of thoughts. But once we make this admission we then open the door to empty 
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But that we can give a coherent account of empty names and singular negative existentials 
does not mean that we should be irrealists wherever we think we see empty names and true 
singular negative existentials. And I argue that this is the case with fictional names. There are 
good reasons to be realists about fictional characters, even though there are good reasons to 
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Chapter 1: Empty Names 
 
In this chapter we set out an approach which we argue provides an adequate treatment of 
empty names, if we wish to provide such a treatment. We do not, however, take a stand on 
whether we ought to provide such a treatment. In §1, we briefly consider a reason for 
providing a treatment of empty names, and a reason against providing such a treatment, 
arguing that neither reason is decisive. As such we should keep an open mind as to whether 
such an approach in needed. In §2 we outline the various options for such a treatment and 
argue in favour of negative free logic. In §3 we follow Sainsbury and provide a treatment of 
empty names within a truth-theoretic setting, arguing that such an approach is adequate 
whether or not empty names and non-empty names are to be treated uniformly. This sets the 
scene for our treatment of singular negative existentials in Chapter 2 and the complications 
that arise from the case of fictional characters which we discuss in the rest of the thesis.  
 
 
1. Empty Names: For and Against 
The claim that sentences involving empty singular terms fail to express propositions, starts 
from the attractive premise that some thoughts are, in some sense, object-dependent. 
Following Martin, let us think of object-dependence thus: a proposition is object-dependent 
iff its content “is constitutively dependent on the existence of the object or objects that the 
thought content is about” (Martin 2002: 4), so that “a mental state or episode which has the 
thought content in question as its content could only occur given the existence of the object 
being referred to or thought about” (Martin 2002: 5). Alternatively, we could follow Martin’s 
(2002: 4 n8) suggestion of defining object-dependence solely in terms of the possibility of 
episodes of thought, rather than in terms of the existence conditions of the contents 
themselves. Such an approach allows for the possibility that the contents themselves 
necessarily exist, but that they are epistemically inaccessible in circumstances in which the 
relevant objects do not exist. Both the metaphysical and epistemic conceptions of object 
dependence have the important consequence that in the absence of the relevant objects, the 
thought content could not be entertained, and it is this that seems crucial to McDowell’s 
characterization: “a singular thought is a thought that would not be available to be thought or 
expressed if the relevant object, or objects, did not exist” (McDowell 1982: 204). 
 




It follows that if one utters a sentence of the relevant sort, containing a singular 
term that, in that utterance, lacks a denotation, then one expresses no thought at 
all; consequently neither a truth nor a falsehood (1982: 204). 
 
But does McDowell’s conclusion really follow? As Martin notes in his discussion of 
perceptual experience, no object-dependent content can 
 
be entertained in a case of hallucination as normally conceived, where no 
appropriate candidate for the object of thought exists. Whether that should 
mean that no thought content at all could then be entertained, and in turn 
whether that means that no mental state or episode could then be occurring is a 
further matter (Martin 2002: 5). 
 
That is, in the absence of o some sentence cannot express a singular content concerning o, but 
that leaves open that it expresses some other content, not dependent on o. 
 
So does the claim that singular thoughts are object-involving support McDowell’s 
conclusion? Only if, necessarily, any content expressed by a sentence containing a putatively 
referring term is an object-dependent one. Without this common kind assumption, 
McDowell’s conclusion does not follow. All that object-dependence establishes is that the 
content expressed by a sentence with an empty singular term cannot be one dependent on 
some object in virtue of the presence of the empty name.1 
 
Let us say that a name is Russellian iff (i) it can contribute to a sentence which expresses a 
thought, (ii) its ability to so contribute depends on its rigidly referring to an object and (iii) it 
belongs to a semantic category which contains only such terms. For McDowell, all names are 
Russellian, since no names can contribute to a thought if they are empty. 
 
Sainsbury (2005a), on the other hand thinks that there are no Russellian names. This is 
because he thinks that some empty names can contribute to the expression of thoughts, and 
that all names belong to the same semantic category. Sainsbury categorises all names together 
                                                          
1 Of course the content may be object-dependent in virtue of the presence of some non-empty name. 
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since all names share the important feature that they purport to refer to an object, whether 
they in fact do. 
 
But why does Sainsbury think that empty names can contribute to the expression of thoughts. 
Quite simply, because it seems as if they do. If I tell a child that Father Christmas lives at the 
North Pole, my utterance seems completely intelligible, and what appears to be going on is 
similar to when I say that The Queen lives at Buckingham Palace. But Sainsbury must accept 
that this similarity belies a difference, since in the one case there is an object that we are 
describing and in the other case there is no such object. Because of this we can say that if 
sentences containing empty names express thoughts, the thoughts they express are not of the 
same kind as the thoughts expressed by sentences containing non-empty names, at least in the 
sense that the latter thoughts are object-dependent. (Even if we were to reject object-
dependence, there is still a difference between the two thoughts on the approach to be 
advocated below and accepted by Sainsbury, since the truth of sentences containing non-
empty names, depends upon the predicative material, whereas sentences with empty names 
are automatically false). 
 
It is agreed on all sides that there is something similar and something different about such 
cases, both in terms of the names and the utterances/sentences. The question is whether we 
should categorize according to the similarities or according to the differences. McDowell 
wants to highlight the differences: empty names are not be categorized with referring names, 
and sentences containing empty names are not to be taken as expressing thoughts as 
sentences containing referring names are. Sainsbury on the other hand wants to categorize 
according to the similarities: all names belong to a single semantic class and sentences 
involving them express thoughts as do sentences containing non-empty names. 
 
But there is a third possibility. We could agree with Sainsbury that empty names can 
contribute to thoughts, but deny that they are to be classified along with non-empty names. 
So here we see that there are three possibilities: there are only Russellian names, there are 
only non-Russellian names, there are both Russellian and non-Russellian names. All three 
approaches agree that something very different is going on in the case of empty names than in 
the case of referring expressions, but they differ as to whether this means that there is no 
thought at all expressed in the empty case, and whether all names form a uniform semantic 
category. Which approach we should adopt turns on which categories are most fundamental 
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to semantics. This is a question which we shall not decide, but which is not settled by 
appearance nor by object-dependence. We shall argue in this Chapter that we should keep an 
open mind. We should develop a treatment of empty names in case it is needed. As we argue 
in Chapter 2, however, there is one consideration which strongly suggests that we do need it. 
 
 
2. Free Logic 
 
It is . . . an immediate consequence of recognizing names like ‘Julius’ 
in a language that classical logic must be modified. Evans (1982: 36). 
 
Evans’ point is not just that languages that include descriptive names, such as Julius, cannot 
be treated within classical logic, but rather that classical logic cannot be the correct logic for 
any language with meaningful empty names, descriptive or not. Evans puts the point in terms 
of descriptive names because these are the only empty names that he recognises. The 
question is, if we are to allow for the possibility of meaningful empty names, how should we 
amend classical logic?2 
 
The minimal commitment of a free logic, a logic which allows for meaningful empty names, 
is to be free of the existence assumption of classical logic that validates ∃x x=a, namely that 
in every model, the interpretation function assigns every individual constant or name an 
entity from the domain over which the quantifiers range. Note that this characterization does 
not rule out that names will be assigned entities outside the domain by the interpretation 
function, nor that all names will be assigned objects. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are three decision points when deciding upon which free logic is 
appropriate for a language containing empty names: i) what is the truth value of a (simple) 
sentence containing an empty name, ii) which entity, if any, is assigned to an empty name, 
and iii) what is the appropriate treatment of the quantifiers. We shall address the three 
questions in two parts. First, we shall discuss the different variety of free logics, arguing for a 
                                                          
2 The issues that we’ll consider here to do with the appropriate treatment of empty names are orthogonal to other 
debates about what is the correct logic. So, for example, if we reject classical logic in favour of intuitionistic 
logic on the basis of some argument of Dummett’s, there is still the further question of how to modify 
intuitionistic logic to provide a treatment of empty names. What I say here applies even if we are working 
against the background of a non-classical logic (cf. Sainsbury 2005a: 74). 
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negative free logic which assigns no entity to an empty name. Second, I’ll discuss the 
appropriate treatment of quantifiers within a free logic, and argue that even those who eschew 
a free logic ought to accept this treatment of the quantifiers. 
 
 
2.1 Varieties of Free Logic 
Free logics are traditionally split into three groups, depending upon what attitude they take 
towards the truth value of simple sentences containing non-referring singular terms, where a 
simple sentence is a sentence consisting of an n-place predicate concatenated with n referring 
expressions (Sainsbury 2005a: 66n9).3 The three approaches to simple sentences traditionally 
taken by free logics are as follows (cf. Sainsbury (2005a: 66)): 
 
Positive Free Logic: Some simple sentences containing empty singular terms are true 
 
Neutral Free Logic: All simple sentences containing empty singular terms are neither 
true nor false. 
 
Negative Free Logic: All simple sentences containing empty singular terms are false. 
 
Now, just as we can ask what is the appropriate attitude to take to simple sentences whose 
singular terms fail to refer?, we can also ask what is the appropriate attitude to take to 
predicates which correspond to a function which fails to partition all objects into its extension 
and its anti-extension?4 We shall not pause to consider the appropriate treatment of such 
predicates here, but we should note that our taxonomy of free logics ignores this issue. This is 
not especially problematic in the case of empty names, but we should note that just as 
classical logic was a generalization of the Port Royal theory, being free of existence 
assumptions with respect to its general terms, and free logics are a generalization of classical 
logic, being free of existence assumptions with respect to its singular terms (Lambert 1991b), 
                                                          
3 Sainsbury (2005a: 66n9) notes that a simple sentence will not be atomic if the referring expressions are 
semantically complex. Similarly, a simple sentence will not be atomic if the predicate is semantically complex. 
So here we are not dealing with Sainsbury’s (2005b: 67n2) notion of a simple sentence which is framed in terms 
of non-complex predicates. 
4 Functions corresponding to predicates map objects on to truth values. The question I am raising is traditionally 
framed in term of such functions being partial functions, functions which fail to map all objects to a truth value 
(Evans 1982: 11). But we cannot follow this way of framing the issue here, since we are asking whether we 
should deny a truth value to sentences containing these defective predicates, and so do not want to build the 
answer in to the question. 
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there is room for a further generalization, which yields a logic free from the assumption that 
predicates partition all objects into an extension and an anti-extension. But we shall ignore 
this question in what follows as it seems to have no direct bearing on what we want to say in 
the case of empty names. For example, if we wish to say an empty name when combined 
with a non-defective predicate yields a falsehood, we shall hardly want to say that such a 
term yields a truth when combined with a defective predicate. 
 
As specified, our definition of a positive free logic groups together a number of possibilities. 
First, it allows that all simple sentences containing empty names are true, although this is 
obviously not an attractive option. Second, limiting our concern to positive free logics where 
some simple sentences containing empty singular terms are not true, this allows that the rest 
are false, the rest are neither true nor false, or that some of the remaining sentences are false 
and some are neither true nor false. And for any positive free logic which allows that some 
simple sentences containing empty names are neither true nor false, we can distinguish 
between those logics which say that such sentences express a thought, those which say such 
sentences fail to express a thought, and those which say some such sentences express a 
thought whereas others do not 
 
More interestingly, this traditional taxonomy of free logics is not exhaustive. In addition to 
our three options, there is the neglected alternative of allowing that some simple sentences 
containing an empty name are false, whereas the rest lack a truth value (whether or not they 
express a thought).5 
 
Once we have determined the truth value, if any, of simple sentences containing empty terms, 
we can derive the truth value of complex sentences given our preferred treatment of logical 
and non-logical operators. For example, if we assume bivalence, the truth value of compound 
sentences in a positive or negative free logic is determined in exactly the same way as in the 
classical picture, or in whichever is our preferred background logic. In particular, the 
negations of all false sentences will be true, and so, in a negative free logic, the negation of 
any simple sentence containing an empty singular term will be true. 
 
                                                          
5 Lambert (1991b) and Nolt (2011) define neutral free logic to allow that simple sentences of the form ‘a exists’ 
are false when ‘a’ is empty, although we are following Sainsbury’s (2005a) classification here, at least in this 
respect. We consider the version of the neglected alternative that makes all sentences of the form ‘a exists’ false 
in our discussion of Wiggins’ approach to negative existentials in Chapter 2. 
15 
 
2.2 Rejecting Neutral Free Logic 
A neutral free logic can be motivated by the thought that there is something defective about 
sentences containing singular terms which fail to refer. This latter thought motivates two 
distinct positions. As we have seen, McDowell thinks that no thought whatsoever is 
expressed by a sentence containing an empty singular term. He therefore has no need to 
employ a free logic, since logic is concerned with the relations between propositions. Insofar 
as one wanted to subscribe to McDowell’s views and yet maintain a logic for declarative 
sentences, one could do so by making conditional claims about the semantics and the rules of 
inference along the lines of ‘if ‘s’ is a simple sentence which expresses a proposition, it is 
true iff .....’. 
 
An alternative view, which appears to have been Frege’s (Evans 1982: Chapter 1), is that 
such sentences do express thoughts, but that such thoughts are neither true nor false. This is 
not to say they have some third truth-value, rather, they are truth-valueless; they result in a 
truth-value gap. This is the approach taken by neutral free logic. 
 
If motivated by the thought that empty singular terms are defective, a neutral free logic will 
preserve the lack of truth value under embeddings, so that if P is without truth value, then so 
is ~P.6 This would mean that if ‘exists’ is a first level predicate, and ‘Vulcan’ is an empty 
term, then ‘Vulcan does not exist’ is without truth-value, regardless of whether ‘not’ takes 
wide or narrow scope (see Chapter 2). But intuitively such singular negative existentials are 
true.  
 
In any case, as Evans argues (1982: 24-25), it is hard to see why there could not be a wide-
scope or global negation operator which takes any thought that is not true and returns a 
thought that is true. As such, there ought to be a reading of not-P which is true in a neutral 
free logic. We should note, however, that it is not built in to the notion of a neutral free logic 
that lack of truth value is preserved under embeddings, and so a neutral free logic is 
consistent with such an operator.7 Of course, such a logic cannot be motivated by the Fregean 
thought that there is something defective about all sentences containing singular terms which 
                                                          
6 This is the analogue of the classical position that maintains that if P is without truth value, so is OP where ‘O’ 
is a propositional operator. Of course, some sentential operators, such as ‘....’ is true, can take a sentence which 
fails to express a proposition and return a proposition with a classical truth value. 
7 Compare Sainsbury’s (2005a) non-exhaustive taxonomy which divides free logics into positive, negative and 
Fregean free logics, the latter being committed to all sentences containing an empty referring expression lacking 
a truth value. 
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fail to refer, but it could, perhaps, be motivated by the thought that there is something 
defective about simple sentences containing singular terms which fail to refer. 
 
But even allowing for a global negation operator, a neutral free logic faces problems since 
such a logic validates the law of non-contradiction, ~(P & ~P), since even if P & ~P is neither 
true nor false, its negation will be true, which is reason enough to reject a neutral free logic. 
 
But there are deeper difficulties. If P is neither true nor false, so that ~P is true, then ~~P is 
false, since a sentence is true iff its negation is false. But by double negation elimination we 
ought to be able to (classically, but not intuitionistically) derive the falsity of P contra the 
original starting point. Evans makes essentially the same point when he writes 
 
What can it mean on Frege’s, or on anyone’s, principles, for there to be a 
perfectly determinate thought which simply has no truth value? Remember 
that the notion of thought that Frege was intending to use had strong links 
with notions embedded in ordinary propositional-attitude psychology – the 
notions of belief, knowledge, memory, information, judgement, and so on. 
If someone understands and accepts a sentence containing an empty name, 
then, according to Frege, he thereby forms a belief; not a belief about 
language, but a belief about the world. But what sense can be made of a 
belief which has no truth-value – which is neither correct nor incorrect? 
Evans (1982: 24)8 
 
So neutral free logic appears to have intolerable logical and semantic consequences, and so 
should be rejected. And what goes for neutral free logic, applies to the neglected alternative 
which has it that some simple sentences containing empty names express thoughts which are 
neither true nor false, and some to be false. The options that remain then are a positive free 
logic, a negative free logic, and the version of the neglected alternative which says some 




                                                          
8 The caveat regarding perfectly determinate thoughts is important, since many accept that when indeterminacy 
is in play, we can have a failure of bivalence. 
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2.3 Rejecting Positive Free Logic 
There seem to be two motivations for a positive free logic. First, the following sentences all 
seem felicitous (ignoring issues of tense) 
 
(1) Pegasus is winged 
(2) The Greeks worshipped Zeus 
(3) Sherlock Holmes lived at 221b Baker Street. 
 
Assuming this felicity is best accounted for by the truth of the sentences, and further 
assuming that these are simple sentences with non-referring singular terms, then a positive 
free logic is required. We might, at least in the case of (2), doubt that what we have are 
examples of simple sentences. But leaving this to one side, and leaving questions of whether 
these specific sentences really contain empty singular terms, we have reason to doubt that 
these sentences are true. 
 
First, although, for example, (3) is better than ‘Sherlock Holmes lived on the moon’, it is far 
from clear that we think that (3) is really true. We would not be surprised upon visiting 221b 
Baker Street to learn that Mr Holmes is not a resident there. Indeed, we would not, unless 
blissfully unaware of the Conan Doyle stories as fictions, visit Baker Street to meet Mr 
Holmes. So it seems that our attitude to (3), is not one of belief.9 A second, more systematic 
reason for doubting the literal truth of these sentences is, as Burge argues, that we cannot 
substitute co-extensional terms salva veritate in these sentences. For example, we cannot 
move from (1) to ‘Sherlock Holmes is winged’ even though ‘Pegasus’ and ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ do not differ in extension in virtue of the fact that they both fail to refer. Burge 
concludes then that these sentences, insofar as they are true “are best seen as an involving an 
implicit intensional context: ‘(A well-known myth has it that) Pegasus is winged’” (1974: 
310). Although correct, Burge’s conclusion may not go far enough. On the assumption that 
empty names necessarily do not denote, empty names are co-intensional as well as co-
extensional, so that the true readings of sentences like (1) involve an implicit 
hyperintensional context (but see Dummett (1993a) for scepticism concerning the required 
modal assumption). 
 
                                                          
9 Compare Walton’s (1978) discussion of fear and quasi-fear. 
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So consideration of sentences such as (1) to (3) offers no real support for a positive free logic. 
The second consideration often given in favour of a positive free logic is that it alone can 
account for true identity statements involving empty names, such as ‘Batman is Batman’. 
Lambert (1991c: 25) thinks such a sentence “follows from the unexceptionable identity 
principle ‘x=x’’. 
 
But in what sense does ‘Batman is Batman’ follow from the logic of identity? Not by 
Universal Instantiation, as free logics must reject classical Universal Instantiation, limiting it 
in a way which excludes instantiating on empty names (see below). Nor does the fact that the 
predicate ‘λx. x=x’ is true of everything help, since Batman is not one of everything 
(Sainsbury 2005a: 66). Nor is it a priori or necessary that all strings of the form ‘a=a’ are 
true, as there are instances which are false. For example, ‘Aristotle = Aristotle’ is false when 
the first occurrence of ‘Aristotle’ refers to the philosopher but the second refers to the 
shipping magnate (Sainsbury 2005a: 67). 
 
Regardless of whether or not we can prove by uncontentious principles of logic that identity 
statements involving empty names are obviously true, the claim that Batman is Batman has 
some intuitive plausibility, so we should examine whether a positive free logic is plausible. 
 
Although I am assuming that Meinongianism is out of bounds, there is still the question of 
which entity, if any, is to be assigned to an intuitively empty term. Frege stipulated that all 
such terms referred to the null set, although to maintain appearances we could amend Frege’s 
suggestion and say that the semantic value, but not the referent, of an intuitively empty term 
is the null set. Evans (1982: 32) seems to think this would be ‘formally adequate’,10 but 
whatever he might have meant by that, it is clear that the proposal is not semantically 
adequate. As Burge notes, on this proposal, or on any structurally similar one, “we get 
unwanted identity statements such as Pegasus is identical with Hercules” (1974: 310). 
Moreover, if the null set is within the domain, as presumably it needs to be in some cases, we 
shall get unwanted existential commitments, since from Pegasus = Pegasus we shall be able 
to existentially generalize to derive ∃x x = Pegasus, which is precisely the conclusion free 
logics were designed to avoid (see below). 
                                                          
10 Evans is actually considering a proposal where the semantic value of every singular term is a set, whereas the 
picture implicit in the above discussion is that intuitively empty terms are special in that they are all assigned the 
null set as their semantic value whereas every other singular term is assigned their usual referent as their 




The question is can we have the putative wanted identities without mechanisms which 
overgenerate and deliver unwanted identities? As Burge (1974: 318) shows, attempts to 
deliver the wanted identities fail to meet this desideratum. Lambert (1962) and Scott (1967) 
employ the following axioms respectively 
 
(4) ∀x (x ≠ t1 & x ≠ t2) ⊃ (t1 = t2) 
(5) (~∃x x=t) ⊃ t=* where ‘*’ denotes an object outside of the object language 
 
But these axioms imply that for any two empty terms, say ‘Pegasus’ and ‘Batman’, we can 
derive the false identity statement ‘Batman is identical to Pegasus’. So such theories are 
empirically inadequate. 
 
Grandy (1972) utilizes the following axiom 
 
(6) If ├ C ⊃ ∀x (Fx ≡ Gx), then ├ C ⊃ (ιx) Fx = (ιx) Gx) 
 
which will not yield all of the wanted true identities, since it says nothing about proper 
names. Moreover, as Burge notes, in any theory which contained the following true statement 
as an axiom 
 
(7) ∀x (Present King of France (x) ≡ Unicorn on the Moon (x)) 
 
Grandy’s axiom gives the unwanted result that the present King of France is identical to the 
unicorn on the Moon. Perhaps then, we should simply exclude such contingent, empirical 
non-logical axioms as (7), thus avoiding the problematic entailment. But we side here with 
Burge who thinks that the fact that whether or not we can derive these problematic results 
turns on which axioms we have in place is “arbitrary and unintuitive” (Burge (1974: 318). In 
any case, Grandy’s axiom is inadequate since ├ ∀x (Fx ≡ Gx) ⊃ ∀x (Fx ≡ Gx) is clearly true, 
whereas ├ ∀x (Fx ≡ Gx) ⊃ (ιx) Fx = (ιx) Gx) is false, when the antecedent is nonvacuously 





So, all of the positive free logical approaches to identity statements that Burge considers are 
to be rejected. Be that as it may, Burge has not demonstrated that we cannot be rid of the 
unwanted identities without preserving all instances of the schema a=a. Nevertheless, he has 
posed an explanatory challenge to positive free logicians. What is clear is that such an 
account cannot be given in terms of simple universal generalizations. It might, however, be 
possible, for instance, to appeal distinct name-using practices (Sainsbury 2005a: Chapter 3) to 
generate the supposedly wanted identities without generating the unwanted identities. Of 
course, if we only appealed to such practices we would undergenerate true identity statements 
in the case of referring singular terms, but identity statements involving distinct co-referring 
terms would be secured by a sister principle of Lambert’s above, namely 
 
(8) ∀x (x = t1 & x = t2) ⊃ (t1 = t2). 
 
We do have a more systematic reason for thinking that there are no true identity statements 
involving empty names, however. Any such statement, t=t, is inconsistent with 
 
(9) Ft ⊃ ∃x x=t 
 
which is encapsulated by Burge’s axiom (A9), since a substitution instance of ‘F’ is ‘t=’. But 
surely (9) is compelling? Burge thinks that appeals to intuition over the relative merits of the 
schema t=t and (9) will not settle the matter, and that the decision whether or not to allow true 
identity statements involving empty terms “must rest on more general considerations” (1974: 
322). 
 
Now, as highlighted above, Burge thinks that non-referring terms ought to be able to be 
substituted salva veritate in extensional contexts. Indeed, as I noted, perhaps they ought to 
substitutable salva veritate in intensional contexts. Neither identity elimination nor Leibniz’s 
Law will guarantee this (Burge (1974: 314)). In order to secure this result without relying on 
unwanted identities, Burge adds the following axiom to his logic (his (A8)) 
 




Now if we allowed true identity statements involving empty names, we would not be able to 
employ this axiom to explain why empty terms can be substituted salva veritate in 
extensional contexts, since it would allow us to derive a true identity statement involving any 
term empty terms. One way round this problem, would be to simply exclude identity 
statements from the scope of (10). This would, however, be ad hoc, and noticing this, I think, 
points to a deeper, more systematic reason for rejecting true identity statements involving 
non-referring singular terms. 
 
An extremely intuitive feature of Tarski's theory of truth is that it 
explicates what it is for a sentence to be true in terms of a relation 
(satisfaction) between language (open sentences) and the world (sequences 
of objects). The notion of correspondence which had always seemed so 
integral to truth came clean in Tarski's theory. ... It is difficult to see how 
the purported truth of, say, [Pegasus = Pegasus] can be explicated in terms 
of a correspondence relation.  
 
Loosely speaking, self-identity is a property of objects and  all objects 
have it; sentences expressing identities are true or false by virtue of the 
relation that the identity predicate and its flanking singular terms bear to 
the world-never merely by virtue of the identity of the singular terms. 
Philosophical questions regarding identity seem bound to the notions of 
existence and object (Burge 1974: 322-323). 
 
Burge goes on to say that this can all be captured by the following 
  
(11) ∃y y=t ≡ t=t 
 
The left-to-right direction of (11) is uncontroversial. The right-to-left direction of 
(11) is an instance of (9) above, which we capture with the following 
 




In a systematic account of the truth of simple sentences, subject-predicate sentences of the 
form Fa, there seem to be two options for accounting for when they are true and false, both of 
which return the same verdict on when they are true: 
 
Ockhamist Truth Conditions: Fa is true iff the referent of ‘a’ satisfies F. It is false 
otherwise. 
 
Strawsonian Truth Conditions: Fa is true iff the referent of ‘a’ satisfy F, it is false iff 
the referent of ‘a’ fails to satisfy F. It is truth-valueless otherwise. 
 
A positive free logic provides neither Ockhamist nor Strawsonian truth conditions. (Neither 
does the neglected alternative, although as its truth conditions are a disjunction of Ockhamist 
and Strawsonian truth conditions, it retains the feature of both of these approaches that simple 
sentences with empty names are never true). Both Ockhamist and Strawsonian truth 
conditions respect The Existence Principle. As we have seen, the no thought view of 
McDowell provides Strawsonian truth conditions. Negative free logics, on the other hand, 
provide Ockhamist truth conditions. 
 
The motivation for a negative free logic then, is that simple sentences containing empty 
names can express determinate thoughts, and, contra neutral free logic, the determinate 
thoughts are either true or false. But given that the world does not match the thought, the 
thought must be false. This is what is summed-up in the Ockhamist truth conditions above. 
 
Burge’s (1974) explication of a negative free logic, avoids the unwanted identities discussed 
above, but also allows for the straightforward substitution of different non-referring terms in 
simple sentences and other extensional, indeed other intensional, contents. Burge’s system, 
like any negative free logic, does not validate t=t, although it does validate ∀x x=x. As we 
have seen, although many instances of t=t have some intuitive appeal, systematic 
considerations support the view that these identity statements are in fact false, and so a 
negative free logic in fact delivers the correct result. And Evans himself assumes a negative 
free logic is the correct logic for dealing with empty names such as ‘Julius’. This will be the 
logic we shall assume if we want to allow for possibility of empty names.11 
                                                          
11 But see our discussion of the neglected alternative in Chapter 2. 
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2.4 Principles for Quantifiers 
Within a free logic, the introduction and elimination rules of classical logic cannot be 
maintained. In particular, no free logic can accept all three of the following: 
 
Identity Introduction: At any stage infer ∀x x=x 
Universal Instantiation: From ∀x Ax infer A(t/x) (where ‘A(t/x)’ is the 
formula which results from ‘Ax’ by replacing every occurrence of ‘x’ by 
‘t’). 
Existential Generalization: From A(t/x) infer ∃x Ax12 
 
Since together they yield the conclusion that for any empty name, ‘n’, there is something 
which is identical to n: 
 
(12) ∀x x=x  Identity Introduction 
(13) n=n   Universal Instantiation 
(14) ∃x n=x  Existential Generalization 
 
But (14) is precisely the conclusion the free logician rejects: the raison d’être of a free logic is 
to allow for the possibility that some (meaningful) names are not the names of anything. So 
the conjunction of these three classical rules cannot be maintained in a free logic. 
 
A free logician has no reason to abandon Identity Introduction, which says of everything, that 
it is identical to itself. Free logicians can, and should accept this, as the issue of empty names 
does not bear upon this obvious and necessary truth. Indeed, free logicians do accept Identity 
Introduction and instead question Universal Instantiation and Existential Generalization.13 
But how exactly should free logicians block the conclusion above; what should their attitudes 
be towards Universal Instantiation and Existential Generalization? Sainsbury says the 
following: 
                                                          
12 These rules are adapted from Sainsbury’s formulation of free logical quantifier rules (2005a: 65). We should 
note that in the case of Universal Instantiation, A(t/x) has to be the result of replacing every occurrence of ‘x’ by 
‘t’, otherwise we can move from ∀x x=x to ∀x x=a, which is false. This differs from Existential Generalization, 
where A(t/x) can be the result of replacing as many instances of ‘x’ by ‘t’ as one likes. 
13 Identity Introduction is sometimes given by the following alternative schema: at any stage infer t=t. As we 
have seen, negative and neutral free logicians have to reject this. But we see this alternative formulation as being 
derived from the interaction of Identity Introduction and Universal Instantiation as we have given them. And 




There is general agreement that providing a formal system suitable for 
representing a language containing empty referring expressions requires 
changes to the quantifier rules. One may instantiate only using a non-empty 
term, and one may generalize only with respect to a non-empty term. One 
could put this into effect by replacing the classical quantifier rules by the 
following: 
 
Universal Instantiation: From ∀x Ax and ∃x x=t infer A(t/x) (where 
‘A(t/x)’ is the formula which results from ‘Ax’ by replacing every 
occurrence of ‘x’ by ‘t’). 
 
Existential Generalization: From A(t/x) and ∃x x=t infer ∃x Ax 
 
Free logicians are united in accepting such quantifier rules (Sainsbury 
2005a: 65). 
 
We should first note that Sainsbury’s informal gloss differs from his formulation of Universal 
Instantiation and Existential Generalization. In his informal gloss he talks of limiting the rules 
to non-empty terms, whereas he explicitly restricts the rules by adding the requirement ∃x 
x=t. Perhaps these distinct conditions are necessarily co-extensive, but for all that has been 
said the possibility opens up of intensionally distinct formulations of free logical quantifier 
rules, one which adds the condition ‘t’ refers, and one which adds the condition ∃x x=t.14 
 
Universal Instantiation needs to be modified along the lines Sainsbury suggests. Negative and 
neutral free logicians reject that ‘n=n’ is true when ‘n’ fails to refer. Even positive free 
logicians, such as Lambert, who allow that ‘n=n’ is true when ‘n’ is empty have to reject 
Universal Instantiation. This is because ∀x ∃y x=y is a logical truth, from which classical 
Universal Instantiation allows us to infer the unwanted conclusion ∃y n=y. So Universal 
Instantiation must be rejected along the lines Sainsbury suggests. 
 
                                                          
14 Similarly, one might restrict the rules in terms of an existence predicate, E, allowing Universal Instantiation 
and Existential Generalization only when Et. But since we ought to accept that  (Et ≡ ∃x x=t), this formulation 
cannot come apart from Sainsbury’s official formulation. 
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But once we have rejected Universal Instantiation, we have addressed the route to the 
problematic conclusion, so is there any need for the free logician to reject the classical 
formulation of Existential Generalization? 
 
Positive free logicians clearly have to reject Existential Generalization along Sainsbury’s 
lines as they allow some simple sentences containing empty names to be true. For example, if 
with Lambert, the positive free logician accepts ‘n=n’ when ‘n’ is empty, then classical 
Existential Generalization allows us to derive our unwanted conclusion, ∃x n=x. 
 
Negative and neutral free logicians, however, have no problem maintaining classical 
Existential Generalization for simple sentences, as they admit no true simple sentences 
containing empty names.15 But negative and neutral free logicians cannot accept classical 
Existential Generalization in the face of truth-functional compounds containing empty names 
to be true. Consider the following sentence: 
 
(15) ~∃x x=a 
 
When ‘a’ is empty, (15) is true for the negative free logician, and it will be true for the neutral 
free logician, when ‘~’ is treated as a global or wide-scope negation operator (cf. Evans 1982: 
24). If, on the other hand, the neutral free logician is like Sainsbury’s Fregean free logician, 
maintaining that no compound sentence containing an empty name is either true or false, then 
he need not restrict existential generalization. If Existential Generalization is unrestricted, we 
can derive 
 
(16) ∃y ~∃x x=y 
 
which is necessarily false. As a result Existential Generalization must be restricted for all free 
logicians. And regardless of their particular differences, free logicians must in any case reject 
classical Existential Generalization since it is equivalent to classical Universal Instantiation. 
That is, Universal Instantiation represented by an axiom is ∀x Fx → Ft, which by 
contraposing and the definition of ‘∃x’ yields ~Ft → ∃x ~Fx, which is the corresponding 
axiom for existential generalization. 
                                                          




But it does not follow from these observations that the negative or neutral free logician need 
restrict Existential Generalization along the lines Sainsbury suggests. Indeed, as we have 
seen, Existential Generalization, classically construed, is valid for simple sentences in 
negative and neutral free logics. This suggests then, that instead of Sainsbury’s formulation 
of Existential Generalization, the negative or neutral free logician can restrict Existential 
Generalization to simple sentences to avoid the problems we have discussed so far. And 
indeed, this is the route taken by Evans (1982: 37) and Burge (1974: 312 – see his axiom 
A9).16 
 
Is there any reason to prefer the Burge-Evans’ version of Existential Generalization to 
Sainsbury’s, or vice versa? To employ Sainsbury’s version of free logical existential 
generalization, we need to know when we are licensed to the additional premise required for 
it, namely ∃x x=t. The obvious suggestion is that we can infer ∃x x=t from any simple 
sentence of the form Ft. So Sainsbury’s version of Existential Generalization in effect breaks 
down the Burge-Evans’ version into two steps for simple sentences. Moreover, Evans himself 
will want to add the rule that we can infer ∃x x=t from any simple sentence of the form Ft, so 
it might seem that Sainsbury’s version is more fundamental in some sense. But we can 
modify Evans’ rule and allow that from any simple sentence Ft we can infer both ∃x x=t and 
∃x Fx, noting that these are both existential generalizations, one saying that the general term 
is non-empty, as mandated by the Port Royal theory, the other saying the subject terms is 
non-empty, as mandated by classical logic. 
 
It might be objected that if we adopt the simple sentence restriction on Existential 
Generalization like Burge and Evans we lose something. For example, when a exists, we 
should be able to move from ~Fa to ∃x ~Fx, but given that ~Fa is not a simple sentence we 
cannot on employ this version of existential generalization to achieve this result. It is true that 
we cannot move via Existential Generalization from the premise here to the desired 
conclusion directly, but it does not follow that the adherent of the Burge-Evans’ formulation 
of Existential Generalization cannot account for the validity of the above inference. And in 
                                                          
16 Burge (1974: 312-313) formulates his negative free logic in terms of atomic predicates. But there is no need 
as a negative free logic can, and should, say that any simple sentence containing an empty name is false, even if 
the predicates are themselves complex. Similarly, he need not restrict existential generalization to simple 




fact no complex sentence of this type presents a problem. Any complex sentence will be of 
the form OFa, where ‘O’ represents a sequence of operators. When ‘a’ exists we ought to be 
able to conclude ∃x OFx. We can do so in the following way 
 
(17) OFa    Premise 
(18) ∃x x=a   Premise 
(19) ∀x ~OFx   Assumption 
(20) ~OFa   Universal Instantiation, (18), (19) 
(21) OFa & ~OFa  &I, (17), (20) 
(22) ~∀x ~OFx   ~I, (19), (21) 
(23) ∃x OFx   Interdefinability of quantifiers 
 
So I don’t think we lose anything if we adopt the Burge-Evans’ approach. 
 
But I do think we gain something. First, as noted above, we can derive the additional premise 
of ∃x x=t that Sainsbury needs in order to employ his version of Existential Generalization. 
Second, consider Quine’s famous example 
 
(24) Giorgione was so-called because of his size 
 
We cannot move from (24) to 
 
(25) ∃x x is so-called because of his size 
 
as the latter does not make any sense. But ∃x x=Giorgione, so we ought to be able to 
existentially generalize, if this is restricted in terms of existence. It might be objected that 
quantifier rules are not to be applied to natural language sentences which do not show their 
logical form. Once we have a sentence which displays (24)’s logical form, a candidate being 
 
(26) Barbarelli was called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size 
 




(27) ∃x x was called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size 
 
But part of the rationale for a free logic is to provide a logic of natural language sentences, 
and we cannot apply Sainsbury’s version of existential generalization to natural language 
sentences like (24). The reason why not is because ‘was so-called because of his size’ is not a 
predicate, so it seems that restricting existential generalization to simple sentences explains 
why we cannot existentially generalize into (24). 
 
Similarly, as Quine noted, we cannot substitute ‘Barbarelli’ salva veritate for ‘Giorgione’ in 
(24) as 
 
(28) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size 
 
is false. Does this observation threaten identity elimination, from Fa and a=b infer Fb, or 
Leibniz’s law which underpins it? No it does not, because replacing ‘Giorgione’ with 
‘Barbarelli’ in (24) is not an instance of identity elimination, since ‘was so-called because of 
his size’ is not a predicate, not an instance of F. Just as Williamson (1989: 98) observes that 
we should distinguish the physical act of substituting a name for a variable from the syntactic 
operation of predication, we should also distinguish the physical act of substituting a bound 
variable for a name from the operation of existential generalization.17 In any case, since we 
accept that (∃F Ft ≡ ∃x x=t) either version of existential generalization will do for neutral 
and negative free logicians. 
 
The negative free logical approach to existential generalization helps us to solve a problem 
raised by Wiggins (1995: 99-101). Wiggins notes that whereas 
 
(29) ~∃x x=Julius Caesar 
 
is contingently false, its existential generalization 
 
(30) ∃y ~∃x x=y 
                                                          
17 See Stalnaker (1977) and McCarthy and Phillips (2006) for more reasons to distinguish between complex 
formulas and complex predicates especially when dealing with existential claims. Stalnaker also provides 




is necessarily false. But a contingently false premise cannot validly take us to an impossible 
conclusion, as the argument schema (P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (◊P ⊃ ◊Q) is valid. Wiggins’ own solution is 
not to give up existential generalization in full generality, but to note that although Fa ⊃ ∃x 
Fx is valid, its necessitation (Fa ⊃ ∃x Fx) need not be, if formulas containing ‘a’ when 
empty have no truth value, Fa ⊃ ∃x Fx is only necessarily true on the presupposition that a 
exists. As Wiggins (1995: 101) says, “[a]ll that existential generalization has to preserve is 
truth, not modal status”. 
 
But this way out of the puzzle is not open to free logicians, since Fa is false when ‘a’ is 
empty, and so Fa ⊃ ∃x Fx true. Hence, for the free logician, unlike Wiggins, Fa ⊃ ∃x Fx is 
necessarily true. This then puts pressure on existential generalization. But, as Wiggins notes, 
if Fa is true then we can move to ∃x Fx and “[i]f this is all it amounts to, then the principle of 
existential generalization cannot be invalid” (Wiggins 1995: 100). I concur. Moreover, as I 
have argued above, this is what existential generalization does amount to. But we can square 
the circle for the negative free logician by noting, as before, that on the contingently false 
reading of (29), we do not have an instance of Fa. Existential generalization can be applied to 
simple sentences with complex predicates, but not to complex sentences such as (29). 
 
Wiggins considers a second problem concerning the classical rules for quantifiers. As noted 
above, from 
 
(31) ∀y ∃x x=y 
 
we can derive by universal instantiation 
 
(32) ∃x x=Julius Caesar. 
 
The problem emerges because (31) is a necessary truth, and since anything that follows from 
a necessary truth is itself necessary, that is, ( (P ⊃ Q)) ⊃ (P ⊃ Q), we can derive 
 




which is false. Similarly, as Rumfitt (2003: 480) notes, ∃y a=y is a theorem of classical logic, 
as we saw above when introducing this section, and so is necessarily true assuming classical 
logic and necessitation. But even those who think there are no empty names, should regard 
(∃y a=y) as false. As we have seen we can reach ∃y a=y from the uncontroversial identity 
introduction with universal instantiation and existential generalization, so at least one of these 
latter rules must go. In fact the two observations above also show that even those who eschew 
empty names should restrict both quantifier rules. That is, with classical universal 
instantiation, we can move from a necessary truth, ∀x ∃y x=y, to a contingent truth, ∃y a=y, 
and so classical universal instantiation cannot be valid. Similarly, we can move from a 
contingent falsehood, ~∃y a=y, to a necessary falsehood, ∃x~∃y x=y, with classical 
existential generalization, and so this rule also cannot be valid. 
 
Wiggins suggests that his solution to the problem with existential generalization above can be 
employed with respect to the problem with universal instantiation 
 
On the supposition of Caesar’s existence, we cannot go from a truth to a 
falsehood in passing from ‘everything is Φ’ to ‘Caesar is Φ’. But the ‘cannot’ 
here is Caesar-relative or presuppositive of Caesar. No simple necessity, no 
necessity for all worlds, is thereby shown to attach to the conditional ‘If 
everything is Φ, Caesar is Φ’ Wiggins (1995: 102). 
 
Wiggins’ proposal is equivalent to that of the negative free logicians, so even those who think 
that sentences containing a use of an empty name do not express thoughts have reason to 
restrict the quantifier rules in the way advocated by the negative free logician. But this is not 
to endorse a free logic: the truth value of simple sentences containing empty names is one 
thing, the correct quantifier rules are another. In any case, both the classical logician who 
wants to allow for the above seemingly contingent truths, and the free logician, must adopt 








3. Truth Theory 
If we are to provide a treatment of empty names then, we should adopt a negative free logic, 
and in any case we should adopt the quantifier rules such a logic embraces. But how else 
should we accommodate empty names in our theorizing? It is easy enough to treat them in a 
model theory as long we follow the lessons from Burge above (see Sainsbury 2005a Chapter 
2, §3 for an outline of this approach). That is, for intuitively non-referring terms, we assign to 
them no entity and not an entity from an outer domain which will generate unwanted 
identities. Moreover, the approach of assigning entities to empty names does not wear its 
ontological commitments on its sleeve. 
 
But what approach to meaning should a treatment of empty names take? Empty names cannot 
express Russellian propositions since there is no object to be a part of the proposition. Braun 
(1993) suggests that sentences containing empty names express gappy Russellian 
propositions, but it is really not clear what the metaphysics of Russellian propositions would 
have to be in order to allow them to have gaps. In any case, since the negative free logician 
accepts that simple sentences containing empty names are automatically false, regardless of 
the predicative material in the rest of the sentence, it is not clear that we want to distinguish, 
at the level of Russellian proposition, between such sentences since the predicative material 
plays no role in determining the truth value of such sentences. Simple sentences containing 
empty names purport to, but do not, describe a specific way the world is, and so they do not 
need to be treated differently at the level of reference. 
 
Of course, this does not mean that we should not distinguish between distinct sentences 
containing empty names at the level of understanding. One way of doing this is to follow 
Davidson’s (1967) lead by using a theory of truth to serve as a theory of meaning. McDowell 
(1977) drawing an analogy between Davidson and Frege, argues that names in an extensional 
fragment of a truth theory could be handled by axioms of the form 
 
(34) ‘n’ refers to n18 
 
So, for example, one such axiom would be 
 
                                                          




(35) ‘Hesperus’ refers to Hesperus 
 
But since Phosphorus is Hesperus, the following is also true 
 
(36) ‘Hesperus’ refers to Phosphorus 
 
Now although both state the reference of ‘Hesperus’, McDowell contends that only the first 
shows its sense. We can see this by noting that we can understand ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
without knowing that it is true. But of course if the axioms for ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ 
were not given homophonically but in terms only of Phosphorus or only in terms of 
Hesperus, this would not be possible. Similarly, utterances of ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
would often be pointless just as, often, ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is. 
 
We should note that such a picture of sense does not support McDowell’s contention that 
empty names cannot figure in thought expressing sentences. McDowell notes that empty 
names cannot “be handled in a theory of sense in the style I have considered so far” (1977: 
185). This is because an instance of (34) can only be true when ‘n’ refers and so cannot be 
used in an adequate treatment of empty names.  
 
Now although McDowell is correct that his axioms for proper names cannot account for 
meaningful empty names, it does not follow from this that there are no acceptable axioms for 
the treatment of empty names in a truth theory which can serve as a theory of sense. Indeed 
Evans (1982: 35-38) notes, when considering the type of approach McDowell is advocating, 
that although axioms like (34) cannot be used for empty names, axiom schemas such as  
 
(37) ∀x (‘n’ refers to x iff x = n) 
 
can be. And this is the suggestion advocated by both Burge (1974) and Sainsbury (2005a).19 
 
                                                          
19 Although Evans is not actually endorsing this approach, favouring an interpretational semantics, it is not clear 
that he is entitled to such schemas by his own lights. For Evans, sense is a mode of presentation of semantic 
value. But what axioms like (37) show, if anything, is a mode of presentation of a referent. But in the empty 
case, the semantic value of a term cannot be identified with the term’s referent and so schemas like (37) cannot 
show the term’s mode of presentation of its semantic value and hence cannot show the sense of any empty term 
for Evans. In any case, what we are concerned with here is understanding and truth conditions, not sense as a 
mode of presentation of semantic value. 
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Assuming a negative free logic, which we are in any treatment of empty names, ‘x=n’ is false 
when ‘n’ is empty, as is ‘‘n’ refers to x’, and so (37) is true, when ‘n’ is empty. So here we 
have a McDowell-style austere conception of sense which does give sense to empty names. 
 
Now although suggested by Evans for empty names only, (37) is extensionally adequate for 
all names. Instances of (37) are satisfied in the case of non-empty names since if n is non-
empty ‘n’ refers to n and all and only those things identical with it. Further, since  
 
(38) ‘Hesperus’ stands for Hesperus. 
 
is classically equivalent to 
 
(39) ∀x (‘Hesperus’ refers to x iff x = Hesperus). 
 
we can use (37) as an axiom schema for all names including any Russellian names in either a 
negative free logic or a classical logic (Sainsbury 2006: 2). 
 
So, if we want to allow for the possibility of empty names in this way, we must adopt axioms 
like (37). Moreover, we can employ axioms such as (37) even for non-empty names 
including any Russellian names. And so we have the option of adopting a uniform truth-
theoretic approach to names, rather than the disjunctive model that Evans considers in The 
Varieties of Reference, where non-Russellian names are handled by (37) and Russellian 
names are treated by (34). 
 
So here we can see that although McDowell (1977) was correct that an axiom like (34) could 
not be provided for empty names, a truth-theoretic semantics can nevertheless accommodate 
empty names, by employing axioms along the lines of (37). Moreover, such an approach 
maintains the advantages of McDowell’s approach whilst allowing for empty names. It, like 
McDowell’s approach, is an austere approach, as it does not analyze the meanings of the 
object language’s words, but rather reuses them in the metalanguage. And such an approach 




makes no concessions to descriptivism about proper names, even though 
it allows the possibility of a content without a referent. Accordingly, it 
pulls apart two ideas which risk being merged. In the first sentence of 
“De re senses,” McDowell sets up as a target a supposedly Fregean view 
according to which there is a kind of: 
 
content that determines the object by specification, or at least 
in such a way that the content is available to be thought or 
expressed whether the object exists or not. (McDowell 1984: 
283) 
 
The first disjunct expresses the familiar idea of descriptivism; the second 
disjunct expresses a view which might loosely be labelled object-
independent content. It is easy to see that the free logical approach is not 
descriptivist, and so is not the target of the first disjunct. The second 
disjunct is ambiguous between the claim that there are contents which 
have their objects essentially, a claim [which can be] accepted by the 
negative free logician, and the claim that there are no singular contents 
lacking objects, a claim the negative free logician rejects. (2006: 3) 
 
So we can, like Burge (1974) and Sainsbury (2005), capture the semantics of names in a truth 
theory with a single axiom schema, and remain neutral over whether there are any Russellian 
names or whether there are any non-Russellian names. Such neutrality, does not extend to our 
choice of logic, however. Axioms along the lines of (37) can be embedded within classical 
logic or within a free logic, but if we want to allow for empty names, we must, as we have 
seen, reject classical logic in favour of a free logic, and in particular in favour of a negative 
free logic. 
 
If we accept (37) as opposed to (34), however, a problem emerges if we want to allow both 
for the possibility of empty names and of Russellian names. Sainsbury adopts (37) as he 
thinks that all names belong to a single semantic category (Sainsbury 2005a: vii). But we 
might want to contest this, even if we agree with Sainsbury that empty names have a sense. 
Although (34) and (37) are equivalent in classical logic, they are not equivalent in a negative 
free logic. (34) is strictly stronger than (37). But the relevant point to note is that, in a free 
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logic, however existential generalization is formulated, only (34) and not (37) licenses 
existential generalization. So it seems that (37) is not suitable for Russellian names. This is 
not a problem for anyone who thinks there are no Russellian names, but it is problematic for 
those who wish to remain neutral on this issue: a commitment to the meaningfulness of 
empty names does not commit one to treating empty and non-empty names alike. 
 
The solution, however, is obvious. Instead of adopting (37) across the board as recommended 
by Sainsbury, we return to the disjunctive model offered by Evans. That is, in virtue of their 
semantic differences, we treat Russellian and non-Russellian names differently. Russellian 
names are to treated by axioms like 
 
(40) ‘Hesperus’ refers to Hesperus20 
 
whereas non-Russellian names are to be treated by axioms such as 
 
(41) ∀x (‘Julius’ refers to x iff x=Julius)21 
 
As (40) is a simple sentence, (40) entails that Hesperus exists, whereas, since (41) is not a 
simple sentence, it does not entail the existence of Julius. And this is the desired result: our 
truth theory can give the required profile to both Russellian and non-Russellian names. But 
there is a residual problem. As Sainsbury (2005b) notes, axioms for both Russellian and non-
Russellian names can be used to derive homophonic truth theorems such as 
 
(42) ‘Hesperus is visible’ is true iff Hesperus is visible 
(43) ‘Julius is tall’ is true iff Julius is tall. 
 
                                                          
20 Alternatively, we could follow Sainsbury (2005b: 74) and use axioms of the form [Hesperus] ∀x (‘Hesperus’ 
refers to x iff x = Hesperus), for Russellian names. Such axioms are logically equivalent, both in classical and 
negative free logic, to Evans’ axioms such as (40). Perhaps Sainsbury’s formulation allows us to see more 
clearly the similarity and the difference between Russellian and non-Russellian names. 
21 Evans’ position is a little odd since although he wants to treat Russellian and non-Russellian names 
differently, he thinks of them belonging to a single semantic category (Evans 1982: 31). But then, as we have 
categorized Russellianism, he is not a Russellian. Rather, like Sainsbury, he accepts that there are names with 
object-dependent senses and names that lack such senses which belong to a single semantic category. We shall 
take it that the fact that he does want to treat descriptive and non-descriptive names with different axioms means 
that ultimately, he thinks that they do not belong to the same semantic category, on at least one, important, way 
of construing that. 
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But, in a negative free logic, neither theorem entails that the name they contain refers, given 
an appropriate formulation of existential generalization, since these theorems are not simple 
sentences. As a result “although the free logical framework does not impair the logical 
powers of axioms for Russellian names, it does impair the logical powers of the relevant 
theorems” (Sainsbury 2005b: 67). 
 
This is problematic, not because the truth theory does not allow us to derive the existence of 
Hesperus; it does in virtue of adopting axioms like (40). Rather the problem is that “we do 
not have the resources to generate a T-sentence which is true only if a name contained in it 
refers, so we cannot generate a T-sentence with a profile appropriate to a Russellian name” 
(Sainsbury 2005b: 69). That is, in a negative free logic, (42) will be true even if Hesperus 
does not exist. Moreover, from an utterance of ‘Hesperus is visible in the evening’ we cannot 
conclude that Hesperus exists even though ‘Hesperus’ is, by hypothesis, a Russellian name. 
As a result 
 
The existence assumption characteristic of a Russellian name does not surface 
in interpretation. If an utterance is interpreted as containing a name having 
wide scope, requiring it to have a bearer if the utterance is to be true, this does 
not reveal whether this is because the name is Russellian or because it is 
descriptive [or otherwise non-Russellian] but used with wide scope; if the 
latter is the case, the interpretation can be correct (and the T-theorem true) 
even if the name is empty. (Sainsbury 2005b: 70) 
 
So, the negative free logic, which is required if we are to allow empty names, makes the role 
in interpretation of Russellian names indistinguishable from non-Russellian names, including 
descriptive names, with wide scope. So if we wish to use a T-theory as a theory of 
interpretation, Russellian names and non-Russellian names cannot be accommodated by the 
T-theory as stated.22 
 
But this does not mean that we cannot accommodate both Russellian and non-Russellian 
names within a T-theory. First, we could abandon any interpretative aims, and simply treat a 
                                                          
22 So here Sainsbury seems to be going back on Sainsbury (2006: 2 my emphasis) when he claims that the 
equivalence between  (34) and (37) “ensures that a truth-theory with [(37)] instead of [(34)] will have just the 
same T-sentences, and thus be indistinguishable from the point of view of the project of interpretation”. 
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T-theory as providing a semantics and serving as a theory of sense. Second, we can keep the 
interpretative role of T-theories but amend the T-theory so that it provides suitable T-
sentences for Russellian names. And it is this that Sainsbury (2005b) does on behalf of those 
who want to allow for the possibility of empty names. 
 
Appropriate T-sentences for Russellian names would be of the form 
 
(44) [Hesperus] ‘Hesperus is visible’ is true iff Hesperus is visible 
 
But if we want to end up with T-sentences for Russellian names of the form of (44), then we 
must be careful in interpreting the compositional axiom for simple sentences. Evans’ 
formulation of this axiom is 
 
(45) If S is an atomic sentence in which the n-place concept expression R is combined 
with n singular terms t1, . . . tn, then S is true iff <the referent of t1 . . . the referent 
of tn> satisfies R. (Evans 1982: 49; cf. 1979: 184) 
 
If we are working with a univocal notion of reference, then (45) must hold for both 
Russellian and for non-Russellian names.23  But since (45) is governed by a negative free 
logic, the scope of the definite description ‘the referent of t1’ makes a semantic difference to 
the interpretation of (45). The wide-scope version of (45) 
 
(46) [the referent of t1] . . . [the referent of tn] If S is an atomic sentence in which the n-
place concept expression R is combined with n singular terms t1, . . . then S is true 
iff <the referent of t1 . . . the referent of tn> satisfies R. 
 
cannot be correct for empty names. So the definite descriptions in (45) must always take 
narrow scope. 
 
Given our axiom for Russellian names, the composition axiom (45) ensures that we can 
derive the required T-sentences only if we have some further rule such as 
 
                                                          
23 According to Evans, ‘Julius’ refers to its bearer, if any, ‘in exactly the same sense as that in which a 
Russellian name refers to its bearer’ (Evans 1982: 50). 
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(47) If ‘s is true iff p’ is a theorem, then so is ‘[n1 . . .nk] s is true iff p’, where n1 . . .nk 
are (the translations into the metalanguage of) names contained in ‘s’ which are 
given widest scope in their axioms. 
 
As Sainsbury notes, this rule 
 
ensures that only Russellian names allow interpreters to interpret on the 
pattern: [Hesperus] the speaker said that Hesperus was. . . ; or, more 
idiomatically: concerning Hesperus, the speaker said that it was . . . . 
Descriptive [and other non-Russellian] names would always take narrower 
scope than the T-sentential biconditional, and so would permit at most 
interpretations like: the speaker said that [Julius] Julius was . . . . (Sainsbury 
2005b: 76). 
 
So here we have a truth theory for a fragment of English that can do justice to Russellian 
names and also allows for empty names. This then seems to be a viable alternative to the no 
thought view. 
 
But perhaps there is there is a parallel problem in the case of empty names. As we have seen 
our axioms for Russellian names allow existential generalization and so entail ∃x x=n. Our 
axioms for non-Russellian names, on the hand, do not allow for existential generalization, 
and so there is no corresponding entailment. So far, so good. But it is plausible, perhaps, that 
non-descriptive empty names are necessarily empty. But our axiom for empty names does not 
reflect this, since although existential generalization is not permitted, nothing in our truth 
theory entails ~∃x x=n. But if we required that our treatment of Russellian names entails that 
they have a referent, why should we not also require that our treatment of empty non-
descriptive names entail that they lack a referent? 
 
There is, however, an asymmetry between referring and empty names. Someone who knows 
that a name is empty can only go in for what Evans calls a ‘conniving use’ of the term. These 
uses have been set aside by Sainsbury since something special is going on in such cases, and 
so they require a special treatment. So an axiom for a non-conniving use of an empty name 
cannot entail that there is no referent, since knowledge of this fact would prevent one from 
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using the name in a non-conniving fashion. And obviously the axiom for an empty term 
cannot entail that there is a referent. So we want an axiom that neither entails a referent nor 
entails the absence of a referent, and that is what the axiom schema (37) gives us. When we 
go in for a non-conniving use of an empty term, we are not-knowingly not using a referring 
term, and (37) reflects this. 
 
McDowell (2006) objects to Sainsbury’s (2005a, 2006) uniform treatment of empty and non-
empty names in a T-theory even once we prescind from the possibility of Russellian names in 
the following way 
 
[A] sentence containing “Neptune” is enabled, by its composition and the 
semantic properties of its parts, to express a thought that depends for its 
truth or falsity on how things stand with a certain object, the referent of 
the name it contains. It is true that the free logical framework allows us to 
say that the sentence containing “Vulcan” is enabled, by its composition 
and the semantic properties of its parts, to express a thought. But this 
supposed thought is not one that depends for its truth or falsity on how 
things stand with a certain object, the referent of the name it contains. 
There is no such object, and the thought that negative free logic allows us 
to say the sentence is fitted to express is simply determined as false by 
that fact, independently of the predicative material in the sentence that is 
supposed to express it. When we put things like this, the thought we are 
supposed to see as expressible by the sentence containing “Vulcan” 
seems to be of a strikingly different kind from the thought we can 
routinely see as expressible by the sentence containing “Neptune.” 
(McDowell 2006: 16) 
 
And McDowell is clearly correct. But what reason do we have to reflect this difference in a 
T-Theory? If McDowell is correct that Russellian and non-Russellian names form distinct 
semantic classes, then we can follow Sainsbury (2005b) as above and provide different 
treatments of these names in a T-Theory. But if all names form a uniform semantic class, then 
we need not amend Sainsbury’s original approach. Sainsbury can accept McDowell’s point 
above even if he thinks there are no Russellian names and adopt a uniform treatment of 
names in a T-Theory. As we noted above, thoughts containing empty names do not 
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correspond to a Russellian proposition. If he were so inclined, Sainsbury could appeal to this 
fact to show that there is all the difference in the world between Neptune thoughts and 
Vulcan thoughts. But note that on McDowell’s own view there is all the difference in the 
world between referring to and thinking about Mars and referring to and thinking about 
Venus. But this fact does not need to be reflected in a T-Theory by different styles of axioms 
for each object. McDowell wants to group the referring cases together in one category and the 
non-referring cases in another. Sainsbury wishes to group them together. It is simply not clear 
whether the referential cases mark a more fundamental kind for semantics as McDowell 
would have it, or that purportedly referential terms are the fundamental semantic kind as 
Sainsbury contends. On the present approach we accept the similarities and also the 
differences, and remain neutral on the issue. If there are only Russellian names, we shall treat 
them à la McDowell, if there are no Russellian names, we shall treat them a la Sainsbury 
(2005a), and if there are both we shall treat them a la Sainsbury (2005b). A truth theory then, 
can account for the meaning of all names, whatever the possibilities. 
 
But recognition of all this leads to a further complication. McDowell writes of Le Verrier’s 
non-conniving use of ‘Vulcan’ 
 
If he said (a French equivalent of) “Vulcan is at least 1,000 miles in 
diameter,” he surely meant to be expressing a thought that would be 
determined as true or false according to whether or not a certain object, the 
referent he took his name to have, was at least 1,000 miles in diameter. It 
would not have cohered with his conception of the risks he was running to 
say what Sainsbury would have us say, that even though he turned out to be 
wrong about the existence of a referent for the name, he was anyway 
expressing a thought, one determined as false just by the name’s lack of a 
referent. The only possibility of falsity his thought-expressing intentions 
would have required him to envisage, for the thought he took himself to be 
expressing, was a possibility of its turning out, concerning the referent of the 
name he used, that it was not at least 1,000 miles in diameter. It is quite 
implausible that his intentions, in so far as they related to expressing a 
thought at all, whether a true one or a false one, were such as to be satisfied 
by his having turned out to have satisfied the condition for expressing a false 
thought that Sainsbury bases on the possibility of free logical truth-theory. 
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Leverrier intended to be running the kind of risk of falsity that is a 
concomitant of aiming to speak the truth – not a risk of a kind of falsity that 
would belong with there never having been any chance of speaking the truth 
by uttering the words one utters (McDowell 2006: 17-18). 
 
And it seems that, at least up to a point, Sainsbury agrees 
 
The essential role of a referring expression is given by the fact that, normally, 
in using it in a simple sentence a speaker represents himself as aiming to 
introduce an object (or objects—I will bracket the plural case) for the rest of 
the sentence to say something about. If a speaker is sincere, this means that in 
normal circumstances (not storytelling, negative existential sentences, etc.) 
she should believe that any referring expression she uses has a referent, and 
should intend that how things are with this object be what matters to truth, 
actual and counterfactual (and with respect to other times). A semantic theory 
should represent the meanings of expressions in line with the way speakers 
standardly and literally use them to represent how things are, and so should 
represent a (unary) simple sentence as requiring for its truth the introduction 
of a referent, and for the truth or falsity of the sentence, with respect to any 
possible situation, to turn on how things are with this referent. This is what is 
reflected by Evans’s principle [(45)], and this is why referring expressions are 
modally rigid (Sainsbury 2005a: 81). 
 
But we can agree with McDowell that Le Verrier took himself to be expressing an object-
dependent thought, but note that he was wrong. McDowell must admit that Le Verrier was 
mistaken in this way, since there is no object-involving thought to be had in this case. So 
whatever Le Verrier thought he was up to, he was radically mistaken. McDowell’s 
observation has no force against Sainsbury’s uniform approach since both of them concede 
Le Verrier was mistaken. The difference is only that McDowell thinks that no thought was 
entertained, whereas Sainsbury thinks that no object-dependent thought was entertained.  
 
McDowell mounts a distinct objection along similar lines. He notes that if we allow empty 




we are envisaging a kind of sense that needs to be understood in terms of the 
idea of an expression’s purporting to have a sense of the kind “Neptune” 
turned out to have and “Vulcan” turned out not to have. This is not the kind of 
sense Sainsbury’s free logical approach credits to “Vulcan.” (McDowell 
2006: 18) 
 
But it is simply not clear that this is correct. It is plausible that the axiom schema (37) is a 
cashing-out of the idea that ‘n’ purports to refer to n: it says that it refers to all and only the 
objects that are n, but does not, as it cannot, commit to there being an n. So McDowell has 




We have argued that it does not follow from the acceptance of object-dependent senses that 
sentences containing empty names fail to express thoughts. But on the other hand it is not 
clear that sentences containing such names do express thoughts. It is admitted on all sides that 
what is going on in the empty case is radically different from what is going on in the non-
empty case. Whether this robs empty names of the ability to contribute to thought-expressing 
sentences, we did not decide. If we do offer a treatment of empty names, then it is not clear 
whether we should treat them in the same semantic category as referring terms or treat them 
separately. But in either case, we have argued that there is an acceptable truth-theoretic 
approach. 
 
As we have argued, both the classical logician and the free logician must restrict their 
quantifier rules as outlined above. And until we can settle whether empty names do 
contribute to thoughts, a negative free logic seems like the most neutral approach. Those who 
prefer the unrestricted rules do not lose anything since the two sets of quantifier rules are 
equivalent in classical logic. On the other hand, if we ought to give a treatment of sentences 
containing empty names, then we gain something if we restrict our quantifier rules as we 
avoid invalidities. 
 
More generally we can see the disagreement between neutral free logicians, negative free 
logicians and classical logicians takes place against a background of agreement. All endorse 
The Existence Principle which we have here taken as a constraint on theorizing. Indeed, the 
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three logics cluster around three further choice points each accepting two claims whilst 
rejecting the third: classical and neutral free logic agree that sentences containing empty 
names are neither true nor false; classical and negative free logic agree that all thoughts are 
either true or false; neutral and negative free logic agree that simple sentences containing 
empty names express thoughts. 
 
What all this shows is that all three logics agree on what to say about referring cases, and 
although they disagree on how to characterize the empty case, they agree that however it is 
characterized, the treatment of such cases is radically different from what goes on in the 
referring case. This is easily seen in the case of classical and neutral free logic, but is true 
even in a negative free logic, where simple sentences containing empty names are false 
simply in virtue of the fact that they contain an empty name, and are not sensitive to the 
predicative material. 
 
So whichever logic we decide on, in one sense at least, not that much turns on our choice. In 
the next chapter we shall argue, however, that there is a reason for preferring a negative free 
logic, and this reason is still operative even if we want to single out singular negative 




Chapter 2: Singular Negative Existentials 
 
The problem of singular negative existentials can be illustrated by considering one reason for 
being sceptical of the idea of nonexistent objects: 
 
One of the reasons why there are doubts about the concept of a nonexistent 
object is this: to be able to truly claim of an object that it doesn't exist, it 
seems that one has to presuppose that it exists, for doesn't a thing have to 
exist if we are to make a true claim about it? Reicher 2010 (my emphasis). 
 
So it seems as if true negative existential statements are impossible, since we need to 
presuppose the existence of an object, so that we can truly say of it that it does not exist. That 
is, an apparently true negative existential such as 
 
(1) Vulcan does not exist 
 
seems to be claiming of an object, Vulcan, that it does not exist. In particular, (1) appears to 
be a subject-predicate sentence, or what Sainsbury (2005a: 66n9) calls a simple sentence, a 
sentence consisting of an n-place predicate concatenated with n referring expressions. In (1), 
the singular term ‘Vulcan’ appears to pick out an object, and the rest of the sentence, ‘_ does 
not exist’, appears to predicate a complex property, nonexistence (λx. x does not exist), of 
that object.24 
 
But such a prime facie appealing semantic treatment of singular negative existentials is 
inconsistent with two other intuitively compelling claims, namely (i) that some such 
sentences are true, and (ii) that existence is prior to predication, the thought that is captured 
by 
 
The Existence Principle: For all t and for all F, Ft only if ∃x x=t  
 
                                                          
24 Again we are not dealing with Sainsbury’s (2005b 67n2) notion of a simple sentence which is framed in terms 
of non-complex predicates. As noted, to the extent that (1) looks like a subject-predicate sentence, it looks like it 
predicates a complex property of its subject. 
45 
 
The Existence Principle requires that any true subject-predicate sentence has a subject term 
which picks out an existent object. So by The Existence Principle, if true singular negative 
existentials are of subject-predicate form, their subject term must pick out an existent object. 
But this requirement contradicts the claim that the singular negative existential appears to be 
making. So here we have an inconsistent triad: (i) existence is prior to predication, (ii) there 
are true singular negative existentials, and (iii) singular negative existentials are of subject-
predicate form. This is one version of the problem of negative existentials. But there is 
another, more general version of the problem. 
 
Regardless of whether (1) is of subject-predicate form, it appears to use what appears to be a 
singular term, ‘Vulcan’. In virtue of this fact, (1) seems to be making a claim about an object, 
namely Vulcan. But if the statement is to be true, then this object does not exist, and so the 
truth of (1) seems to commit us to Meinongianism, the view that some objects do not exist. 
This, more general version of the problem, seems to show that singular negative existential 
claims provide a straightforward counterexample to the Russellian view of names we 
considered in Chapter 1. That is, singular negative existentials present us with a further 
inconsistent triad: (i) everything exists (the denial of Meinongianism), (ii) there are true 
singular negative existentials, and (iii) any true negative existential (of the type we are 
concerned with, that is, involving non-descriptive names) would have to involve the use of a 
Russellian name. By (iii), a true singular negative existential requires an object to be picked 
out by the singular term; by (i) this object exists, but by (ii) this object does not exist. 
 
So here we have two inconsistent triads which show that either we must admit nonexistent 
objects and deny The Existence Principle, or else deny that there are any true singular 
negative existentials, or else deny both that such statements are of subject-predicate form and 
that they use Russellian names. I shall argue for a particular version of the final response. But 
before doing so, let us set aside two responses to the problem. 
 
The Meinongian approach to singular negative existentials is to say that such sentences are of 
subject-predicate form, and that such sentences may be true, and that when they are true, they 
are true in virtue of the singular term picking out a nonexistent object.  In doing so, 
Meinongian approaches can maintain semantic appearances with respect to singular negative 
existentials, as they not only allow that singular negative existentials are of subject-predicate 
form, but also that the singular term refers to an object which the rest of the sentence says 
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something about. So, in that sense, Meinongian approaches are perhaps the least revisionary 
accounts of singular negative existentials, although this is not to say that Meinongian theories 
are, as a whole, less semantically revisionary than non-Meinongian accounts. But the 
metaphysics of such accounts are independently problematic and Meinongianism violates 
The Existence Principle – the denial of Meinong’s Independence Principle – which we have 
taken as a constraint in our thinking about singular thought. So Meinongian accounts are to 
be rejected. 
 
Also to be rejected are non-Meinongian accounts which reject The Existence Principle. Such 
approaches agree with the Meinongian that singular negative existentials are of subject-
predicate form, and that such sentences are true, but deny that the truth of these sentences 
involve reference to an object, and so reject the Russellian view of names. Insofar as they 
avoid the problematic metaphysics of Meinongianism, such accounts are to be preferred. But 
such accounts employ a positive free logic, which, as we saw in Chapter 1, leads to 
problematic unwanted identities. And as has just been noted, such views deny that existence 
is prior to predication. We have already argued (Chapter 1) that if we are to employ a free 
logic, we should favour a negative free logic.  
 
So, in different ways, Meinongians and positive free logicians reject The Existence Principle. 
Meinongians reject it by saying that there are nonexistent objects. Positive free logicians say 
that there are no nonexistent objects, but that genuinely empty terms can feature in true 
subject-predicate sentences. Neither view is countenanced here as we are taking The 
Existence Principle as a constraint. If only an approach to singular negative existentials which 
denied The Existence Principle were tenable, then we would have to reconsider our stance, 
but as I shall argue below, no such expedient is required. 
 
So, we are left with the following options (i) maintain that singular negative existentials are 
of subject-predicate form, but deny that there are any true negative existentials, (ii) deny that 
singular negative existentials are simple sentences, accept that all names are Russellian, but 
deny that negative existentials involves the use of Russellian names, or (iii) deny that singular 
negative existentials are of subject-predicate form and that all names are Russellian. This 
final option is the strategy to be advocated here, but first let us look at what can be said in 





1. Russellian Approaches 
The first remaining approach to singular negative existentials is to deny their truth. Such a 
proposal lacks appeal, although we might be led to it, by theoretical considerations.25 In 
particular, one might deny the truth of singular negative existential statements if one were 
convinced that there are no non-Russellian names. If there are no non-Russellian names, then 
any sentence purporting to express a true singular negative existential statement of the type 
we are interested in will either (i) use a name which refers, and so will be false, or (ii) will 
use a mock name which fails to refer, and hence the sentence will fail to express a 
proposition, and so will not be true, or (iii) will neither use a name or a mock name. The 
Russellian then must either deny that there are any true singular negative existentials, or else 
deny that such sentences use what appear to be names. 
 
So the Russellian must either explain why we take singular negative existentials to be true, 
when they are not, or else provide some account of the truth conditions of singular negative 
existentials that does not involve the use of a (mock) name. 
 
There are two broad strategies that Russellians have adopted, either as an account of the truth 
conditions of singular negative existentials, or as explanations of why we take some singular 
negative existentials to be true when they are not, and when, moreover, they fail to express 
any proposition whatsoever. These ways correspond to the two ways in which the Russellian 
can deny that singular negative existentials involve the use of a (mock) name: they can either 
claim that singular negative existentials do not involve a (mock) name or else they can admit 
that they do, but that the name is not used. In closing, we shall consider a third Russellian 
strategy, one that addresses head-on the incompatibility of Russellianism and the truth of 







                                                          
25 We shall consider another reason in Chapter 6, namely that we are realists about the putative non-existents. 
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1.1 Descriptivism  
First, the Russellian may claim that what appear to be names are in fact disguised definite 
descriptions. The Russellian may think that all ordinary proper names are in fact disguised 
descriptions, or else he may think that it is only in the context of (negative) existential 
statements that names are really descriptions. Our Russellian about names allows, contra 
Strawson (1950), that definite descriptions which lack a denotation may nevertheless 
contribute to the expression of thoughts which are true or false.26 
 
For Russell, a sentence containing a definite descriptions such as ‘the first woman on the 
moon was Pakistani’ has the following truth conditions: 
 
(2) ∃x Wx & ∀y Wy ⊃ x=y & Bx. 
 
The falsity of (2) is shown by the truth of its wide scope negation not the negation of its final 
conjunct. Similarly, where a name ‘n’ is an abbreviation of the definite description ‘the F’, 
the truth conditions of ‘n does not exist’ are given by 
 
(3) ~∃x Fx & ∀y Fy ⊃ x=y & Ex.27 
 
In terms of truth conditional adequacy, we can drop the last clause, given our non-
Meinongianism, and if, like Russell himself, we think that ‘exists’ is a second-level concept, 
then ‘exists’ is not to be represented by the predicate letter ‘E’. 
 
Descriptivism, at least in its qualitative forms, is rejected without argument here, for broadly 
Kripkean reasons (Kripke 1980).28 Those same reasons tell against admitting that singular 
negative existentials fail to express a proposition, but that the feeling of falsity is given by the 
falsity of the associated proposition employing the relevant qualitative definite description. In 
any case, we should note that employing descriptivism just in the case of existential 
statements seems like an ad hoc manoeuvre by the Russellian to save their claim about proper 
                                                          
26 This is not commitment of Russellianism per se, but it is the position of, for example, Russell (1905), Evans 
(1982: Chapter2), and Wiggins (1995). 
27  Given that (3) is consistent with the existence of a non-unique F, presumably uniqueness will have to be built 
in to the predicate itself for (3) to capture what we are after when we use a singular negative existential. 
28 Non-qualitative forms of descriptivism won’t help the pure Russellian, since they shall depend, for him, on 
employing terms with object dependent senses, and so the problem reappears elsewhere. 
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names. This appearance can be mitigated, somewhat, by the realization that there is 
something special about singular negative existentials, at least for the Russellian, but 
nevertheless, this isolated descriptivism is not independently motivated.29 
 
 
1.2 The Metalinguistic Approach 
The second pure Russellian response admits that singular negative existentials involve mock 
names, but that these names are mentioned rather than used.30 As noted above the 
Meinongian is, in some ways, semantically conservative. But that such accounts are perhaps 
not as faithful to our semantic intuitions as they might at first appear, even in the case of 
singular negative existentials, can be seen by noticing that we ordinarily think that there is a 
tight connection between singular negative existentials and failures of reference. As Evans 
notes, in singular negative existential statements “empty singular terms are apparently used to 
register the fact that they are empty” (1982: 343). This then suggests that the Russellian 
employ a metalinguistic treatment of (true) singular negative existentials. 
 
Donnellan (1974) advocates one such metalinguistic approach:  
 
When the historical explanation of the use of a name (with the intention to 
refer) ends in this way with events that preclude any referent being 
identified, I will call it a "block" in the history (Donnellan 1974: 23). 
 
If N is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements with the 
intention to refer to some individual, then 'N does not exist' is true if and 
only if the history of those uses ends in a block (Donnellan 1974: 25) 
 
                                                          
29 A similar approach takes existential statements to be claiming that a certain concept is instantiated and 
singular negative existentials as denying this instantiation claim. But if the concept is purely qualitative, then 
this approach has the defects of qualitative descriptivism. The best version of this approach utilises individual 
concepts, but again, for the Russellian, if a name is meaningless, so will be the corresponding individual concept 
expression and so the pure Russellian cannot avail himself of this strategy to account for true singular negative 
existentials. We discuss this approach, in a broadly Russellian setting when considering Wiggins’ approach to 
singular negative existentials below. 
30 An alternative Russellian strategy is sketched by Kripke (1974). As we shall see when we discuss Evans’ 
account of singular negative existentials, either Kripke’s account does not use a singular term, and so is subject 
to the criticisms levied at Donnellan’s account, or does use a singular term and so is unsatisfactory for the 
reasons Evans gives and which should by now be apparent. 
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Perhaps, suitably cleaned-up, Donnellan’s proposal does provide extensionally correct truth 
conditions for singular negative existential statement, but nonetheless this account is not 
satisfactory. 
 
As Evans points out, in singular negative existential statements, just as in cases of successful 
reference, there is a big difference between grasping what is said by a negative existential 
statement and understanding the metalinguistic truth conditions:  
 
I take it to be obvious that in [the case of singular negative existentials] the 
singular term is used (albeit connivingly) and is not merely mentioned. 
That is to say that no less of a gap exists in these cases, between grasping 
any proposition about the term (as uttered on that occasion) and grasping 
what is said, than in the case of a normal use of a singular term. This 
means that we cannot contemplate the kind of metalinguistic analyses of 
singular existential statements which have been so popular among those 
who subscribe to the Russellian status of singular terms. ... If a speaker 
says something like ‘That woman does not (really) exist’, in the context of 
a shared perceptual illusion, a remembered film, or a story, he surely 
cannot simply be represented as saying something like ‘This use of the 
demonstrative “That woman” does not refer’; no one who merely grasped 
that could be said to have understood what the speaker said. Understanding 
these uses of singular terms requires something of the same general kind as 
is required to understand ordinary information-invoking uses of singular 
terms (Evans 1982: 344) 
 
I agree with Evans (1982: 344-345, 349), Kripke (1974) and Dummett (1983: 297) that a 
metalinguistic solution to the problem of negative existentials is implausible. 
 
Now Donnellan explicitly says that his truth conditions are not to be thought of as an analysis 
of singular negative existentials, so that he is not claiming that what we grasp when we grasp 
a singular negative existential is the metalinguistic truth condition. So it might be thought that 
Evans’ objection is unfair to Donnellan. But noticing this does not help Donnellan avoid the 





Despite not offering an analysis in metalinguistic terms, Donnellan (1974: 27) admits that on 
his account a name has a different function in singular negative existential statement than it 
does in an ordinary predicative statement, and by this, I take it, he means it is mentioned and 
not used.31 
 
Further, by not providing an analysis, Donnellan admits that he is not saying what negative 
existential statements mean or what proposition they express (1974: 25). But the suspicion is 
that there is no Russellian proposition or no proposition involving an object-dependent sense 
that it could be unless it involved the word ‘a’ or the sense of the word ‘a’. So by not 
providing an analysis, Donnellan makes it completely mysterious what proposition could be 
expressed by a singular negative existential statement. And elsewhere he takes this to 
undermine the claim that empty names can be used to express propositions: 
 
But a true negative existence statement expressed by using a name 
involves a name with no referent and the corresponding positive existence 
statement, if false, will also. But in other contexts, when a name is used 
and there is a failure of reference, then no proposition has been expressed-
certainly no true proposition. If a child says, "Santa Claus will come 
tonight," he cannot have spoken the truth, although, for various reasons, I 
think it better to say that he has not even expressed a proposition. 
 
Given that this is a statement about reality and that proper names have no 
descriptive content, then how are we to represent the proposition 
expressed? (Donnellan 1974: 20-21 and 21 n15). 
 





                                                          
31 One might think that we could refute Donnellan here by appeal to a sentence with a single occurrence of a 
name which had an ordinary predicative element and a negative existential element. But as we shall see in 
Chapter 5, singular terms can be both mentioned and used simultaneously. 
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1.3 Doing without Truth 
Given the failure of these two strategies, then, we must, in the absence of any other 
explanation for why we take singular negative existentials to be false when they express no 
thought, abandon Russellianism about proper names in its full generality. Russellians claim 
that no proposition is expressed by someone using a mock name, or what we ordinarily call 
an empty name. So sentences such as ‘Vulcan is a planet’ are neither true nor false. But the 
Russellian is not, and should not be, committed to the claim that utterances of ‘Vulcan is a 
planet’ are unintelligible. As McDowell puts it 
 
Of course when we say that Le Verrier falsely took “Vulcan” to have a 
sense of a referent-dependent kind, we are not saying that non-conniving 
uses of “Vulcan” by Le Verrier and his interlocutors were blankly 
unintelligible – as if they were on a par with gibberish. It is perfectly 
clear what was going on in such talk. In seriously uttering sentences such 
as (a French equivalent of) “Vulcan is at least 1,000 miles in diameter,” 
Le Verrier was making as if to be using a name with a sense of the kind 
“Neptune” in fact turned out to have. His performances, moreover, had 
just the sort of background in astronomical facts, and plausible 
hypotheses about how to account for them, that his uses of the name 
“Neptune” had before the hypothesis about the perturbations of Uranus 
was confirmed – apart from the fact that in the case of “Vulcan” the 
corresponding hypothesis, about the perturbations of Mercury, was going 
to be disconfirmed (McDowell 2006: 18). 
 
Now if the Russellian cannot give the same type of account for singular negative existentials, 
then there is pressure on him to recognize the truth of them, given that they cannot be 
explained away as above. Now it is clear that someone who uses an empty name to sincerely 
utter a singular negative existential cannot simply be making as if to be using a name with an 
object dependent sense, since, if he is sincere, he will not think the name has an object-
dependent sense. But what he can do is initially make as if to be using a name with an object-
dependent sense, and then to reveal that the term lacks such a sense and lacks a referent. 
Indeed, this is akin to what Wiggins (1995) claims is going on in utterances of singular 
negative existentials, even though Wiggins himself thinks that there are true singular negative 
existentials. But here we can see that the Russellian can explain what is going on without 
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invoking either truth or a Russellian proposition. So it is not clear, working within a 
Russellian perspective, what is generating the pressure for the Russellian to accept the truth 
of singular negative existentials. The (pure) Russellian cannot state how the world is by using 
a singular negative existential, but this does not prevent him showing how the world is. 
 
Nevertheless, we all have the strong impression that some singular negative existentials are 
true and so, we are committed to the minimal claim there are empty names that can contribute 
to the expression of thoughts in the context of negative existentials. The extent to which we 
must abandon Russellianism is, however, not settled by this observation. Perhaps empty 
names can only contribute to the expression of (negative) existential thoughts; perhaps non-
Russellian names can be used only in certain contexts; perhaps, all names which do in fact 
refer, are Russellian, and form a distinct semantic class from any non-Russellian names. 
These questions are, at this stage, left open, so we can still distinguish between non-
Russellian and broadly Russellian accounts in what follows. 
 
 
2. Abandoning Full-Blown Russellianism 
As we have seen, accepting both The Existence Principle, and the apparent truism that there 
are true singular negative existentials, requires us to deny that singular negative existentials 
are of subject-predicate form. Although, singular negative existentials appear to predicate a 
complex property, (λx. x does not exist), of an object, there is the possibility that what they 
are doing instead is denying a predicative claim. That is, rather than ‘not’ being a predicate 
modifier in such sentences, taking the predicate ‘exists’ and forming a new predicate ‘does 
not exist’, ‘not’ is a sentential operator. So instead of the logical form of singular negative 
existentials being given by 
 
(4) (λx. x does not exist) <a> 
 
they are instead given by 
 
(5) ~[(λx. x exists) <a>] 
 




More generally, we can parse many complex sentences of the form ‘a is OF’ in two ways. 
First we can treat ‘O’ as a predicate modifier, so that the logical form is given by 
 
(6) (λx. OFx) <a> 
 
where ‘OF’ is a complex predicate. Or we can treat ‘O’ as a sentential operator so that the 
logical form is given by 
 
(7) O[(λx. Fx) <a>] 
 
These syntactic variations are, in many cases, semantically equivalent in the sense that 
necessarily one is true iff the other is. But when we are dealing with questions of empty 
names and nonexistence, we must take care which form we choose. Given The Existence 
Principle, when a does not exist, we cannot formulate a true claim in the style of (6), but only 
in the style of (7). Moreover, if we accept (something like) a negative free logic, then claims 
of the form of (7) are often true. 
 
Nor are such questions of form only semantically relevant to questions of existence. As 
Forbes puts it 
 
In first-order logic, logical connectives are restricted to connecting sentences 
(open or closed). But in natural language, they can connect expressions of 
various categories. Thus, in ‘Tom sleeps and snores’, ‘and’ appears to 
connect two intransitive verbs. One option is to deny appearances and treat 
‘Tom sleeps and snores’ as the result of some kind of transformation of ‘Tom 
sleeps and Tom snores’, but it is not easy to state this transformation in 
general form (try replacing ‘Tom’ with ‘some cat’). An alternative is to 
include in [our language] not merely the connective ‘and’ [which is a function 
from truth values to a function from truth values to truths values, that is of 
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type <t,<t,t>>], but an ‘and’ for each case where we want to allow direct non-
sentential conjunction. (Forbes 2006: 27-28).32 
 
That is, although (8) and (9) are equivalent, (10) and (11) are not: 
 
(8) (λx.sleeps and snores) <Tom> 
(9) (λx.sleeps) <Tom> and (λx.snores) <Tom> 
 
(10) (λF. ∃x Cat (x) and F(x)) <λx.sleeps and snores>  
(11) [(λF. ∃x Cat (x) and F(x)) <λx.sleeps>] and  [(λG.∃x Cat (x) and G(x)) <λx.snores>] 
 
Nor need the phenomenon be limited to predicates. If we want to distinguish the collective 
and distributive readings of ‘Tom and Jerry got married’, then one obvious way to go, is to 
distinguish between ‘and’ the sentential connective and ‘and’ which forms a complex, plural 
referring term from two names. 
 
So the approach to singular negative existentials to be explored and recommended here does 
not require the ad hoc postulation of a distinction, but rather reflects the syntactic 
complexities of natural languages that often, but not always, leave no semantic trace. 
Moreover, given that such ambiguities are often semantically irrelevant and, as Forbes (2006: 
27) says, ‘systematic’, it is not surprising that we fail to distinguish the available readings, 
thinking that true singular negative existentials are of the form of (6) rather than the form of 
(7) (also see note 32 above, and Chapter 5). So the approach here is also plausible as well as 
motivated by independent syntactic and semantic considerations. 
 
We also noted above that The Existence Principle and the admission that there are true 
singular negative existentials involving names entails that the names in such sentences are not 
Russellian, if used. And on the approach sketched above, the names are indeed used, and so 
cannot be Russellian. That is, since we are taking for granted that ‘exists’ is a predicate true 
of everything,33 these approaches must allow for the intelligibility of empty names. Such 
                                                          
32 Forbes (2006: 28) continues “... Effectively, then, we regard the English ‘and’ as systematically ambiguous, 
shifting its type according to its context of utterance”. This is, in effect, the response to those such as Wiggins 
(1999) who claim that since ‘exists’ is a second-level predicate in ‘cows exist’ it must also be a second-level 
predicate in ‘Neptune exists’. 
33 Or the second-level equivalent. 
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accounts cohere with a non-Russellian view of names such as those advocated by Burge and 
Sainsbury. But such an approach can also be taken by those who allow that as well as 
Russellian names, there are also non-Russellian names. These latter approaches can maintain 
the Russellian paradigm as an ideal by allowing that such non-Russellian names imitate 
Russellian names and can only be used to express thoughts in special contexts. Moreover, 
although as I shall argue such approaches must abandon classical logic in order to account for 
the truth of singular negative existentials, such considerations alone do not force them to 
endorse a negative free logic. Nevertheless, I shall argue that any plausible account of 
singular negative existentials must both deny Russellianism in its full generality and embrace 




Given that non-Russellians allow for meaningful empty names, the non-Russellian can allow 
that sentences containing empty names, including negative existentials such as 
 
(1) Vulcan does not exist 
 
are meaningful. Moreover, if our non-Russellianism is combined with a negative free logic, 
as recommended in Chapter 1, then the treatment of negative existentials is relatively 
unproblematic. Sainsbury claims that a negative free logic 
 
Offers a dazzlingly straightforward account of how there can be negative 
existential truths. Like any simple sentence with a non-referring 
expression, ‘Vulcan exists’ is false. What is said by ‘Vulcan does not 
exist’ is the denial of this falsehood, and so is true. This account is much 
more simple and straightforward than any rival, and I am not aware of 
any serious problems with it. (Sainsbury 2005a: 195) 
 
Given his three assumptions, Sainsbury’s claim can be substantiated. That is, if ‘Vulcan’ is an 
empty name, and ‘exists’ is a first level predicate, then 
 




is a simple sentence, which, given our Ockhamist truth conditions, is false. So if (1) is the 
negation of (12), so that we might more perspicuously represent it as 
 
(13) ~[(λx. exists x) <Vulcan>] 
 
then, (12) is true, which is the result Sainsbury claimed, and the one that we want to secure. 
 
On the other hand, if the ‘not’ in (12) is not sentential negation, but rather a predicate 
modifier, so that (12) is more perspicuously represented as 
 
(14) (λx. does not exist x) <Vulcan> 
 
then, as a simple, albeit one with a complex predicate, sentence with an empty name, (12) is 
false given our negative free logic, which is not the result we were looking for. So this 
account of singular negative existentials is at least committed to there being a reading of (12) 
where ‘not’ plays the role of a sentential operator. 
 
Note that this issue, as will be apparent, is not restricted to questions about existence. If we 
want to say that there is a true reading of ‘Sherlock Holmes is not (really) a detective’, or ‘it 
is not the case that Sherlock Holmes is (really) a detective’, where ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is an 
empty name, then ‘not’ has to be sentential negation. If ‘not’ is here construed as a predicate 
modifier, so that what we have is a simple sentence, then this is automatically false in a 
negative free logic.34 
 
Sainsbury couches his account in terms of a first order existence predicate, but this is not 
essential to a negative free logical account of singular negative existentials. If, instead, we 
treat ‘exists’ as a second-level predicate, so that (1) is not a simple sentence, but rather has 
the form 
 
(15)  (λF.∃x Fx) <λy. y=Vulcan> 
 
                                                          
34 I am not (yet) committing to there being such a true reading. But here we are, for the moment, assuming that 
some names are non-Russellian, so that empty names can contribute to the expression of thoughts. 
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Then we can still provide a straightforward account of the truth of (12), since it will be 
formalized as either 
 
(16) ~[(λF. ∃x Fx) <λy. y=Vulcan>] 
 
which says that it is not the case that the concept being Vulcan is instantiated, or 
 
(17) (λF.~∃x Fx) <λy. y=Vulcan> 
 
which says that the concept being Vulcan is uninstantiated. If there is such a concept, then 
(16) and (17) are equivalent, although (16), but not (17) is consistent with their being no such 
concept. 
 
As (15) is not a simple sentence containing an empty name, a negative free logic does not 
entail its falsity in virtue of its form, and so does not entail the truth of (16) and (17) in virtue 
of their form. However, given the equivalence of (15) and λy. (∃x x=y) <Vulcan>, the latter 
being a simple sentence with a non-referring singular term, a negative free logic is committed 
to the falsity of (15) and thereby the truth of (16), although not in virtue of its form. 
Moreover, the Ockhamist truth conditions which a negative free logic accepts for simple 
sentences can be generalized so as to ensure the falsity of (15) 
 
Generalized Ockhamist Truth Conditions: if ‘a’ is an argument of level n and ‘F’ is a 
function of level n+1, then ‘Fa’ is true if F maps a to the true and false otherwise. 
 
With this generalization in hand, which is to be motivated in the same way as a negative free 
logic, we secure the falsity of (15) and thereby the truth of (16). And on the assumption that 
there is the concept of being identical to Vulcan, the falsity of (15) ensures the truth of (17) 
given that the second-level concepts of instantiation and uninstantiation effect a partition on 
first level concepts.  
 
But again, just as in the case where we take ‘exists’ to be a first level predicate, the negative 
free logician is committed to their being a reading of (1) where negation does not take narrow 
scope; either negation has to take wide scope, as in (16), or intermediate scope, as in (17). 
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This is not, however, because the narrow scope reading of negation produces a falsehood, 
since, like (16) and (17), 
 
(18) λF.∃x Fx <λy. y≠Vulcan> 
 
is true: the concept being non-identical to Vulcan is instantiated, assuming that there is such a 
concept. But unlike (16) and (17), sentences like (18) do not plausibly provide the correct 
truth conditions for negative existentials in general, as they give the incorrect verdict in the 
case of non-empty names. That is, whereas λF.∃x Fx <λy. y≠Sainsbury> is true ‘Sainsbury 
does not exist’ is false. 
 
So regardless of whether we take ‘exists’ to be a first or second-level predicate, a negative 
free logic can straightforwardly account for singular negative existentials if the ‘not’ in such a 
statement is not construed as having narrow scope. 
 
But is it plausible that negation in singular negative existentials does not take narrow scope? 
Note that there is no issue here for the second-level view, as giving negation narrow scope on 
such a view is a not even prima facie plausible. When we say that Vulcan does not exist, we 
are not thereby saying that something which is not Vulcan does exist. So the second-level 
view of exists, embedded within a negative free logic provides a straightforward account of 
the truth of singular negative existentials, modulo any worries about the second-level 
treatment of ‘exists’ itself. 
 
On the first level view of ‘exists’, however, there is a challenge, since, as we noted at the 
outset, singular negative existentials do appear to be of subject-predicate form, an appearance 
denied by the second-level approach. As has already been stressed, singular negative 
existentials cannot have subject-predicate form on modest assumptions, namely, (i) that some 
singular negative existentials are true, and (ii) The Existence Principle, and so we must give 
up this pre-theoretic semantic intuition about singular negative existentials. In any case, it is 
easy to see, I think, that denying that singular negative existentials are subject-predicate 




We can motivate the idea that ‘not’ often takes wide scope independently of the issue of 
empty names. Consider the true sentence 
 
(19) Neil Armstrong might not have been born. 
 
This sentence has to be treated as 
 
(20) ◊~[(λx. x is born) <Neil Armstrong>] 
 
and not as 
 
(21) ~◊[(λx. x is born) <Neil Armstrong>] 
 
which is false, nor as 
 
(22) ◊[(λx. x is not born) <Neil Armstrong>] 
 
which, presumably, is false, but is in any case not the intended interpretation of our target 
sentence. So here we have a sentence, (19), in many ways similar to (1), where ‘not’ has to 
take wide scope relative to the predicate. 
 
It might be replied that, of course if we are treating the modality in question as a sentential 
operator, (19) has to be read as (20), but this ignores the possibility that ‘might’ is to be 
treated as a predicate modifier, giving the unobjectionable formalization 
 
(23) (λx. x might not have been born) <Neil Armstrong> 
 
Alternatively, one might accept the reading of (19) as (20), but deny that (1) is analogous. 
Both these objections can be addressed by making the point not with the explicitly modal 
sentence (19), but with the non-modal sentence 
 




(24) is false. Nevertheless, it could have been true, that is 
 
(25) (24) could have been true. 
 
In (25) there is no question whether the possibility modal is a sentential operator. But if so, 
(24) must be read as 
 
(26) ~[λx. x is born <Neil Armstrong>] 
 
rather than as 
 
(27) [λx. x is not born <Neil Armstrong>]. 
 
So here we see that when we consider questions of modality, we are forced to recognize a 
wide scope reading of ‘not’ in sentences such as (24).35 
 
As the above discussion has shown, the kind of scope distinction that we have marked above 
with the lambda operator is present in English. That is, some sentences of English employ 
negation as a sentential operator, whereas others employ it a as a predicate modifier. 
Sainsbury (2005a: 197) thinks that ordinarily ‘non-’ is a predicate modifier whereas, ‘not’ is a 
sentential operator. If so, then singular negative existentials such as (1) are straightforwardly 
true as illustrated above. There does not appear to be a false reading of (1), and so, there 
appears to be no ambiguity. That is, (1) seems to uniquely express (13), there being no 
reading of (1) along the lines of (14). 
 
Sainsbury, however, (2005a 197-198) thinks that a hard-and-fast rule cannot be maintained 
with regards to ‘not’ and ‘non-’. Consider the following pair of sentences 
 
(28) Vulcan is not more than 1000 miles across 
(29) Vulcan has a diameter of no more than 1000 miles. 
 
                                                          
35 By focusing on a non-modal sentence to make a modal point, this strategy is similar to Kripke’s (1980) reply 
to Dummett (1981 appendix to Chapter 5). By invoking modality to provide motivation about a view concerning 




Taken as the negation of a simple sentence, (28) is true given a negative free logic. But, 
Sainsbury thinks, we ought to accord the same truth value to both (28) and (29), and so given 
that (29) is false, (28) must be false also. But this means that the ‘not’ in (28) cannot be 
construed as a sentential operator in a negative free logic. Hence, Sainsbury concludes that 
‘not’ sometimes functions as a predicate modifier. 
 
Sainsbury notes that one might resist this conclusion by noting that since Vulcan does not 
exist, it is not anything, it is not more than 1000 miles across, not less than 1000 miles across, 
not exactly 1000 miles across. But he resists this line of thinking based on a hypothetical 
exchange of the following type: 
 
Lescarbault: Vulcan is about 900 miles in diameter, but in any case, is not more than 
1000 miles in diameter. 
Le Verrier: I think it nearer 925 miles across, but I agree that Vulcan is not more than 
1000 miles across. 
 
Here we have to regard this utterance [of ‘Vulcan is not more than 1000 
miles across’] as false. We parse it not as negation but as an affirmation, 
equivalent to the claim that Vulcan is exactly or less than 1000 miles across. 
(Sainsbury 2005a: 198). 
 
But consider the following pair: 
 
(30) 2 is not more than six feet tall 
(31) 2 has a height of no more than six feet 
 
These two sentences parallel Sainsbury’s (28) and (29) in syntactical form, although ‘2’ 
refers whereas ‘Vulcan’ does not. But do we have to regard (30) and (31) as having the same 
truth value? Intuitively, (30) is true whereas (31) is not, since 2 is not any height whatsoever, 
and so this would seem to count against Sainsbury’s claim that ‘not’ is ambiguous in English. 
This does not settle the matter, however, since 2 satisfies the complex predicate λx. is not 
more than six feet tall, whereas Vulcan does not satisfy any complex predicate. Nevertheless, 
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this example shows that we need not assign the same truth value to pairs such as (28) and 
(29). 
 
But what about the hypothetical exchange between Lescarbault and Le Verrier? Here it is true 
that Le Verrier wants to affirm something because he thinks that Vulcan exists. The question 
is, whether his utterance succeeds in affirming something? If what a speaker intends to say 
and what he says can come apart, as surely they can, we cannot read off the content of Le 
Verrier’s utterance from his intentions. To explore this topic, however, would take us too far 
afield. But minimally, we can conclude that Sainsbury has not made the case that ‘not’ is 
ambiguous in English. If this is correct, then this is even better news for his treatment of 
negative existentials and more broadly a negative free logic, although it seems that not much 
turns on this. Regardless of the precise treatment of ‘not’ and ‘non’ in English, the non-




As is clear by now, if Russellians are to admit the truth of some singular negative existentials, 
then they must treat the names in such sentences differently from referring terms, and so must 
abandon Russellianism as a thesis about names in general. It is consistent with this fact, 
however, that referring terms are Russellian. As Evans puts it 
 
The challenge posed by [true singular negative existentials] to the thesis 
that normal information-invoking uses of singular terms are Russellian is 
not direct, for it is clear that such cases are abnormal. (Evans 1982: 343). 
 
The admission of non-Russellian names, only threatens the Russellian status of referring 
names, if we have the additional premise that all names belong to a single semantic category 
as Sainsbury would have it. But Russellians like McDowell (2006), who now flirt with the 
idea of according senses to empty names, deny this. So true singular negative existentials do 
not require us to abandon all Russellian instincts we may have, but does require us to accept 
that empty names can be used to express thoughts with a classical truth value, at least in the 




Moreover, the concession that the Russellian must make in the face of seemingly true 
singular negative existentials is consistent with the claim that such contexts are odd, and are 
the only contexts in which empty names can be used to express thoughts. So, more than a 
modicum of Russellianism can be maintained in spite of singular negative existentials. 
 
The Russellian could, if he were happy to do so, simply embrace the negative free logical 
apparatus and adopt the Burge/Sainsbury treatment of singular negative existentials. This 
would mean that in addition to admitting true singular negative existentials, they would have 
to admit the truth of the negation of other simple sentences involving empty names. This is, 
in effect, what Braun (1993) does, although with the unhelpful and unclear addition of a 
gappy Russellian proposition. 
 
But some Russellians have not been happy to go this way as they want to make their 
concession about the thought expressing powers of empty names only in the case of singular 
(negative) existentials. That is, they want to highlight a contrast between what is happening in 
the case of singular negative existentials and other sentences containing empty names. For 
these Russellians are happy to say in general that sentences containing empty names fail to 
express propositions. But they think it is more costly to take the same route in the case of 
singular negative existentials. As we saw above, the Russellian has a story to tell about what 
is going on in the case of utterances involving empty names, which makes intelligible such 
behaviour, and we argued such an account could be extended to singular negative 
existentials. But for these Russellians, in the absence of Vulcan, ‘Vulcan is a planet’ fails to 
communicate any specific information, which corresponds to the lack of a suitable Russellian 
proposition. There is, however, the strong impression that singular negative existentials do 
communicate a specific piece of information. Negative free logicians treat false singular 
existentials and simple sentences with nonreferring terms on a par, whereas, some Russellians 
want to resist this. 
 
The second reason that some Russellians are not happy to simply follow Burge and Sainsbury 
in their treatment of negative existentials is that they want to highlight a particular aspect of 
true singular negative existentials which is not present in other cases of sentences with empty 





As Donnellan puts it: 
 
Discourse about actuality carries the presupposition that the speaker is 
talking about people, places, or things that occur in the history of our 
world. A puzzle arises when the speaker is unfortunate enough to use a 
singular expression, intending to attribute a property to something, but 
fails, in his use of that expression, to refer to anything. ... For example, 
someone might well have said, "Jacob Horn wrote about Augusta Town 
and now we know where it was located." It would have been some sort of 
inconsistency-exactly what kind is another question-for such a speaker 
then to affirm the nonexistence of Jacob Horn. This contrasts with 
discourse about fiction – there one can, for example, consistently deny the 
existence of Snow White while also stating that she enraptured a prince 
(Donnellan 1974: 6). 
 
For Donnellan, it seems that (some) discourse about fiction does not carry this 
presupposition of existence, and so we can make the negative existential claim in 
good conscience. But, as Donnellan notes, the negative existential claim itself is not 
a claim about fiction: 
 
The denial of Snow White's existence, it should be noted, is in discourse 
about actuality, while the statement that she enraptured a prince is in 
discourse about fiction. (If the question of existence arose in discourse 
about fiction alone, Snow White existed, whereas Hamlet's father's ghost, 
again presuming we are talking about fiction, probably did not.) 
(Donnellan 1974: 6 n9).36 
 
But neither is it simply a statement about actuality, since such utterance carries an existential 
presupposition, and the Russellian utterances containing empty names made in reality-
invoking mode express no thought. Rather, someone who sincerely utters a singular negative 
existential should be 
 
                                                          
36 Donnellan (1974: 5) thinks that sentences such as ‘Snow White enraptured a Prince’ can express true 
thoughts, but this is not essential to the type of Russellianism under discussion. 
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seen as standing with one foot in the fiction, where the singular term leads 
a simulacrum of a normal life, and one foot in the real world, from which 
perspective the term can be used to state the fact which makes its 
behaviour abnormal (Sainsbury 1999: 259; cf. Wiggins 1995). 
 
So for these two connected reasons, then, our Russellian does not simply wish to follow 
Burge and Sainsbury’s treatment of empty names, whilst holding onto the claim that referring 
terms form a distinct semantic category. The question is, can the Russellian secure this 
amount of Russellianism? I shall argue that whilst the Russellian can privilege singular 
negative existentials, he has not shown that he can treat them as being true without also 




Gareth Evans’ treatment of singular negative existentials is one attempt to spell out the 
thought implicit in Donnellan that singular negative existentials are in part comments on or 
within the scope of a fiction or pretence, and in part in reality-invoking mode. Evans focuses 
on the case of singular negative existentials involving names from fiction, although no doubt 
his account could be extended to include other cases of apparently true singular negative 
existentials (see the discussion of Wiggins below for an illustration of how such an extension 
might go). 
 
For Evans, when we talk about fiction we engage in a pretence. For him, true negative 
existentials express a move in the pretence which reveals that it is a pretence. For Evans, 
someone who utters a true singular negative existential 
 
is not like someone who tries to prevent a theatre audience from being too 
carried away by jumping on the stage and saying: ‘Look, the men are only 
actors, and there is no scaffold or buildings here – there are only props.’ 
Rather, he is like someone who jumps up on the stage and says: ‘Look, 
Suzanne and the thief over there are only characters in a play, and this 
scaffold and these buildings are just props.’ The audience must be engaged 





When using the name ‘Godzilla’, within the scope of a fiction, we pretend that ‘Godzilla’ 
names a monster. A sentence used within a fiction containing ‘Godzilla’, such as 
 
(32) Godzilla is more terrifying than King Kong 
 
does not, for a Russellian like Evans, express a proposition since it contains an empty name. 
However, Evans thinks that (32) can be used to make-believedly express a proposition and 
that when employed within a fiction we have quasi-understanding, although this is not a 
species of understanding. How then does Evans account for the truth of singular negative 
existential statements containing empty names? Evans analyzes such sentences as of the form 
 
(33) Not (Really (Godzilla exists)) 
 
The operator ‘Really’ is supposed to allow for ‘Godzilla exists’ to have a serious use outside 
the scope of a fiction. As Evans says 
 
‘Really’ is a word which, when prefixed to a sentence, produces a sentence 
such that an utterance of it is true (absolutely) [that is, not merely 
according to a fiction] if and only if the sentence preceded by ‘really’ is 
itself such that there is a proposition expressed by it when it is uttered in 
the relevant game of make-believe, and this proposition is true (absolutely) 
(Evans 1982: 370). 
 
So Evans’ idea is that when we precede ‘Godzilla exists’ by ‘Really’ we have a sentence 
which expresses a false proposition. Its negation, (33), is then true. 
 
It is clear that the essence of Evans’ account is not tied to the first-level view of ‘exists’ 
which he favours. Evans could have equally as well have offered the following treatment of 
singular negative existentials 
 




or to spell it out in the lambda calculus 
 
(35) ~ Really (λF. (∃x Fx) <λy.y=a>) 
 
Sainsbury (1999) argues that ‘really’ performs no such function in English. Rather, Sainsbury 
thinks that ‘really’ has no effect on the truth conditions of a sentence, so that 
 
(36) ‘Really p’ is true iff ‘p’ is true 
 
It is agreed on all sides that ‘really’ is factive, so that the left-to-right direction of (36) holds. 
So the truth of (36) turns on whether there are counterexamples to the right-to-left direction 
of (36). Evans (1982: 372) seems to think that ‘really’ does have a truth-conditional effect 
which he illustrates with the following pair 
 
(37) Had this man’s parents not met, this man would not have existed 
(38) Had this man’s parents not met, this man would not have really existed. 
 
Whereas (37) sounds fine, (38) is infelicitous. But why should we think that infelicity here is 
an indication of falsity? 
 
[I]t is not clear that inserting ‘really’ produces any change of truth value, 
as opposed to some oddity. The interpreter of the ‘really’ version looks for 
pretence or speculation or false view to the effect that this man would have 
existed under the supposed circumstances, and finding none feels 
dissatisfied; but it would be hard to dissent from the conditional 
supplemented with ‘really’ (Sainsbury 1999: 262-263). 
 
For Sainsbury, the function of ‘really’ in English is to highlight a contrast between reality and 
mere appearance, including, but not only fiction. Sainsbury’s claim is supported by the 
following examples 
 
(39) The author was quoted as saying that he feared a fiend but what he really said was 




(40) The service is currently exploited by a wide range of applicants, but should be 
confined to those really in need. 
 
Further, as Sainsbury notes, removing ‘really’ from these examples does not seem to affect 
their truth conditions. But even if we concede that the infelicity in Evans’ example tracks 
falsity, this does not show what Evans wants it to show, at least not by his own lights. As 
Sainsbury points out, Evans accepts that sentences with the same truth conditions can embed 
differently in modal contexts. That is, employing Dummett’s (1991 appendix to Chapter 5) 
terminology for the distinction, ingredient sense does not supervene on assertoric content (see 
Stanley 1997 §7 for some discussion). 
 
In the light of this, Evans’ proposal is best seen as employing ‘really’ in some technical 
manner, rather than as employing it in its everyday sense. But there is a decisive problem for 
Evans. 
 
Yet it remains to be explained how quasi-understanding can be an input to 
genuine understanding: we cannot know what it would be for ‘p’ to be 
really true in the most common case, that in which there is no such thing as 
what it is for ‘p’ to be true (absolutely) (Sainsbury 1999: 262). 
 
To put things in terms of thoughts, rather than understanding, if the fact that ‘n’ is empty robs 
the sentence ‘n exists’ of the ability to express a thought, why does it not rob the ability of 
‘Really n exists’ to express a thought? As Dummett says of an example of Evans’ “that little 
green man” is an information-linked term, so that, if it has no reference, no sentence 
containing it can express a proposition” (1983: 305). Similarly, if ‘S’ does not express a 
thought, how can any embedding of ‘S’, where ‘S’ is used and not mentioned? 
 
Evans himself commits to both of these principles when chastising Frege 
 
Now it is true that anyone who holds that a given singular term, ‘b’, is 
Russellian must, like Frege, regard such Free-Logical manoeuvrings as quite 
out of place; he too will subscribe to the principle that Frege here upholds, 
namely that if S has no truth value, no embedding of S can be true. But the 
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Russellian has something to defend his use of this principle. In his case, 
‘failing to have a truth value’ amounts to ‘failing to express any thought at 
all’, and since no complex sentence can express a thought if a constituent 
sentence (used not mentioned) fails to do so, it follows that no embedding of a 
sentence without a truth-value, even within the scope of ‘Neg’, can be true, 
failing as it does to express a thought (Evans 1982: 24-25 my emphasis). 
 
So ‘~Really S’ can only express a thought given Evans’ Russellianism about non-descriptive 
names, if ‘S’ expresses a thought. But given that for Evans, the relevant cases of ‘S’ do not 
express thoughts, although they may be used in a make believe to make-believedly express 
thoughts, then ‘~Really S’ cannot, in the relevant cases express a thought either, and so, 
cannot be true. So, the fact that makes singular negative existentials problematic for Evans in 
the first place prevents his account, however initially promising it might have been, from 
working. That Evans’ view is inadequate is simply a consequence of the fact that no 
Russellian name can be used in a true negative existential given The Existence Principle. 
 
Does the Evans-inspired second-level approach fare any better than Evans’ own first-level 
approach? This turns on whether, for Evans, ‘∃x x[=a]’ expresses a proposition. If it does, 
and it expresses a proposition that is false, then all well-and-good. If it fails to express a 
proposition, then this approach fails in the face of Dummett’s objection above. (If it expresses 
a proposition which is true, then the account is not extensionally adequate, but this possibility 
shall not concern us). 
 
Now given that ‘a’ is an empty non-descriptive name, ‘∃x x[=a]’, fails to express a 
proposition since ‘=a’ will lack a sense due to the lack of sense of one of its components, 
namely, ‘a’. Similarly, ∃x x[=a] iff ∃x x=[a], and the latter cannot be true on a Russellian 
account when ‘a’ is empty. So although Evans’ account is not tied to a first-level account of 
existence, switching to a second-level view dos not avoid the problems with his account, and 
so Evans’ proposal is to be rejected. 
 




It is, however, impossible to see why the condition for “Really (E(g)” to 
express a proposition should be what Evans takes it to be unless that sentence 
is being used to say something about a particular use of the sentence “E(g)” 
(Dummett 1983: 305). 
 
That is, Evans wants ‘Really S’ to be false even when ‘S’ expresses no proposition, but 
according to the principles above, this can only be the case if ‘S’ is mentioned. As has been 
stressed already, if empty names have no sense, then they cannot be used in order to express 
true singular negative existential thoughts. This is why the only hope for Evans’ account is as 
a metalinguistic treatment of negative existentials. But, following Evans himself, we have 
rejected such accounts here. 
 
It is odd that Evans did not see this objection.37 To see this, compare what Evans says about 
the very similar Russellian account of singular negative existentials offered by Saul Kripke 
(1974). Kripke says that a true-sounding negative existential ‘a does not exist’ can be seen as 
saying that there is no true proposition that says of a that it exists. Kripke’s analysis is, 
however, like Evans’, a non-starter for the Russellian since, as Evans (1982: 350) notes, if the 
fact that ‘a’ is empty robs ‘a does not exist’ of its ability to express a proposition, which is 
what the Russellian claims, then this fact also robs Kripke’s analysans of its ability to express 
a proposition if the singular term is used and not mentioned. 
 
2.2.2 Wiggins 
Although Evans’ account fails, it remains insightful. First, as the quote from Evans (1982: 
369) above shows, Evans thought that singular negative existentials were moves within a 
pretence that exposed it as a pretence, and that such moves required being party to the 
pretence. Second, although he did not have time to spell out the idea properly, Evans thought 
that such exposure requires a game-to-reality shift, with ‘Really’ being the device that signals 
and/or effects that shift. But both of these ideas are independent of Evans’ own, flawed, 
implementation. 
 
                                                          
37 The Varieties of Reference was published posthumously from a set of notes and draft chapters that Evans left. 
As Sainsbury (1999: 259) notes, Evans’ remarks about ‘Really’ come at “the end of a hastily concluded chapter, 
which would no doubt have been elaborated considerably had Evans lived”. 
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David Wiggins (1995, 1999, 2003) offers a broadly Russellian account of singular negative 
existentials which takes these insights of Evans’, but embeds them within an account that 
does not fall foul of the principles of embedding empty terms appealed to above. 
 
Wiggins’ account differs from Evans’ in a number of respects. First, Wiggins remains 
committed to classical logic, unlike Evans, who given his acceptance of empty descriptive 
names, embraced a negative free logic. Second, Wiggins frames his account in terms of a 
second-level treatment of exists. Third, to avoid the problems that beset Evans’ approach, 
Wiggins allows that, in certain circumstances, empty names can have a sense, and that we 
don’t merely quasi-understand (certain) utterances containing empty names, but we do 
genuinely understand them. So Wiggins’ account is not a pure Russellian one. Fourth, as we 
shall see, all this means that Wiggins gives the name in question wide scope over the Really 
operator. Finally, Wiggins concentrates the explication of his account on supposition rather 
than fictions, presumably just to show how Evans’ insights can be applied to other cases of 
negative existentials. 
 
Starting with the last point, Wiggins, taking his lead from Evans, explains what happens 
when we utter a singular negative existential such as ‘Vulcan does not exist’: 
 
We make ourselves party to Le Verrier’s thoughts and hypothesis. In 
becoming party to those thoughts, and speculating about how it’s as if 
things are with Uranus and its neighbours in the solar system – and then 
in participating in Le Verrier’s later speculations about how it’s as if 
things are with Mercury and its neighbours – we are drawn into having 
thoughts of our own that make reference to the very same subject matter 
that Le Verrier had in mind (Wiggins 1995: 105). 
 
And it is by Le Verrier refining his speculations that a sense is secured for ‘Vulcan’, and by 
going along with Le Verrier we can grasp its sense: 
 
At the beginning of such a prolepsis, it will not be clear what ‘Vulcan’ is 
to stand for; but then, at some point in Le Verrier’s hypothesizing—at 
some point in his inventing his story, one might say, for this is the 
analogy we are depending upon—we shall understand him well enough, 
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and he will understand himself well enough, to know what he means by 
saying that it is presence of Vulcan that explains the behaviour of 
Mercury. For when this point is reached, a sense is secured for “Vulcan” 
(Wiggins 2003: 489). 
 
And what is true for speculation is true in the case of fiction too 
 
Gradually such a story constructs a narrative space in which we can 
answer the question “who is Nausikaa, what is she?”. Just as the story 
mimics reality, so the name “Nausikaa” mimics an ordinary proper name. 
... This is to say the name behaves as if it named a young woman and, in 
this way, the name secures a sense for itself (Wiggins 2003: 490-491). 
 
It is in virtue of this sense that we can, on Wiggins’ account, understand, genuinely 
understand, what Le Verrier is saying: 
 
Evans thinks that when we go along with Le Verrier we’re in the state of 
as if understanding which objects these are. He says noting stronger than 
that. But surely it’s not merely as if we understand how Le Verrier says 
things are. Rather we understand, we actually do understand, how Le 
Verrier says it’s as if things are, both in the Neptune case and in the 
Vulcan case (Wiggins 1995: 107) 
 
Now that Wiggins, unlike Evans, has a sense for Vulcan and genuine understanding, he can 
provide an account of true singular negative existentials. Once a sense has been secured for 
the name ‘Vulcan’, this determines, not a referent, for Vulcan does not exist, but the 
associated concept, the concept of being identical to Vulcan, λx. x=Vulcan. Once this 
concept has been secured we can employ it in a second-level account of singular negative 
existentials to say that this concept is not instantiated. 
 
But since, for Wiggins, names presuppose that they name something, even within 
presupposition or fiction, we cannot simply use an empty name in a singular negative 




Each genuine semantically satisfactory name comes with a putative claim 
for existential generalization [EG]. Since fictional names present 
themselves as genuine names, for these too it is always as if EG is 
validated. For suppositional names, while the supposition is alive, there is 
non-fictional but probationary status. Before and after the death of a 
supposition, we treat such names as 'Vulcan' and their claim upon EG 
with great caution. (Wiggins 1999: 286 n11). 
 
So we have to employ ‘really’ to invoke what Evans called ‘the game-to-reality shift’. As 
Wiggins puts it 
 
What ‘really’ marks is the transition – within one sentence – from one 
sort of thinking and talking, the speculative mode, to the other sort, a 
reality-invoking mode. What the true singular negative existential will 
force us to recognize is that we need both these modes, and that we need 
the means to negotiate transitions – even transitions within one sentence 
– from the one mode to the other (Wiggins 1995: 106). 
 
As Wiggins (1995: 108) says, we find ourselves with one foot in Le Verrier’s speculation and 
with the other foot in the real world. 
 
The account that emerges of saying ‘Vulcan doesn’t really exist’ ... is 
then as follows. To say this, we have to rehearse the hypothesis yet again 
(or tell the story yet again) but, this time, in the course of the rehearsing 
(or the telling) and the further developing or amplifying, we must make a 
comment. We must say that the hypothesis fails, or say the story is only a 
story. But we do this in the course of the rehearsing (or telling) it 
(Wiggins 1995: 109). 
 




‘As regards that planet, the planet which (it’s as if) affects the perihelion 
of Mercury, and as regards its concept, c, well, really nothing at all 
answers to c, c is not really instantiated’ (Wiggins 2005: 108). 
 
So a well-developed hypothesis or fiction, allows us to specify a concept and then say that 
this concept is not really instantiated. 
 
So here we have a neo-Russellian account of singular negative existentials which is 
putatively both adequate and distinct from non-Russellian accounts such as Sainsbury’s. Two 
questions still remain, however. First, Wiggins’ (1995) initial account of his view was 
presented as part of a rehabilitation of the second-level view of ‘exists’, but is this style of 
treatment of singular negative existentials essentially tied to a second-order view of 
‘exists’?38 Second, can the Russellian follow Wiggins in allowing empty names to be used in 
true singular negative existentials, without allowing their occurrence elsewhere in thought-
expressing sentences? Let us address these questions in order. 
 
Presumably a Wiggins inspired first-order account of singular negative existentials will take 
something like the following form 
 
(41) As regards Vulcan, it does not really exist 
 
Now if such a proposal is not to fall to Dummett’s objection to Evans, then ‘Vulcan exists’ 
must express a proposition, so that both ‘Really (Vulcan exists)’ and ‘~Really (Vulcan 
exists)’ can express propositions. In order for this to be the case, ‘Vulcan’, when employed in 
uttering a singular negative existential, must have a sense. And it must have a sense, even 
though it is bearerless. This requirement is something that the Russellian usually rallies 
against, so as a Russellian, we might expect Wiggins to deny that ‘Vulcan’, in such uses, has 
a sense. But there are good reasons to think that this is not a consistent position, for there are 
good reasons to suppose that ‘λx. x=Vulcan’ has a sense iff ‘Vulcan’ has a sense.39 
 
                                                          
38 Wiggins nowhere states that his style of account is tied to the second-level view of ‘exists’, but neither does 
he say that it can be adapted to a first-order treatment of ‘exists’. 
39 For our purposes we only need the left-to-right direction of this equivalence. 
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First, if the concept of being Vulcan which Wiggins employs in his account of singular 
negative existentials, ‘λx. x=Vulcan’, has a sense, we might expect that we can show its 
sense, even if we cannot state it. And following the approach outlined in Chapter 1, we might 
expect we could do this with the relevant axiom in a truth theory. Such an axiom might look 
like 
 
(42) ∀x x falls under the concept being identical to Vulcan [λy. y=Vulcan] iff x = Vulcan 
[λz.z=Vulcan <x>] 
 
Now if this axiom is to be understood, the right-hand side of it must be understood, and hence 
‘Vulcan’ must have a sense. But we should be wary of relying on this consideration, for 
Wiggins has not committed to the claim that the sense of every concept can be shown in a 
truth theory or indeed that it can be shown at all. Moreover, since this axiom will be adequate 
only if it is true, and its truth in classical logic supports the false ∃x x=Vulcan, its adoption 
requires a (negative) free logic. Now although we have argued that a negative free logic is the 
appropriate neutral background logic, Wiggins has been at pains to distance himself from it, 
although whether he can really do so we shall question below. 
 
But we need not settle such controversial matters here. Rather we can rely on the general 
Fregean claim that an expression has a sense only if all its semantically significant parts have 
a sense (Dummett 1993: 290). This principle, combined with the claim that the concept 
expression ‘identical with Vulcan’ has ‘Vulcan’ as a semantically significant part, ensures 
that ‘Vulcan’ has a sense. Although perhaps not incontestable, the Fregean principle is 
compelling, and there appear not to be any counterexamples. Moreover, it is something like 
this principle that underlies Dummett’s objection to Evans, and Evans’ objection to Kripke, 
so in the context of establishing whether there is a first-order Russellian account of singular 
negative existentials, the principle does not have to be granted, since if it is not, Dummett’s 
objection to Evans fails, and we have our first-order Russellian account after all. 
 
In any case, Wiggins is explicit that ‘Vulcan’ does have a sense, and it is this that allows us to 
grasp the concept λy. y=Vulcan which he needs for his account of singular negative 
existentials. So ‘Vulcan’ has a sense, and so one barrier to the first-order account of singular 
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negative existentials is lifted. There are, however, two more potential problems that need to 
be addressed, before we can be confident that the proposed first-order account is acceptable. 
 
Whilst we have reason to think that Vulcan has a sense if ‘λy. y=Vulcan’ has a sense, what 
has not been established is that ‘Vulcan’ has a sense that can be used to express true singular 
negative existential thoughts. Of course, if ‘Vulcan’ has a sense, then it would be appear that 
the onus is on anyone who wanted to deny that ‘Vulcan’ could be used as a singular term to 
express true negative existential thoughts to show why this was the case. 
 
Now if ‘Vulcan’ has a sense which is not fully determinate it may not be able to combine 
with the other words in a singular existential statement to express a thought. So the possibility 
remains that Wiggins can grant, as he must, that ‘Vulcan’ has a sense, but deny that this sense 
is such that it can contribute to first-order negative existential thoughts. 
 
We might object to this rejection of a Russellian first-level account of singular negative 
existentials on the grounds that if ‘Vulcan’ lacks a determinate sense, how can ‘λy. 
y=Vulcan’ possess a determinate sense? We know, however, that two indeterminate terms 
can be disjoined to make a determinate term. Take any vague predicate and its 
complementary vague predicate and disjoin then to form a determinate predicate. Whilst it 
might not be clear whether Timothy Williamson is thin or whether he is not thin, it is clear 
that he is thin or not thin.40 But here we can see how the indeterminacies lead to determinacy, 
and the case is very different to the one required by the opponent of the first-order approach 
suggested here, but nevertheless it demonstrates that indeterminacy is not necessarily 
inherited by a whole from its parts. 
 
Nevertheless, the objection based on indeterminacy of sense, is not plausible given the 
transparent and tight connection between ‘Vulcan exists’ and ‘λy. y=Vulcan is instantiated’. 
That is, λx.∃y=x <Vulcan> stands or falls with λF. ∃y Fy <λx. x=Vulcan>. Indeed both can 
be seen as ways of decomposing ∃y y=Vulcan. We have been given no reason to suppose that 
whilst ‘λy. y=Vulcan’ has the kind of sense suitable for inclusion in thoughts of the kind 
expressed by singular negative existentials, ‘Vulcan’ does not have such a sense. So I 
conclude that this line of thought fails to undermine the first-level Russellian view of singular 
                                                          
40 Of course, it is clear that Williamson is thin, but never mind. 
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negative existentials we are considering. We have seen no reason then, that someone who 
accepts Wiggins’ views about names cannot employ a first-level existence predicate. 
 
A more fundamental question is whether Wiggins can allow an empty name to do work in 
expressing singular existential thoughts without allowing them to feature in sentences 
expressing other thoughts. It would seem that there is nothing to prevent this possibility, and 
Wiggins himself accepts it: 
 
If I say 'Father Christmas doesn't really bring presents' then (1) I do as if to 
narrate the legend of Father Christmas (a jolly old man from the north with 
a long white beard who brings presents to children on the night before 
Christmas etc.), doing this either explicitly or else (where every-one knows 
the story) inexplicitly by simply using the name: and then (2) I comment, 
within the same speech episode but directing it now towards reality, that 
Father Christmas doesn't really bring presents. If I say 'Father Christmas 
brings (does not bring) presents' I need not be saying anything true or 
false. Well or badly, I am just recounting or applying the legend. But if I 
say that, as regards Father Christmas, he really brings (does not bring) 
presents, then the 'really' lifts the thought to a level at which it demands to 
be evaluated as true or false. The reference of the name is secured 
sufficiently for these purposes by the fact that it's as if 'Father Christmas' 
stands for Father Christmas who.... (Wiggins 1999: 282). 
 
So empty names, it seems, can be used to express thoughts, as long as they occur within the 
Really operator. This shows that Wiggins is committed to the view that empty names can be 
used to express thoughts in simple sentences, and so can have no qualms with someone 
employing a first-order existence predicate (bracketing his general worries about such a 
predicate), within his Really operator. If the worry about the determinacy of sense 
undermined the ability of ‘Father Christmas’ to feature in singular negative existential claims, 
construed as negations of simple sentences, then we would be at a loss to explain why this 
same indeterminacy does not rob ‘Father Christmas’ of its ability to feature in sentences 




But what about occurrences of empty names outside of the ‘really’ operator? The really 
operator marks a shift from game to reality, so if we do not have such a shift, we do not need 
to employ the operator. There are two cases to consider. 
 
First, what is to prevent Le Verrier’s speculations from expressing thoughts, even if he is in 
an as if mode, rather than full reality-invoking mode as Wiggins suggests? All the terms he 
used have a sense, or at least they will have once he developed his theory sufficiently. And 
these terms are arranged in a grammatical fashion characteristic of the way in which words 
with senses are arranged to express thoughts. So how do they fail to express thoughts? It 
cannot be that ‘Vulcan’ lacks a bearer, for we have seen that Wiggins allows for there to be 
thoughts expressed using ‘Vulcan’. The only explanation can be that as well as signalling a 
shift in our mode of speech, the ‘really’ operator also imbues otherwise senseless terms with 
sense. But this cannot be, if Wiggins is not to fall prey to the Dummett objection to Evans. So 
we have no explanation of why sentences outside the scope of a ‘really’ operator cannot 
express thoughts. 
 
Of course, we may use such sentences outside the scope of a really operator and yet not say 
anything true or false, for we may use them in ways other than assertion. If I am engaging 
with a fiction I need not be asserting anything but may be engaging in a game of make-
believe, and to that extent need not be saying anything true or false. This accounts for 
Wiggins’ remark above. Nevertheless, the words I use may have a content, such that if they 
were used to make an assertion they would express a thought. 
 
Second, what happens if someone were to happen upon a work of fiction and mistake it for 
biography, sincerely uttering in a reality-invoking way ‘Sherlock Holmes was a great 
detective’. Such a claim would not be true, and given that we have argued that such a 
sentence has a sense, it seems there is nothing to prevent it from being false. Similar remarks 
could be made for Le Verrier’s notebooks. So if fiction and supposition imbue empty terms 
with senses good enough for Wiggins’ purposes, it seems that these names are available to be 
used to express thoughts, regardless of the speaker’s awareness of the fiction or supposition. 
Of course, without engaging in the relevant fiction or supposition, the speaker cannot fully 





But once we have the occurrence of empty names expressing thoughts in reality-invoking 
mode, but not embedded within a ‘really’ operator, we cannot hold on to classical existential 
generalization. That is, if ‘Sherlock Holmes was a great detective’ expresses a proposition, as 
we have argued it does, even when there is no game-to-reality shift, we cannot validly 
conclude that ∃x x=Sherlock Holmes. So once we admit the truth of singular negative 
existentials, it seems that a negative free logic follows, and that the neglected alternative 
mentioned in Chapter 1 is not viable. 
 
 
2.2.3 Whither Russellianism? 
What is left of Russellianism on such a view? In the face of apparently true singular negative 
existentials, it has been conceded that empty names can have a sense, and thereby can be used 
to express thoughts, which are true or false. But once the case of singular negative 
existentials has been conceded, much more follows, namely that empty names can be used to 
express other thoughts. Our neo-Russellian then, concedes that there are names that function 
as Burge and Sainsbury say they do only in the sense that the do not guarantee a referent and 
do not have an object-dependent sense (although they may have a sense that guarantees them 
to be empty). Neo-Russellianism then comes down to the claim that empty names and non-
empty names do not form a uniform explanatorily important kind. Rather there are the class 
of non-empty names and the class of empty names which mimic the non-empty names, but 
which are incapable of figuring in the kinds of thoughts in which non-empty names do. This 
is what is left of Russellianism once it is admitted that there are true singular negative 
existentials. All that the Russellian and the non-Russellian such as Sainsbury disagree upon is 
whether empty names and non-empty names should be group together or separately. Or so it 
seems, if we are to accept the truth of singular negative existentials. 
 
We have seen that both neo-Russellians such as Wiggins, and non-Russellians, such as 
Sainsbury, have adequate accounts of singular negative existentials either using a first or 
second-level existence predicate. The above considerations, then, do not upset our 
presupposition in favour of a first-level account of singular existential statements. 
 
There is, however, a consideration which may favour the second-level treatment of existence, 
one which will appeal particularly to Russellians, but perhaps not only to them. As we have 
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seen, Russellians have been driven to abandon a large part of their position by trying to 
account for the truth of singular negative existentials. The ideal position for the Russellian, 
which I have argued is not to be had, is to allow for the truth of singular negative existentials, 
whilst denying that other sentences containing empty names express thoughts. The non-
Russellian, on the other hand, treats all sentences containing empty names alike. 
 
Now although I have argued that the ideal Russellian position is unavailable, the neo-
Russellian can maintain a disanalogy between singular negative existentials and other uses of 
empty names by employing a second-level approach to existence. Only on a second-level 
approach is there a Russellian proposition corresponding to a true singular negative 
existential, a proposition composed of the relevant singular concept, the higher-order concept 
of instantiation, and negation. But other sentences containing empty names, unless these are 
also given a second-level treatment, cannot correspond to a Russellian proposition. The 
Russellian then, can say that whilst other sentences containing empty names express 




We have argued here that there is a relatively simple treatment to be had of singular negative 
existentials iff we admit that empty names have a sense. We further argued that once we 
admit this, this opens up the door to empty names figuring in other sentences which express 
propositions, against the Russellian spirit. This means that we are forced to adopt a negative 
free logic, if we accept that there are true singular negative existentials, as there appear to be. 
 
As a result the dispute between neo-Russellians and non-Russellians comes down to whether 
or not empty names and non-empty names form a unified semantic category. Nevertheless, 
neo-Russellians (and non-Russellians) can maintain the distinction between singular negative 
existentials and other sentences containing empty names if they embrace a second-level view 
of existence. In any case, we also noted that just as Russellians can explain away the intuition 
that other sentences containing empty names express thoughts, they can likewise explain 
away the intuition that singular negative existentials are true. 
 
In the remainder, however, we shall assume that there are true singular negative existentials 
and therefore that we require a negative free logic. The remainder of the thesis is concerned 
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with the complication that arises from the case of fiction, since although fictional names are 
paradigmatically empty names, and fictional negative existential statements are 




Chapter 3: Fictional Names and Fictional Characters 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2 we argued that there is a coherent, plausible account of empty names 
whatever attitude we take to non-empty names, and that our treatment of empty names allows 
for a relatively simple treatment of singular negative existentials. Moreover, we argued that 
once we allowed for true singular negative existentials, we had to allow empty names to 
contribute to the expression of thoughts in other contexts too. 
 
In the rest of the thesis we shall focus on one type of putative empty name, fictional names, 
and in particular, on one type of putative nonexistent, namely fictional characters. In this 
chapter we argue for what we think should be the default view of fictional names and 
fictional characters. This is the view that fictional characters exist and are the creations of 
authors, in much the same way that fictions are, but that these artefacts are only sometimes 
the referents of fictional names: broadly speaking fictional names when used outside the 
scope of a fiction refer to fictional characters, whereas uses of fictional names within the 
scope of a fiction are empty. 
 
In the following three chapters I consider three influential objections to the default view. 
First, in Chapter 4, I consider metaphysical objections to the realist element of the default 
view. Then, in Chapter 5, I consider an objection to the claim that fictional names are 
ambiguous. Finally, in Chapter 6, I consider an ontological/semantic objection to the realism 
defended here and in Chapter 4, namely that negative existentials involving fictional names 
are true, and hence there can be no fictional characters. I argue that, although these objections 
have some intuitive force, under further scrutiny, they all fail.41 
 
 
1. Claims with Fictional Names 
Fictional names occur in a number of different contexts, which are illustrated by the 
sentences below: 
 
Claims within the scope of a single fiction 
 
                                                          
41 In Chapter 6, I also argue that if we are to be realists, we should endorse the ambiguity thesis, thus providing 
further support for the default view. 
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James Bond was married to Vesper Lynd 




Hercule Poirot is more conceited than Jane Marple 




I admire Sherlock Holmes 




Captain Nemo was Jules Verne’s finest creation 
Sam Spade is not a well-developed character 
 
Metaphysical and Existential Claims 
 
Mr Tumnus is a fictional character 
Cruella de Vil is not real 
Godzilla does not exist 
There are fictional characters, for example, Godzilla.42 
 
How should we account for the (in)felicity of these sentences? Does a successful answer to 
this question require the postulation of fictional characters, which are the referents of the 
proper names in the sentences above? Realists about fictional characters, such as Lewis 
(1978), Salmon (1998) Thomasson (1999), and van Inwagen (1977), and irrealists about 
fictional characters, such as Everett (2005, 2007), Sainsbury (2009), and Walton (1990) 
disagree over this question. 
                                                          
42 I do not claim that these categories are exhaustive or mutually exclusive. For example, consider the claim 
‘Blofeld is my favourite James Bond villain’. This is both an intentional claim and it would seem a transfictional 




Prima facie, different types of claim involving fictional names seem to pull us opposite 
directions. To see this, let us focus on claims within the scope of a fiction and metafictional 
claims. Metafictional claims seem like good candidates for literal truth and often strike us as 
literally true. For example, ‘Charles Dickens created Martin Chuzzlewit’ seems 
straightforwardly and literally true. A simple and plausible semantic treatment of this 
statement treats the two singular terms as referring to objects, Charles Dickens and Martin 
Chuzzlewit respectively. Similarly, ‘Sam Spade is not a well-developed character’ also seems 
to be making a claim about the world which turns on how things are with the fictional 
character Sam Spade; again ‘Mr Tumnus is a fictional character’ appears to be a 
straightforwardly true subject predicate-sentence, with ‘Mr Tumnus’ playing a referential 
role, just as ‘Mr Cameron’ does in ‘Mr Cameron is Prime Minister’. 
 
Similarly, realism about fictional characters is supported by sentences which seem to 
explicitly quantify over fictional characters. For example, ‘some fictional characters are 
based on real people, whereas others are not’ appears to quantify over fictional characters. 
So, metafictional discourse seems to commit us to realism about fictional characters, with 
fictional names in such contexts referring to fictional characters.43 
 
The claims above are similar to claims which seem to commit us to fictions themselves: The 
Red-Headed League is a Sherlock Holmes story; Iain Banks is the author of The Wasp 
Factory; Northanger Abbey is not itself a Gothic novel; there are many works of fiction 
written by women; The Illuminatus Trilogy is a shaggy dog story; Fahrenheit 451 is fiction, 
but too close to the truth for comfort. Here we have existential, metaphysical, and 
metafictional claims about works of fiction, including creation claims, which seem to commit 
us to the existence of fictions conceived of as creations of authors.44 But given the parallel 
between these statements about fictions and the statements about fictional characters above, it 
                                                          
43 Van Inwagen (2000) argues that the realist has a further advantage, namely that he can account for the 
apparent entailments which seems to hold between sentences which appear to quantify over fictional characters. 
For example, the following argument seems valid: there is a fictional character who, for every novel, either 
appears in that novel or is a model for a character who does, so, if no character appears in every novel, then 
some character is modelled on another character. Van Inwagen thinks that the irrealist is at a loss to explain this 
entailment, since there is no obvious paraphrase strategy that saves the entailment. But this assumes that the 
best irrealist treatment is to employ paraphrase. On a pretence theoretic treatment, however, such sentences 
reflect our pretending to quantify over fictional characters and there is no reason why classical logic cannot be 
operative within the scope of the pretence. See below for more discussion of pretence theory. 




is natural to treat them on a par, taking the statements about fictional characters as 
committing us to their existence too. 
 
Irrealists often recognize the force of these considerations, only embracing irrealism because 
of apparent difficulties with realism. For example, before going on to argue that the 
metaphysics of fictional characters is incoherent, Everett (2005: 624) says that such sentences 
“appear to be literally and straightforwardly true. And it seems, prime facie, that we should 
take their syntax at face value” so that they entail the existence of fictional characters.  
Similarly, Sainsbury (2009: 99) notes that it is an attractive feature of some forms of realism 
that they can construe authors “as literally bringing something new into existence” when they 
create fictional characters. 
 
So we have good reason think that it is part of our ordinary way of thinking that there are 
fictional characters. Let us capture this minimal claim about our ordinary thinking with the 
following: 
 
Realism: fictional characters exist.45 
 
Notice that Realism makes only an ontological claim; it tells us nothing about the 
metaphysics of fictional characters nor about the semantics of fictional names. Realism per se 
leaves it open, for example, whether fictional names ever refer to fictional characters. But the 
types of sentences that we have already considered do reveal part of our ordinary thinking 
about the metaphysics of fictional characters and about the semantics of fictional names. In 
particular, the natural picture that we build and that is conceded by irrealists as being prima 
facie attractive, is that we conceive of fictional characters as being literally created, where 
being created entails being brought into existence. That is, we seem to be committed to 
 
Creationism: fictional characters are created, they do not exist eternally, rather they 
are man-made artefacts which are brought into existence. 
 
Creationism about fictional characters simply reflects a more widespread creationist instinct 
that we have about artworks: 
                                                          
45 Like the claims that follow, this claim is to taken at face value and read as being literally true, where I hope 




[The creativity claim] is one of the most firmly entrenched of our beliefs 
concerning art. There is probably no idea more central to thought about art 
than that it is an activity in which participants create things — these things 
being artworks. . . . The notion that artists truly add to the world . . . is 
surely a deep rooted idea that merits preservation if at all possible. 
(Levinson 1980: 8) 
 
But we are not simply committed to Creationism. Rather, it is part of our natural way of 
thinking that authors create fictional characters just as they create fictions: 
 
Authorial Creationism: fictional characters are created, they do not exist eternally, 
rather they are man-made artefacts which are brought into existence by authors. 
 
These three theses are listed in order of increasing strength. That is, Authorial Creationism 
entails, but is not entailed by, Creationism, and Creationism entails, but is not entailed by, 
Realism. All three are part, I think, of our ordinary picture of fictional characters. 
 
In addition to these ontological and metaphysical commitments, the considerations above also 
show that we have semantic commitments. Not only do we think that fictional characters 
exist, we think that they are the referents of fictional names in at least some metafictional and 
metaphysical contexts  
 
Reference: For any fictional name, n, there are potential uses of n which refer to a 
fictional character. 
 
So here we have a cluster of commitments extracted from consideration of some sentences 
containing fictional names. But not all sentences containing fictional names pull us in this 
realist and referential direction. For example, claims made within the scope of a single fiction 
or transfictional claims seem to be naturally treated as empty names: 
 
(1) Sherlock Holmes has a brother called ‘Mycroft’ 
 




(2) Sherlock Holmes has a brother called ‘James’ 
 
since the Conan Doyle stories describe events in which someone called ‘ Sherlock Holmes’ 
has a brother called ‘Mycroft’ and do not describe him as having a brother called ‘James’. 
But we do not, I think, want to say that (1) is literally true. We do not think that (1) is true in 
the same way that ‘Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes’ is. And irrealists concede this. 
More generally, as Kripke (1973) notes, (generally) statements containing fictional names, 
which ascribe non-literary, and non-intentional predicates, such as (1) and (2) count as good 
or correct iff they are true according to some appropriate story, in this case the Sherlock 
Holmes stories of Conan Doyle. Indeed, we might want to treat these statements, insofar as 
we think that they are literally true, as having an implicit qualifier in them, so that when spelt 
out (1) becomes 
 
(3) According to the Conan-Doyle stories, Sherlock Holmes had a brother called 
‘Mycroft’.46 
 
On the other hand, insofar as we do not think that (1) is literally true, we think it apt in some 
game of make-believe that we participate in which is licensed by the appropriate fiction 
(Walton 1990). As Everett puts it 
 
It is plausible that utterances of object-fictional sentences do not involve 
us actually asserting anything but rather involve our merely pretending to 
make assertions or at least our making assertions which describe the 
content of a pretense rather than the nature of the real world (Everett 2005: 
625). 
 
On either reading of sentences such as (1) it does not appear that we are committed to the 
singular terms in such sentences as referring to anything. Insofar as we take such sentences as 
true, they are akin to sentence such as 
 
(4) According to Christians, a supernatural being watches over us 
                                                          




which, regardless of our stance towards theism, does not in itself commit us to the existence 
of a supernatural being. 
 
Similarly, when we treat sentences such as (1) within the scope of a make-believe they are 
not ontologically committing. Sentences such a (1) no more commit us to the existence of 
Holmes than does a child’s game where lumps of mud are treated as pies, commit us to the 
existence of pies. 
 
But what goes for claims made within a single fiction also seems to go for transfictional 
sentences too such as 
 
(5) Poirot is more arrogant than Holmes. 
 
That is, we do not think (5) is literally true, but if true at all is licensed by claims in the 
relevant fictions. 
 
So far all we have is that some sentences containing fictional names seem to commit us to the 
existence of fictional characters whereas others do not. But often, the realist at this point 
impressed by his success in offering a parallel treatment of fictions and fictional characters 
and of construing metafictional claims as literally true, seeks to extend his approach to other 
claims involving fictional names. Just as metafictional claims have singular terms which refer 
to abstract fictional characters, so do claims within the scope of fictions. So although these 
latter types of sentences do not commit us to fictional characters in virtue of their form, some 
realists say that fictional names within such sentences nevertheless refer to fictional 
characters. 
 
It is not an objection to this realist view that we do not think that sentences like (1) and (5) 
are literally true. The realist can, and should, concede that that no fictional character really 
has a brother. So the felicity of such statements is not taken to consist in their literal truth. 
Rather the realist helps himself to the notions above: (1) is literally true only when prefixed 
by an intensional operator and/or is felicitous as a stand-alone sentence because it true in 
some appropriate game of make-believe. Nevertheless, on this realist view, fictional names 




But this reveals something implausible about the present realist strategy. Is it really plausible 
that when authors write a fiction they are ascribing properties to an abstract object that it 
could not possibly have? Indeed, is it plausible to construe authors as ascribing properties to 
any object whatsoever? Do we, when we engage with fiction, pretend that some abstract 
object is a detective? This is certainly not how things seem to be. Rather authors and their 
audience are pretending that there is a man who did such and such, not pretending of an 
abstract object that it is thus and so. This is not a knock-down argument against this form of 
realism, but we should note that our ordinary way of thinking about fiction is at odds with it. 
 
A second, similar, problem with this kind of realism is that it seems to confuse depiction and 
what is depicted. Soames, a realist of this type says that 
 
Among the things that exist are stories, legends, novels, chapters, plays, 
movies, and the like. These are abstract objects created by authors. 
Fictional characters are constituents of these objects. Like the fictions of 
which they are a part, fictional characters are a special kind of real, 
existing object. . . . Typically, however, they are created with the special 
purpose of being depicted as, or playing the role of, something quite 
different (Soames 2002: 93). 
 
But in the sense that fictional characters exist, they are not depicted. Rather, as parts of 
stories, as Soames says they are, they, like stories, depict. And parts of stories do not 
(usually) depict themselves. Writers are not, as a matter of course, writing about parts of their 
own stories. Rather fictional characters, as parts of stories, are representations, not what is 
represented. 
 
A final problem with this form of realism is that, although as we have argued fictional 
characters exist, it is very much part of our practice to deny that fictional characters exist. 
‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ seems as true – and for the same reason – that Vulcan does 
not exist. We argued in Chapter 2 that we have a straightforward account of singular negative 
existentials only if we allow that empty names have a sense. The present realist who thinks 
that fictional names always (or nearly always) refer to fictional objects cannot help himself to 




For these three reasons then – the phenomenology of our engagement with fiction, the 
confusion of what is depicted and what depicts, and the best account of singular negative 
existentials – we must agree with the irrealist that some uses of fictional names do not refer: 
 
Emptiness: For any fictional name, n, there are potential uses of n which do not refer. 
 
Between them Reference and Emptiness entail that fictional names are ambiguous. This 
thesis has been motivated by considering different types of sentence containing fictional 
names. It is not surprising, though perhaps not expected, that prima facie very different types 
of sentence require different types of treatment. We shall defend this view against objections 
in Chapter 5.  
 
Irrealist, accepting Emptiness, rejects Reference. They do this by extending the scope of the 
pretence beyond the content of the fictions themselves to cover our metafictional talk. But 
this, on its face, seems misguided. Our metafictional talk seems very different from the types 
of claims licensed by the claims made within a fiction. These claims seem literally true and 
moreover seem to be claims about the world, just as claims about fictions are. Irrealists are 
forced to appeal to ad hoc principles of generation for games of make-believe which allow 
them to capture true identity claims such as ‘Ulysses is the same fictional character as 
Odysseus’, and to capture our creative talk above. If such manoeuvres were forced upon us, 
then we would have to accept them. But at first appearance, this is not the case as Emptiness 
is consistent with Realism and Reference. And as I shall argue in the remaining chapters, 
nothing should make us abandon the default view consisting of Realism, Authorial 
Creationism, Reference and Emptiness. 
 
Before, in the rest of the thesis, considering objections to the ontological, metaphysical and 
semantic components of the default view, let us say a little more about what we take to be the 








2. The Metaphysics of Fiction and Fictional Characters 
Realists and irrealists alike agree that fictions themselves exist and for some irrealists such as 
Walton (1990), recognition of the existence of fictions is essential.47 Moreover, fictions, at 
least the literary type, are conceived of, by both realists and irrealists about fictional 
characters, as abstract objects, in the sense that they are not to be identified with paradigmatic 
concrete objects and that they are repeatable in that they have instances. Literary fictions, it 
seems, cannot be identified with any number of concrete instances of the fiction, since no 
particular instance or instances of a fiction are required for the continued existence of the 
fiction. This fact also rules out identifying fictions with pluralities, sets, or sums of their 
concrete instances, given the temporal and modal rigidity of plural inclusion, set membership, 
and the parthood relation of classical mereology.48 One could construe literary fictions as (sui 
generis), scattered concrete objects, not identical to their concrete instances, but constituted 
by them. Just as more familiar concrete objects, such as organisms and artefacts, can gain and 
lose parts, and could have had parts different from those that they in fact do have, so too can 
fictions on this view.49 If fictions were concrete objects of this type, then they would differ 
from other artefacts in that, plausibly, artefacts are not only individuated by their creators, but 
also by the material that originally constituted them, whereas this is not the case for fictions. 
That is, although it is plausible that the desk at which I am writing this chapter could not have 
been made from a material other than glass, nor from a wholly distinct piece of glass, A Study 
in Scarlet could have been first instanced not on the paper it was in fact first written on, but 
on some different piece of paper, in fact it could have been first instantiated in some different 
medium altogether, such as slate. Indeed novels can exist without any copy of the novel 
existing. An author may have the entire thing in his head or in digital form. If a designer dies 
before realizing the blueprint of a new car, then his car never existed. But if a poet dies before 
writing down his poem, his poem still existed, as is testified by the oral tradition that pre-
dated the printing press.50 Perhaps, then fictions are to be identified with scattered concrete 
                                                          
47 At least we are concerned here with the debate between realists and irrealists about fictional characters against 
a shared background of realism about fictions. In considering one type of metaphysical objection to realism 
about fictional characters in Chapter 4, we consider an objection against repeatable artworks more generally, 
and find it lacking. Also the reason for thinking realism is part of the default view of fictional characters carries 
over mutatis mutandis to the case of fictions themselves. 
48 Sets are usually conceived of as abstract but Maddy (1990) seems to take impure sets to be concrete objects. 
Mereological sums are usually conceived of as concrete, but one may doubt this characterization given the 
similarity between sums, sets and other mathematical objects. 
49 This is how Sheehy (2006) thinks about social groups. 
50 I am also inclined to think that once created, fictions exist for evermore. That is, they can survive the 
destruction of all their copies and anyone who remembers them, although, as such, they will be epistemically 
inaccessible. Thomasson (1999: 7), on the other hand, thinks that fictional characters ‘depend on literary works 
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objects not solely consisting of their concrete instances, but also of relevant informational 
states such as the mental states of the author and those who have heard or read the fiction, 
and the relevant hardware states? 
 
In any case, the view that fictions are concrete objects is not plausible. Although we may talk 
of the location, weight or colour of a copy of a work of fiction, we do not talk this way about 
fictions themselves.51 So, both realists and irrealists about fictional objects are committed to 
the existence of fictions as abstract objects. And this commitment is warranted. As Friend 
(2007: 149) notes it is not part of our practice to deny the existence of fictions, unless we are 
in the grip of some revisionary philosophical theory. Moreover, our ordinary practices also 
support the idea that, although abstract, fictions exist. If I see you reading a copy of Patrick 
Süskind’s Perfume and I say ‘that is my favourite book’, I am not talking about the particular 
copy of the novel that you hold, but rather the novel of which you have a copy. 
 
But if both irrealists and realists about fictional characters alike are committed to the 
existence of fictions, construed as abstract objects, then there can be no in-principle objection 
to the positing of abstract fictional characters, unless there are particular problems for 
admitting abstract fictional characters into our ontology which do not cause similar trouble 
for an ontology of fictions. In that case, those who accept the existence of fictions should, if 
they want to be consistent, accept the existence of fictional characters, since, as we have seen 
we have good reasons for admitting them into our ontology, and they are simply more of the 
same. More generally, unless there are irresolvable problems for fictional characters, 
regardless of whether these problems afflict fictions themselves, we should assent to the 
existence of fictional characters. 
 
Of course, these considerations do not pronounce on the metaphysics of fictional characters. 
Rather, all that the previous argument establishes, provisionally at least, is that abstract 
fictional characters exist. The metaphysical questions of how they are to be individuated and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in order to remain in existence’. She concludes this based on her observation that ‘we treat fictional characters 
as ... existing because of their appearance in [fictions]’. But if ‘because’ here signals an epistemic explanation of 
why we think fictional characters exist, then her argument is invalid. Alternatively, if her premise makes a 
metaphysical dependence claim, it is not clear that it is true. So in either case her argument fails.  In any case, 
nothing turns on taking a stand on this issue here. 
51 At least in the relevant sense. We do talk of the location of a novel, but in doing so we are talking about the 
setting of the novel, not the location of its concrete instances. Similarly, we may say that a poem is dark or that a 




what properties they instantiate are left open. All we have is the anti-nominalistic claim that 
there are abstract fictional characters. 
 
There are, broadly speaking, two types of realism about fictional characters, internal and 
external realism. Internal realists maintain that fictional characters are individuated by sets of 
properties, so that a weak form of the identity of indiscernibles holds. The properties which 
individuate fictional characters on this view are the properties which the fictional character 
has from the perspective of the fiction. So for example, Sherlock Holmes is individuated in 
part by having a brother called ‘Mycroft’ and by living at 221b Baker Street. That Holmes is 
individuated by such properties does not entail the literal truth of, for example, ‘Sherlock 
Holmes has a brother called ‘Mycroft’’. 
 
Internal realism is often combined with two further views. Firstly, with eternalism, the view 
that fictional characters are not created, but rather exist eternally. Secondly, with some thesis 
of plenitude about fictional characters, for example, that for any set of relevant properties S, 
there is a fictional character that corresponds to S. Plenitude and eternalism sit well together, 
since if fictional characters are not brought into existence, what ensures that when novelists 
write their fictions, there is a fictional character for them to write about? The obvious answer 
is that, any fictional character that anyone might write about already exists. To claim 
otherwise would be to posit some pre-existing harmony between the fictional characters that 
exist and the intentions of would be authors. In the other direction, if there is a fictional 
character corresponding to every set of relevant properties, it seems that the properties 
themselves are sufficient for the existence of the character, and so, on the assumption that 
properties are eternal, plenitude supports eternalism, and at least denies creationism. 
 
It is hard to see how to divorce internal realism from eternalism and hence plenitude. If 
fictional characters are individuated by sets of properties internal to fictions, and these sets of 
properties already exist, then what more would be needed to ensure the existence of the 
fictional character to which the set corresponds. Not that some author write about the 
fictional character. As we have seen, however, Authorial Creationism is part of our ordinary 
way of thinking about fictional characters, and so internal realism has to be given up. 
 
A realist about fictional characters who rejects Creationism, will try and capture our 
creationist talk in some deviant way. Typically they will say that authors take a character and 
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make it fictional by writing a story about it. But it seems perfectly coherent to suppose that, 
as we ordinarily say, a writer creates a fictional character before writing any fictions about it. 
That is, he may dream up a character, giving him a name, characteristics and a history, before 
deciding to write anything about him. Indeed, we can imagine a writing team one of whom is 
good at creating fictional characters, the other of whom is good at writing stories employing 
them. In such a situation, the first author creates the character without creating any narratives 
in which they appear. And presumably some such possibilities do in fact obtain – I have been 
told this was the case with Michael Moorcock’s character Jerry Cornelious.52 So, internal 
realism cannot respect the common sense claim that authors literally create fictional 
characters. 
 
In any case there are further problems with internal realism. First, it is not intuitive that 
fictional characters are individuated solely by reference to properties attributed by the fiction. 
As Thomasson writes 
 
Suppose that a student happens upon two literary figures remarkably similar to 
each other; both, for example, are said to be maids, warding off attempts at 
seduction, and so on. Under what conditions would we say that these are works 
about one and the same fictional character? It seems that we would say that the 
two works are about the same only if we have reason to believe that the works 
derived from a common origin (Thomasson 1999: 6) 
 
I share Thomasson’s judgement, but many may not. We can bolster this claim by noting 
internal realism gives us no way to decide whether there are two distinct characters whenever 
externally related characters are described differently. For example, what makes the James 
Bond of Casino Royale the same as the James Bond of Dr No? The external realist has an 
answer, but the internal realist does not. The James Bond of Dr No, took as an input the 
James Bond of Casino Royale, reproducing and then modifying him. In general, reproduction 
seems key to individuating repeatable artworks including fictional characters. 
 
                                                          
52 So we reject Brock’s (2010) claim that it is a conceptual truth that “A fictional character is an individual 
picked out by a name or description first introduced in a work of fiction F, and referred to for the first time in 




Further, internal realism has the consequence that if an author had developed his work in 
slightly different ways, then he would have been writing about different fictional characters. 
For example, in Conan Doyle’s stories, Sherlock Holmes retires to a bee farm and writes The 
Practical Handbook of Bee Culture, with some Observations upon the Segregation of the 
Queen. Now if Conan Doyle had not acquiesced to public demand to bring back Holmes after 
killing him off at the Reichenbach falls, Holmes would not have been developed in this way. 
So according to internal realism, which individuates fictional characters by the properties of 
the stories in which they appear, if Conan Doyle had not acquiesced, he would have in fact 
been writing stories with a different fictional character. But ordinarily we do not think of 
fictional characters as being so modally fragile. We can wonder what would have happened if 
Holmes had married Irene Adler, for example. Would the public have rejected this Holmes, 
would Adler have turned her intellect to good? These have the feel of standard counterfactual 
questions, but cannot be construed as such if Holmes is as modally fragile as internal realism 
has it. 
 
Our case against internal realism is not undermined by the fact that we sometimes seem to 
equate two externally distinct characters. For example, in explaining the Bourne Trilogy to 
someone I might say ‘Jason Bourne is the James Bond character’ or ‘Jason Bourne is a James 
Bond type character’. Indeed, given the internal dissimilarity of Bourne and Bond it is hard to 
see how such statements could support internal realism. Of course this assumes that on 
internal realism fictional characters are individuated by all the properties attributed to them 
by the fictions they occur in and that such sets do not, as a matter of course, contain 
inconsistent properties. Perhaps there is room for an internal realism that abstracts away from 
some of properties encoded in fictions. Even so, this observation does not support internal 
realism to the exclusion of external realism. All it shows is that we need character-types or 
roles, not that we do not need externally-individuated fictional characters as well. Indeed 
given the truth appropriateness of ‘Jason Bourne is not James Bond’, it seems we do need 
both. And this should be no surprise. Just as we distinguish Barack Obama from the office he 
holds and Peter Shilton from the role he played for the England football team, so we should 
distinguish Jason Bourne from the role he plays. Roles, in fiction as elsewhere, may be 
individuated by properties internal to some practice, but it does not follow that the holders of 




Internal realism then had better be rejected in favour of external realism, which individuates 
characters not in terms of a set of properties ascribed to them by the fictions in which they 
appear, but rather by properties external to the fiction such as having been created by Zola at 
such and such a time or by being introduced on the first page of Brighton Rock. External 
realism solves the problems that faced internal realism. As a result, we can hold on to the 
intuition that fictional characters are literally created by authors, that fictional characters that 
occur in qualitatively identical stories may in fact be distinct, and that fictional characters are 
modally robust with respect to variation in their internal properties. Fictional characters then 
are metaphysically on a par with fictions. 
 
Now that we have dispensed with internal realism, we can set out some more of the features 
of fictional characters. We need to distinguish between two different ways of thinking about 
abstract individuals. First, there is a way of thinking about abstract individuals which 
distinguishes them from concrete individuals, and which is not concerned with change over 
time or diachronic identity. Take a work such as a song or a play. Once this work has been 
written, we can ask when does a performance of a song or a play count as a performance of 
that work. As we have noted qualitative identity is not sufficient for the identity of works. 
Similarly, qualitative identity of performances is not sufficient for those performances to 
count as performances of the same work. For a performance to count as a performance of a 
particular work a causal link is required, and in particular the performance must properly 
instantiate or reproduce the work. This does not mean that qualitative identity of 
performances is necessary for two performances to count as performances of the same work, 
however, since different singers and directors can instantiate or perform the work in different 
ways. But perhaps some degree of qualitative similarity to the original work is required for a 
performance to count as a performance of a work. And what goes for performances of plays 
and songs, goes for copies of written works, including musical scores and plays, and also 
parts of them such as fictional characters. When we are considering what counts as a 
performance or instance of an abstract individual in this sense, we are not concerned with the 
identity of the abstract individual over time or its development. This is not to say that there 
cannot be different adaptations of a work, because there can be. Rather such adaptations do 
not change any of the intrinsic features of the work. The work remains the same intrinsically, 




But there is a second way in which we think about abstract individuals, which does not 
distinguish them from concrete individuals, and which is concerned with change over time 
and diachronic identity. A striking feature of fictional characters is that they can be developed 
over time, and can change quite remarkably. Homer Simpson, in his initial incarnation on the 
Tracey Ullman show, was a crude and not particularly funny character, but over the years, 
with a team of writers, Homer has developed into the loveable, selfish idiot that we know 
today. So just like concrete objects, whether they be artefacts, or organisms, abstract 
individuals can change in radical, though perhaps not completely unconstrained, ways over 
time. Just as a single tree can change its intrinsic properties  over time, growing in size, 
changing in shape and health, so can a fictional character change its intrinsic properties over 
time, first encoding only a few properties, then many more, first being crude and 
uninteresting, then becoming well crafted and nuanced. 
 
This might at first seem like a disanalogy with other artworks and abstract individuals. In one 
way it does reflect a difference, but the surface phenomenon of change over time is common 
to other cases too. A writer of a book, whether it be fiction or non-fiction, will usually write 
several drafts of it. These are not like the performances of a work or the distinct print runs of 
a book. The author here is not taking an abstract individual and producing performances or 
instantiations of it. Rather he is, initially creating, and then changing an abstract individual.  
Once he and the editors are finished, the book is published. And what goes for books goes for 
musical works too, and even languages like Esperanto. 
 
Unlike in the case of fictional characters, however, most of this development is hidden from 
the public eye. These types of abstract individual do not usually see the light of day until they 
are finished, or in some sense complete. But this is inessential. Authors often circulate drafts 
of their work, and books, including novels, are often amended and given a second revised 
edition. Moreover, some abstract individuals do develop in the public eye in the same way in 
which fictional characters do: constitutions are rewritten or amended, and the rules of cricket 
and football are revised over time. So it is part of our ordinary thinking about abstract 
individuals that they both have instances, performances, copies etc, and that they are created, 
and can change their intrinsic properties over time. 
 
I said that the fact that fictional characters were recognized to change over time in a more 
transparent way than some other abstract individuals, notably artworks, reflected a difference 
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between fictional characters and these other abstract individuals. That difference is that often, 
but not always, fictional characters span other artworks in a way in which other artworks do 
not. That is, a fictional character can be a part of many stories, in a way in which, typically at 
least, other artworks are not parts of several different artworks. Of course, a song may be 
performed in several different films. 
 
This feature of fictional characters raises the question of how a fictional character gets into a 
fiction? One way a fictional character will get ‘into’ a fiction is when a writer writes a fiction 
that creates him. A second way that a character gets into a fiction is when he is reproduced. 
Once Sherlock Holmes is in a Study in Scarlet, initially, he will be in future copies of a Study 
in Scarlet in just the same way that a copy of a Study in Scarlet is a copy of that work: 
through proper reproduction. If I produce a copy of a Study in Scarlet, I thereby produce a 
copy of a work that contains Sherlock Holmes.53 
 
But there is a third way in which a fictional character can get into a fiction, and that is the 
way in which objects which have nothing essentially to do with fiction get into fictions, 
namely, by being referred to. Napoleon, the flesh and blood Emperor of France, is a character 
in War and Peace because Tolstoy referred to him in the course of writing War and Peace. 
Tolstoy then writes various things about him, some of which are true and some of which are 
false. Of course, Tolstoy in writing a fiction is not putting forward claims about Napoleon to 
be assessed for their truth or falsity, but that does not matter: some of the descriptive material 
in the book Napoleon satisfies and some he does not. Similarly, just as an author can write 
about a real emperor by referring to him, an author could write about a fictional character by 
referring to it. And of course this has been done many times in nonfiction. But a writer could 
get a fictional character into a fiction, in just the same way that an author gets an emperor 
into a fiction, or a nonfiction writer gets an emperor or fictional character into a work of 
nonfiction. 
 
So on the present account we must distinguish between uses of a fictional name in a fiction 
which fail to refer, which is the usual case, from uses which do refer, which happens in the 
final type of case described above. All this will become relevant in Chapter 6 when we 
discuss other realist accounts of fictional singular negative existentials, and when we consider 
                                                          
53 We should not read this spatial terminology too literally. 
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Everett’s (2007) case of Piglet and ‘πιγλετ’, which could be construed as a counterexample 
to the account of fictional characters and fictional names offered here. 
 
One question that needs to be addressed in any fully worked out theory of fictional characters 
is precisely how and when are fictional characters created? We can distinguish two broad 
answers to these questions. First we could have a thin realism, which says that fictional 
characters are the shadows of fictional names used by authors: whenever an author pretends 
to refer, she creates a fictional character (see our discussion of Brock in Chapter 4). Such an 
answer seems to over generate fictional characters as it does not distinguish characters from 
what we might call mere extras. Is it really the case that a name used once in passing by an 
author is sufficient to create a fictional character? Second, we could avoid these problems by 
adopting a thick realism on which there are substantive constitutive conditions on creating 
fictional characters, just as there are, perhaps, substantive constitutive conditions on creating 
a fiction. The thick realist, however, owes us an account of what these conditions are. For 
example, some creationists (Schiffer 1996, 2003) say that a fictional object is created only 
when a certain make-believe process has come to an end. This is an interesting and 
complicated question, and one that we shall not try to adjudicate here. For the purposes of 
argument we shall assume thin realism in the remainder of the thesis as it seems harder to 




So the default view of fictional characters is both realist and creationist. The default view of 
fictional names is that they are ambiguous, both having a use on which they refer to abstract 
entities and a use on which they fail to refer. 
 
There are, I think, three types of objection to the default view about fictional characters.54 
First, it may be thought that the ambiguity posited here is simply implausible, despite being 
well-motivated. We shall outline and respond to this objection in Chapter 5 by arguing that it 
rests on a false assumption which has been accepted only because a restricted diet of 
examples. Once we cast the net more widely, and examine the issue more systematically, we 
                                                          
54 One could also raise an epistemological objection which trades on the fact fictional characters are, in some 
sense, abstract. But we are here taking for granted that we are happy with the existence of, and our knowledge 
of, other abstract individuals such as fictions. Such an objection then would be, in the present context, out of 
place as it is not an especial problem for realists about fictional characters. 
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shall find that the ambiguity of fictional names is not implausible after all, and that the 
phenomena found should be expected given the type of ambiguity posited. 
 
Once we have outlined this response, this will allow us to deal with the second type of 
objection to creationism, namely the fact that we are, in some sense, intuitively irrealists 
about fictional characters, which is manifested in the fact that we accept many singular 
negative existentials as true which involve fictional names. We shall see in Chapter 6 that 
once we embrace the polysemy of fictional names outlined above and defended in Chapter 5, 
the realist about fictional names can help himself to the best account of singular negative 
existentials which we argued for in Chapter 2. Moreover, largely following Everett (2007), 
we shall argue that only the realist about fictional characters who accepts the polysemy of 
fictional names can provide an adequate account of fictional singular negative existentials, 
and so this constitutes another argument in favour of the polysemy of fictional names, given 
realism about fictional characters. 
 
The final type of objection to fictional characters, which we shall consider in the next 
chapter, is metaphysical in character. Really, there are a variety of objections to the 








Chapter 4: Metaphysical Objection to Creationism 
 
In this chapter we consider the first set of objections to the default view of fictional characters 
which we outlined and argued for in the previous chapter. This family of objections highlight 
what are thought to be problems with the metaphysics of the default view. Some of the 
objections are directed against realism about fictional characters per se, others against any 
form of abstract realism, and yet others against creationism. None of the objections, though, 
are decisive. In fact, none of the metaphysical objections that we shall consider even threaten 
the plausibility of the creationist metaphysics of the default view.55 We shall see then, that the 
metaphysical part of the default view is left unscathed. 
 
 
1. Objections from Abstractness 
Deutsch (1991) offers the following argument against creationism about fictional characters. 
 
(1) Fictional characters are abstract objects. 
(2) Abstract objects exist necessarily and cannot stand in causal relations. 
(3) Creating a thing entails bringing it into being or causing it to exist. 
Therefore 
(4) Fictional characters are not created. 
 
Note that Deutsch’s argument is not an argument against realism per se, but only against 
creationism. Realists about fictional characters such as Parsons (1980) and Lewis (1978) who 
think that fictional objects are concrete will reject (1), although this does not really get to the 
root of the issue for them, since objects which do not actually exist cannot be manipulated 
causally. In any case, all non-creationist realists will deny (3). For them, fictional objects 
cannot be causally manipulated by us, and so they have to give some account of our 
creationist talk. As we have argued, this is not a very plausible position, and misses out on the 
real motivation for being a realist in the first place. 
 
                                                          
55 There are distinct metaphysical objections to other versions of realism about fictional characters which we 
omit as our version of creationism is not even alleged to be subject to these. See Sainsbury (2009 passim but see 
Chapter 5 especially §5.4) for a summary of these. 
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But on the creationism endorsed here, fictional characters are not like paradigmatic concrete 
objects, so on some reading of (1), (1) is to be accepted. Moreover, according to creationism, 
fictional characters are literally created, and not simply discovered, just as concrete artefacts 
are, and so some version of (3) must also be accepted. Similarly, the creationist must reject 
Deutsch’s conclusion, and so must either reject Deutsch’s argument as invalid or else reject 
(2). 
 
First, we should note that as it stands, Deutsch’s argument is dialectically ineffective. If (2) 
could be established, then that in itself would be sufficient to refute creationism, which denies 
that all abstract objects, and in particular that fictional characters, exist necessarily. But 
noting this does not get to the heart of the issue, since Deutsch’s argument can avoid this 
response, and would be dialectically more effective, if we were to replace (2) with the weaker 
 
(5) Abstract objects cannot stand in causal relations. 
 
Alternatively, we could simply replace (2) and (3) with 
 
(6) Abstract Objects cannot be created 
 
But leaving the precise formulation of Deutsch’s argument to one side, there is reason to 
reject it since, as Brock notes, Deutsch’s argument generalizes to other artworks which those 
who reject creationism about fictional characters typically concede are created 
 
If it presents a genuine problem for creationist views about fictional characters, 
the argument will also, mutatis mutandis, present a genuine problem for 
creationist views about artworks generally. Novels, symphonies, poems, and 
plays are all abstract objects if fictional characters are. The last two premises 
can thus be used to the same effect to demonstrate that such works of art are 
not created by their authors and composers. (Brock 2010: 342) 
 
Such a conclusion is implausible, but I think it is no more implausible than denying 
creationism about fictional characters, a thesis Brock himself rejects. So as long as the anti-
creationist about fictional characters is willing to embrace a more thoroughgoing anti-
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creationism, he will be unmoved by Brock’s generalizing manoeuvre. Indeed Brock himself 
claims that 
 
Although creationists have advanced many arguments in support of the 
ontological thesis [that fictional characters exist], arguments in support of the 
fundamental thesis [that fictional characters are created by their authors] are 
almost completely lacking. Usually, the thesis is simply taken for granted and 
assumed to be intuitively obvious to anyone who reflects upon it (Brock 2010: 
342). 
 
But what Brock says about fictional characters we can say about artworks more generally: it 
is often taken for granted that artworks are created, not argued. Of course, in Chapter 3 we 
offered arguments in favour of creationism about fictional characters and some artworks 
more generally, so we do have good reason to be creationists. In any case, we can note that 
the same type of argument has been offered in the case of other artworks, and so we cannot 
simply reject Deutsch’s argument on the basis that it overgenerates, as some anti-creationists 
about fictional characters are anti-creationists about repeatable artworks more generally. 
Cameron (2008), for example, presents us with the following ‘paradox’ which mirrors 
Deutsch’s argument against creationism about fictional characters: 
 
(7) Musical works are created. 
(8) Musical works are abstract objects. 
(9) Abstract objects cannot be created.56 
 
And what goes for musical works presumably goes for other repeatable artworks 
characterized as abstract.57 
 
                                                          
56 Cameron (2008) responds to the ‘paradox’ by distinguishing between ordinary English in which claims like 
‘musical works exist’ and ‘musical works are created’ are true, and a language for doing fundamental ontology, 
Ontologese, in which such claims are false. Unfortunately, we do not speak Ontologese, and Cameron provides 
no phrase book, so we literally do not understand what Cameron is saying when he says there are musical works 
but there are no musical works, where bold indicates Ontologese. In any case, we shall see that such desperate 
measures are not needed in order to resolve Cameron’s ‘paradox’. 
57 To be fair to Cameron (2008: 296 n3), he explicitly says that “As is common in this debate, I am confining 
my attention to works of Western classical music; it should not be supposed that what we say here should 
generalize to other works of music, and certainly not to art works in general.” But analogous versions of the 
‘paradox’ will arise for creationism about other repeatable artworks – see below. 
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Hazlett (Forthcoming) argues against the existence of any repeatable artworks such as 
symphonies, novels and fictional characters. His argument is as follows: 
 
(10) If there are repeatable artworks, they are abstract objects 
(11) No abstract object has any accidental intrinsic properties 
(12) All artworks (including repeatable artworks) have at least one accidental intrinsic 
property 
Therefore, 
(13) There are no repeatable artworks. 
 
Hazlett notes that Rohrbaugh (2003: 177-95) presents a similar argument against identifying 
repeatable artworks with types: artworks have some accidental properties, can change their 
properties, and do not exist eternally, whereas types lack all of these features, and so 
repeatable artworks can’t be types. Hazlett’s argument is a generalization of Rohrbaugh’s, 
although for presentational purposes, he focuses only on the accidental properties of 
repeatable artworks. 
 
So here we see that there is a general form of argument against creationism about repeatable 
artworks which runs as follows, if the argument targets creationism but not other versions of 
realism 
 
(14) Repeatable artworks of type A are abstract objects 
(15) If creationism is true, repeatable artworks of type A have feature F 
(16) No abstract object has feature F 
Therefore, 
(17) Creationism about repeatable artworks of type A is false 
 
Or takes the following form if it targets realism per se 
 
(18) If they exist, repeatable artworks of type A are abstract objects 
(19) If they exist, repeatable artworks of type A have feature F 




(21) There are no repeatable artworks of type A58 
 
In the above discussion, feature F is being created or standing in causal relations (Deutsch, 
Cameron), or having accidental intrinsic properties (Hazlett). But given that abstract objects 
are often taken to be one or more of the following: not located in space, not located in time, 
not causal agents, not causal patients, immutable and unchanging, eternal, have no accidental 
properties, exist necessarily, and to be identical if qualitatively indiscernible;59 there are many 
versions of the schematic argument one could run in principle.60 In what follows, let us say 
that an object that has whatever balance of these features we are concerned with is 
ABSTRACT1. 
 
Now, as I argued in Chapter 3, fictional characters, like other repeatable artworks, are not 
paradigmatic concrete objects because (i) they cannot be identified with their instances, and 
(ii) because they are repeatable in the sense that they have instances, and paradigmatic 
concrete objects do not have instances. So in this sense they are abstract. Let us say that 
objects that have instances are ABSTRACT2. But notice that the commitment embodied in 
the claim that fictional characters are abstract in this sense does not decide whether fictional 
characters are abstract in the sense of having any of the features listed above. That is, prima 
facie at least, being ABSTRACT2 does not entail being ASBTRACT1. 
 
The creationist then, can accept the schematic argument, when the first premise concerns 
ABSTRACT2 entities and the third premise concerns ABSTRACT1 entities, but notes that 
the argument is invalid on such a reading. On the other hand, why should the creationist 
accept either valid version of the argument? A creationist will not accept that repeatable 
artworks of type A are ABSTRACT1, but only that they are ABSTACT2. But what reason do 
they have for accepting that no ABSTRACT2 object has feature F? That is, what reason is 
there to accept that objects which have instances are nonspatial, nontemporal, immutable, 
etc? Sainsbury, an irrealist about fictional characters, sees the essence of the point, even if he 
is not correct on the details: for the creationist, fictional characters “are abstract not in the 
                                                          
58 Although we are here focussing on repeatable artworks, there is an even more general version of the argument 
which replaces ‘repeatable artworks of type A’ with ‘entities of type E’. What I say below applies just as much 
to the generalized version of the argument as it does to the version which focuses on repeatable artworks. 
59 See Lewis (1986: 81–86), Hale (1987: 45–77), Burgess and Rosen (1997: 13–25), and Rosen (2006) for some 
discussion of the characterization of abstract objects. 
60 This is not to suggest that creationism about repeatable artworks is committed to denying that repeatable 
artworks have any of these features, however. 
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Platonic sense of being eternal and immutable, but simply in that they are nonspatial and 
nonmental” (2009: 91). So, without some argument that being ASBTRACT2 entails being 
ABSTRACT1, the schematic argument against creationism, and the versions of it discussed 
above, are to be rejected as either invalid or otherwise uncompelling. 
 
If everything is either concrete or ASBTRACT1, then given that it is agreed on all sides that 
repeatable artworks are not concrete, they would have to be ASBTRACT1, if they existed. 
But it is by no means obvious that everything is concrete or ASBTRACT1. Indeed, repeatable 
artworks appear to be a counterexample to the claim that everything is either concrete or 
ABSTRACT1, as do some other non-concrete objects such as constitutions and games. This 
is simply to say that the argument schema some things that are not concrete are ~F, 
repeatable artworks of type A are not concrete, therefore repeatable artworks of type A are ~F 
is formally invalid, and is not compelling. There is no simple way to get from the fact that 
some types of objects in the rag-bag collection that philosophers label ‘abstract’ are ~F, to the 
claim that some other, prima facie very different type of object in that same highly gruesome 
collection, is also ~F. 
 
So nothing about repeatable artworks follows from Yablo’s (2003) observation about the 
intrinsic properties of mathematical objects, which Hazlett (Forthcoming) endorses: 
 
Not a whole lot is essential to me: my identity, my kind, my origins, 
consequences of these, and that is pretty much it. Of my intrinsic 
properties, it seems arguable that none are essential, or at least none 
specific enough to distinguish me from others of my kind. … I have by 
contrast huge numbers of accidental properties, both intrinsic and 
extrinsic. Almost any property one would ordinarily think of is a property 
I could have existed without. … Abstract objects … are a different story. 
I do not know what the intrinsic properties of the empty set are, but odds 
are that they are mostly essential. Pure sets are not the kind of thing that 
we expect to go through intrinsic change between one world and another. 
Likewise integers, reals, functions on these, and so on (Yablo 2002: 220). 
 
We can agree with Yablo and Hazlett that the intrinsic properties of sets and other 
mathematical objects are essential. Indeed, we can accept this claim for some non-
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mathematical abstracta as well. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that as well as 
mathematical objects, pure universals, tropes and propositions, if there are any, all have their 
intrinsic properties essentially. But it does not follow from these observations, and is not even 
made plausible by them, either that repeatable artworks have their intrinsic properties 
essentially, or that there are no such artworks. It does not help to note that, unlike the other 
items in our list above, pure universals are repeatable and have instances. Since from this 
fact, and the claim that pure universals have their intrinsic properties essentially, it does not 
follow that any type of entity which has instances has their intrinsic properties essentially. 
Repeatable artworks, despite sharing this feature with pure universals are, prima facie, very 
different types of entity. For example, pure universals, but not repeatable artworks, obey the 
qualitative identity of indiscernibles and are not created. Indeed, even if there were some 
other type of entity, E, which shared a whole range of features with repeatable artworks, it 
would not be legitimate to infer that since Es have their intrinsic properties essentially, 
repeatable artworks do, especially given the fact that this it at odds with how we ordinarily 
think about repeatable artworks. Similarly, noting that numbers and sets are not created and 
do not stand in causal relations, does nothing to support the claim that anything which is not 
concrete, and, in particular, that anything which is ABSTRACT2, does not stand in causal 
relations and is not created. 
 
Cameron and Deutsch seem to rely on the claim that everything is either concrete or 
ABSTRACT1. But this, as I have argued, is an unwarranted assumption. The correct 
approach to metaphysics is not to decide what metaphysical categories there are based on a 
few examples, and then decree that everything must fall into one of these categories. Rather 
we should examine the actual structure and features of things and categorize them on the 
basis of those features. The labels ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ are occasionally useful, but here 
they are a hindrance. Shadows and tables are both labelled ‘concrete’, but they are obviously 
very different types of entity and we should not expect that generalizations about medium-
sized dry goods hold of light phenomena. And the same goes, it would appear, for numbers 
and fictional characters. 
 
My approach in the last Chapter is similar to the commonsensical approach of Thomasson 
(1999). For any putative type of entity, E, we ask: What sort of things are Es (if there are 
any)? Once we have decided how Es appear to be, we can see if there are any problems 
construing them in this default way. If there are, then we may need to modify our account, or 
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reject the existence of Es altogether. But if there are not, then we are free to take things as 
they seem to be. So without further argument, these objections, which trade on the non-
concrete nature of repeatable artworks, are hopeless. So, is any additional argument supplied 
which would show that being ASBTRACT2 entails being ABSTRACT1, or which otherwise 
support the arguments from abstractness above? 
 
Both Cameron and Hazlett accept that repeatable artworks are not to be identified with token 
concrete or physical objects. In addition Hazlett explicitly accepts that repeatable artworks, if 
they exist, are not concrete since they have instances. So Cameron and Hazlett’s reasons for 
accepting that repeatable artworks are, in some sense, abstract are the same as those given 
above. That is, they think repeatable artworks are ABSTRACT2. But why do they think that 
ABSTRACT2 entities are ASBTRACT1 entities? 
 
Cameron says only the following: 
 
abstract objects cannot be the relata of causal relations — they can 
neither exert a causal influence or be causally acted upon; hence, abstract 
objects cannot be created. [This claim] can be resisted, of course. ... [But 
this is] controversial, however, and I am tempted to side with Dodd in his 
claim that abstract objects cannot be created, and as a consequence that if 
it is true at any time that an abstract object a exists, then it is true at all 
times that a exists (Cameron 2008: 296-297). 
 
This is hardly decisive and should not move any creationist. Of course, we can allow that 
ABSTRACT1 entities cannot be created, but the question here is whether ABSTARCT2 
entities can be, and Cameron has provided us with no reason to think that they cannot be. As 
we have said before, it needs to be argued that everything is either concrete or ASBTRACT1, 
not assumed. 
 
Hazlett, however, advances an argument for his claim that abstract objects have their intrinsic 
properties essentially. If this argument is applicable to ABSTRACT2 objects, then the 
creationist about repeatable artwork does face a problem. The starting point of Hazlett’s 




the existence of (pure) abstract objects (whatever this amounts to) makes 
no demands on the world (in a sense that would eventually need to be 
articulated). There is nothing the world must be like for it to be the case 
that (in whatever sense this is true) (pure) abstract objects exist. The 
necessary existence of the number 2 (whatever this amounts to) isn’t a 
matter of there being a stubborn regularity across the space of possible 
worlds, with each of them having a 2 in it (Hazlett Forthcoming). 
 
He then argues that it is the fact that abstract objects have their intrinsic properties essentially 
which explains why abstract objects make no demands on the world. 
 
One might question Hazlett’s premise that abstract objects make no demands on the world, 
but something like it has been defended by others (see Fine’s (2003) distinction between 
transcendent and necessary truths). In any case, let’s accept the premise for the sake of 
argument. Hazlett continues: 
 
it turns out to be their maximally constraining essences that explains why 
the existence of abstract objects can be gotten for free in this way. For 
suppose that x has some accidental intrinsic property F. In some worlds x 
is F, and in others x isn’t F, and there are worlds in which x changes from 
being F to not being F. But if x is like that, then it becomes impossible to 
see how the existence of x could “made no demands on the world,” for if 
x is like that, then x is clearly a denizen of the world, not a trivial existent 
that can be had for free, as it were, as Yablo and Cameron argue. ... What 
we cannot make sense of is the idea that the existence of the number 2 
makes no demands on the world, whilst the number 2 undergoes intrinsic 
changes as a result of changes in the world. 
 
So I conclude that abstracts objects have all their intrinsic properties 
essentially (Hazlett Forthcoming).61 
 
                                                          
61 That F be an accidental property of mine, so that it is possible for me to be F and it is possible for me to be ~F 
does not entail that it is possible for me to change from being F to being ~F, or vice versa. But Hazlett’s point is 
unaffected by this observation. 
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Whatever the merits of Hazlett’s argument, it is hard to see the relevance of it to our present 
concerns. The creationist does not accept that fictional characters exist necessarily and make 
no demands on the world, so he does not need to explain this by appealing to the claim that 
they have their properties essentially. Nor can Hazlett appeal to the premise that all abstract 
objects exist necessarily, since he accepts that “{Eiffel Tower} exists only if the Eiffel Tower 
exists” (Hazlett Forthcoming), and given that the Eiffel Tower is a contingent existent, so is 
{Eiffel Tower}. 
 
Hazlett recognizes that what he said above needs to be modified to cover abstract objects 
such as {Eiffel Tower} since it is not true that {Eiffel Tower} makes no demands on the 
world; a prerequisite of its existence is the existence of the Eiffel Tower. Nevertheless 
Hazlett claims that 
 
the existence of {Eiffel Tower} also makes no demands on the world, at 
least in the sense that the existence of {Eiffel Tower} is nothing over and 
above the existence of the Eiffel Tower. There is no additional way the 
world must be to ensure that, in addition to the Eiffel Tower, it also 
includes {Eiffel Tower}. The existence of {Eiffel Tower} makes no 
demands of its own on the world; the only demands made are those made 
by the existence of the Eiffel Tower (Hazlett Forthcoming). 
 
Now just as pure sets have their properties essentially, so do impure sets. And presumably 
Hazlett thinks that in both cases it is this that explains why abstract objects make no demands 
on the world, however we are to understand that claim. But what is the argument for 
supposing that all supervenient entities, like impure sets, have all their intrinsic properties 
essentially? Supervenient entities do make a demand on the world, even if it is a demand 
already imposed by their subvening base. But given this there is no barrier to the supervenient 
entity having accidental properties, since this was only argued to be in conflict with the claim 
that an entity makes no claim whatsoever on the world.  
 
Hazlett notes that sets do not inherit their intrinsic properties from their members, the things 
on which their existence supervenes. So perhaps this observation is the basis for an argument 
that all abstract entities have their intrinsic properties essentially. It is plausible that for 
supervenient objects, there can be no modal variation in the intrinsic properties that they do 
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not inherit from their supervenience base, since if there were it is hard to see how they 
impose no extra demand on the world. And since sets do not inherit their intrinsic properties 
from their elements, this would explain why there is no modal variation in the intrinsic 
properties of sets. So what Hazlett would have to show is that repeatable artworks do not 
inherit all of their modally flexible intrinsic properties. But this he cannot do. The intrinsic 
properties of an artwork are inherited from the processes involved in its creation and 
modification. For example, the properties a fictional character encodes depends upon the 
stories it appears in. But given that the stories in which a fictional character can appear in can 
vary, there is nothing to prevent the properties that a fictional character encodes form 
varying. So Hazlett’s argument for the modal inflexibility of the intrinsic properties does not 
work for fictional characters. Moreover, the same considerations show it does not work for 
repeatable artworks and perhaps for ABSTRACT2 objects more generally. And this is not a 
surprise as we knew all along that entities whose existence supervenes on the properties of 
other entities can have accidental intrinsic properties: simply take any macroscopic concrete 
object. So Hazlett’s argument for the claim that all abstract entities have their properties 
essentially fails. The challenge to creationism from abstractness, then, is answered. 
 
 
2. The Alleged Indeterminacy of Fictional Characters 
If there are fictional characters, as the realist maintains, then there must be a certain number 
of them. Indeed, there must be determinate number of them, for whilst a fiction may leave 
open the number of characters within it, since fictions can be incomplete, the world cannot 
leave open the number of fictional characters in reality corresponding to a work of fiction, or 
so the thought goes. But it is also plausible that how many fictional characters there are is 
determined by the relevant works of fiction. So it might be thought that if it is indeterminate 
how many characters a fiction is about, it will be indeterminate how many fictional characters 
there are in reality. So here we have an inconsistent triad: A fiction can leave it undecided 
how many characters there are;  if a fiction leaves it open how many characters there are, then 
it is indeterminate how many fictional characters there are in reality; but it cannot be that it is 
indeterminate how many fictional characters there are in reality. Below I consider three 






2.1. Indeterminacy of Identity 
It seems that fictions can contain cases where it is indeterminate whether one fictional 
character is identical to another fictional character. Anthony Everett (2005) argues that this 
leads to a problem for realists about fictional characters, since the indeterminacy within the 
fiction is carried over into reality, and that there cannot be indeterminacy of this latter type in 
reality. That is, if it is indeterminate in a fiction whether a is identical to b, then, Everett 
claims, the realist is committed to saying that the fictional character a is indeterminately 
identical with fictional character b. But there is a widely accepted, though controversial, 
argument, due to Gareth Evans (1978), for the conclusion that there can be no such thing as 
indeterminate identity.62 And so, Everett concludes, realism about fictional characters is to be 
rejected. I shall grant, for the sake of argument, that Evans’ argument against indeterminate 
identity is sound, or at least that if realism about fictional characters is committed to 
indeterminate identities, this makes the position less attractive. The question then is, is 
Everett correct that realism about fictional characters is committed to worldly indeterminate 
identities? 
 
Consider the following short story taken from Schneider and Solodkoff (2009) 
 
Bah Tale 
There once was a man called Bahrooh 
There once was a man called Bahraah 
But nobody knew if Bahraah was Bahrooh 
Or if they were actually two 
  
Everett claims (2005: 629) of a similar case that ‘it is pretty clear that in this story it is left 
indeterminate as to whether [Bahraah] is [Bahrooh]’. So the first premise of Everett’s 
argument against realism about fictional characters is 
 
(22) It is indeterminate whether Bahraah = Bahrooh in the world of Bah Tale 
 
Everett’s second premise is the following biconditional 
 
                                                          
62 See also Lewis (1988). For a rejection of Evans’ argument see Williams (2008). 
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(23) (It is indeterminate whether Bahraah = Bahrooh in the world of Bah Tale) ≡ (it is 
indeterminate whether the fictional character Bahraah = the fictional character 
Bahrooh) 
 
Everett then concludes by modus ponens that 
 
(24) It is indeterminate whether the fictional character Bahraah = the fictional character 
Bahrooh. 
 
And so the realist about fictional characters is committed to indeterminate identity. 
 
Everett supports (23) by recourse to the following principle: 
 
(25) If a story concerns a and b, and a and b are not real things, then (a = b in the world 
of the story) ≡ (the fictional entity a = the fictional entity b). 
 
Now (25) only supports (23) given the ‘plausible assumption that the biconditional in [(25)] 
preserves indeterminacy’ (Everett (2005: 629)) so that (25) entails 
 
(26) If a story concerns a and b, and if a and b are not real things, then (it is 
indeterminate whether a = b in the world of the story) ≡ (it is indeterminate whether 
the fictional character a = the fictional character b). 
 
(23) is an instance of the biconditional in the schema (26), so given that Bahraah and 
Bahrooh are not real things, (26) underwrites (23). 
 
Schneider and Solodkoff (2009: 140) however note that (22) is ambiguous between the 
following two readings: 
 
(27) It is left-open whether in the world of Bah Tale: Bahraah = Bahrooh 




As Schneider and Solodkoff note, the natural reading of the story supports (27) rather than 
(28). That is, the story leaves it open whether or not Bahraah is Bahrooh, rather than the story 
saying that Bahraah is indeterminately identical to Bahrooh. 
 
Given (27) we have the falsity of the following two claims 
 
(29) According to Bah Tale Bahraah = Bahrooh 
(30) According to Bah Tale Bahraah ≠ Bahrooh 
 
But as Schneider and Solodkoff note, (29) and (30) just reflect the familiar incompleteness of 
fictions, in this case that the fiction is incomplete with respect to the identity properties of its 
characters. They do not by themselves yield any kind of indeterminacy. Moreover, when (22) 
is understood as (27), Everett’s argument is invalid since (27) cannot be combined with (23) 
to yield (24), only (28) can be so combined. This is because it is only plausible to allow that 
(25) transmits indeterminacy, if the indeterminacy on both sides of the biconditional is the 
same. But the indeterminacy that Everett wants on the right-hand side of (26) is not whether 
Bah Tale leaves some fact open, but indeterminacy in the nature of things in reality. So what 
Everett needs is not (26) but 
 
(31) If a story concerns a and b, and if a and b are not real things, then (it is left open by 
the story whether a = b) ⊃ (it is indeterminate whether the fictional character a = the 
fictional character b).63 
 
Now (31) is not entailed by Everett’s principle (25), so if Everett wants to make the valid 
version of his argument compelling he needs to supply support for (31). One way to support 
(31) would be to note that even though Everett’s original argument is blocked, realists about 
fictional characters still face the following question: is the fictional character Bahraah 
identical with the fictional character Bahrooh? Unless the realist can answer this question, 
then her position is incomplete, and without an answer, (31) may begin to look plausible. So 
can the realist provide an answer to this question and thereby block any temptation we have 
to endorse (31)? 
 
                                                          
63 Schneider and Solodkoff use the biconditional version of (31) but only the left-right direction embodied by 
(31) is needed in order to validate Everett’s argument. 
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Schneider and Solodkoff propose the following principle as a way of providing an answer to 
the realist’s question 
 
(32) If a and b are fictional entities originating in story S, then (the fictional entity a = the 
fictional entity b) ≡ (According to the story S (a = b)).64 
 
(32) blocks the route from Bah Tale to indeterminate identity. Since it is not the case that 
according to Bah Tale that Bahraah is Bahrooh, then, by (32), the fictional character Bahraah 
is not identical to Bahrooh. So if (32) can be defended, the realist has a solution to the 
problems raised by Bah Tale. But before considering if (32) is defensible, we should see how 
Schneider and von Solodkoff employ it to deal with further problematic cases for the realist. 
 
As we saw above, Bah Tale itself was not a case of a fiction according to which two 
characters are indeterminately identical. But, as Schneider and von Solodkoff note, Everett 
could simply re-run his argument with a revised example such as the following 
 
Bah Tale II 
There once was a man called Bahrooh 
There once was a man called Bahraah 
But nothing determined if Bahraah was Bahrooh 
Or if they were actually two. 
 
Here we do have a story which supports a claim like (30), and so Everett can run his 
argument as he originally intended, that is, by exploiting (23). But, if the realist follows 
Schneider and von Solodkoff in endorsing (32), she will reject Everett’s (23) and (25), from 
which it plausibly follows. Moreover, Schneider and von Solodkoff’s (32) seems just as 
plausible as Everett’s (25), so by following Schneider and von Solodkoff, the realist can 
provide a seemingly plausible answer to the question of whether the characters from Bah Tale 
II are identical or not: by (32) they are not, since it is not the case that according to Bah Tale, 
Bahrooh = Bahraah. 
 
                                                          
64 We argued in Chapter 3 that fictional characters need not originate in any story, so (32) is incomplete. We 
shall ignore this below. 
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Everett also presents a distinctive kind of case of identity which he takes as problematic for 
the realist, which we can illustrate with the following tale from Schneider and von 
Solodkoff:65 
 
Bah Tale III 
Bahrooh and Bahraah were strange lads 
Bahrooh was Bahraah and yet 
Bahraah not Bahrooh 
A riddle that is – do you know what to do? 
 
In the face of examples like Bah Tale III, Everett thinks that the realist about fictional 
characters must conclude both that Bahrooh and Bahraah are identical, and that Bahrooh and 
Bahraah are not identical. But this is a contradiction, so if Everett is correct, realism about 
fictional characters is untenable. 
 
Given (32), however, this contradiction does not follow. Rather what follows from (32) is 
that Bahrooh and Bahraah are identical, since according to Bah Tale III, Bahrooh = Bahraah. 
To derive the conclusion that Bahrooh and Bahraah are non-identical from (32), and so end 
up with Everett’s contradiction, we would need the claim that it is not the case according to 
Bah Tale III that Bahrooh and Bahraah are identical (and as Schneider and Solodkoff note, 
the same holds, perhaps, for Everett’s principle (25)). But, as we have seen this is false, even 
though it is true that according to Bah Tale III, Bahrooh ≠ Bahraah. Moreover, for any story 
for which it is not the case that according to the story a=b we will not, by (32), have it that 
Bahrooh and Bahraah are identical. So no contradiction threatens, if we accept (32) (or 
perhaps even if we accept Everett’s (25)). 
 
So, assuming that (32) is well motivated, the realist has an answer to the puzzles of identity 
presented by Everett. It is clear, I think, that on the way of approaching the problem that we 
are considering, the realist must accept something like (32). For example, the following 
principle is simply not plausible 
                                                          
65 Everett (2005) in fact presents what he thinks are two distinct objections to realism. Stories like Bah Tale and 
the story of The Slynx below, he takes to show the realist is committed to ontic indeterminacy, whereas stories 
like Bah Tale III lead to logical incoherence. And he is correct in thinking of things this way. But I shall follow 
Schneider and von Solodkoff in considering the problems concerning identity together, and considering the 




(33) If a and b are fictional entities originating in story S, then (the fictional entity a ≠ the 
fictional entity b) ≡ (According to the story S (a = b)). 
 
But noting this is insufficient to support (32), since although (33) is implausible, the 
following criterion of identity for fictional characters is not: 
 
(34) If a and b are fictional entities originating in story S, then (the fictional entity a = the 
fictional entity b) ≡ (It is not the case that according to the story S (a ≠ b)).66 
 
But (32) and (34) are not extensionally equivalent. Since it is neither the case that according 
to Bah Tale nor according to Bah Tale II that Bahrooh and Bahraah are identical nor that they 
are not identical, (32) rules that the Bahrooh and Bahraah of both tales are not identical, 
whereas (34) rules that the Bahrooh and Bahraah of both tales are identical. Similarly, given 
that according to Bah Tale III, Bahrooh and Bahraah are both identical and non-identical, 
(32) identifies Bahrooh and Bahraah whereas (34) distinguishes them. 
 
Now the presence of (32) and (34) as criteria of identity for fictional characters, shows that 
Everett has not demonstrated that the realist about fictional characters is committed to either 
contradictions or to indeterminate identities. That is, Everett has not shown that there is an in 
principle impossibility for the realist in providing criteria of identity which are consistent, and 
so unless Everett can show that the realist must adopt (25) rather than (32), (34), or some 
other criteria, his argument from indeterminate identity lapses. 
 
As well as (25), Everett endorses 
 
(35) If the world of a story concerns a creature a, and if a is not a real thing, then a is a 
fictional character. 
 
In support of these two principles, (25) and (35), Everett (2005: 627) says that they 
 
                                                          
66 Such a criterion is suggested as an alternative to (31) by Caplan and Muller (Forthcoming) in the course of 
motivating their own view, on which see below. Also see Howell (Forthcoming p. 30 n. 43) 
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seem so fundamental to our conception of a fictional character I doubt very 
much that any account which rejected [either] would deserve to be counted 
as an account of fictional characters but should rather be regarded as an 
account of some other sort of entity. Moreover, our acceptance of many 
[claims involving fictional names] appears to result from our applying [(35)] 
and/or [(25)]. Thus, for example, I suspect that our intuitions that [(35)] is 
true are at least as strong as our intuitions that [‘Raskolnikov is a fictional 
character’] is true and that we only judge [it] to be true because we accept 
[(35)] and take the world of Crime and Punishment to contain Raskolnikov. 
I would argue, then, that the fictional realist cannot reject [(35) or (25)] 
without thereby undermining our motivation for accepting fictional realism 
in the first place. 
 
Note that Everett does not here, or anywhere else in his 2005, give an example of a fictional 
claim that is supported by (25). Perhaps the type of claims he has in mind are claims such as 
‘the fictional character Dr Watson and the fictional character Sherlock Holmes are distinct’, 
and ‘the fictional character Dr. Grumman and the fictional character Colonel Parry are 
identical’ which, together with the obvious truths about the relevant fictions, follow from 
(25). But these claims can also be underwritten by (32) and (34) as well as by (25). That is, 
all three principles agree on the non-problematic cases, only coming apart when strange 
things happen with attributions of identity. So it is simply not clear that we are committed to 
(25) as opposed to (32) or (34), and so identity attributions in fiction pose no problem for the 
realist. 
 
Still, the fact that there are multiple, competing consistent criteria of identity, as (32) and (34) 
attest, does present the realist with a question, namely which, if any, provides the correct 
criterion of identity for fictional characters? Providing an answer to this question is not 
needed to answer Everett’s initial challenge from indeterminacy, however. So unless we think 
that uncontroversial principles of identity are required for the respectability of a type of 
entity, the fact that we have competing principles does not cause a problem for realism. But it 
might be argued that there is nothing that could settle the matter, and that choosing either (32) 
or (34) would be ad hoc. And this is precisely what Everett claims is the position of the realist 
who rejects (25), (although Everett is not addressing (32) or (34) explicitly). Commenting on 




even if we block my arguments by rejecting [(35)] and [(25)], we still face 
the problem of deciding whether the Frick-character is the same as the 
Frack-character ... And there seems no principled way in which we might 
decide these questions. In each case we have no more reason to choose one 
of the options than the other and whatever choice we make will be 
unacceptably ad hoc. Hence, I would argue, simply rejecting [(35)] and 
[(25)] will not save the fictional realist (Everett 2005: 632-33). 
 
Similarly, Howell (Forthcoming) and Caplan and Muller (Forthcoming) both think that to 
choose (32) over (34) or vice versa would be unacceptably ad hoc. So is there anything to be 
said for preferring one over the other? 
 
Schneider and von Solodkoff support (32) by recourse to the following principle: 
 
Grounding. The nature (and identity) of fictional entities must be grounded in facts 
about their stories; unless the story provides sufficient grounds for the identity of an 
entity x and an entity y, no such identity is constituted. 
 
But even if we accept Grounding this does not mean we should accept (32). As Schneider and 
von Solodkoff note 
 
Bah Tale III leaves us with a riddle concerning the identity of Bahrooh and 
Bahraah. We are puzzled by the question of whether the fictional Bahraah is, 
or is not, identical with the fictional Bahrooh. Because of this puzzlement 
Bah Tale III does not seem to provide sufficient grounds for the identity. So 
we think we should be driven back to the default option, which is the non-
identity of the two fictional entities. Accordingly, we are willing to restrict 
[(32)] to consistent fictions, and to add a separate clause saying that 
inconsistent identity statements yield the non-identity of the fictional entities 
(Schnieder and von Solodkoff 2009: 148). 
 
And what Schneider and von Solodkoff say about the puzzlement of Bah Tale III, we can 
equally well say about Bah Tale II, since we are working on the assumption that 
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indeterminate identity is metaphysically impossible. In any case, saying that inconsistent 
identity statements yield the non-identity of fictional characters, does not differ from the 
verdict that (32) provides on Bah Tale II: Bahrooh and Bahraah are not identical according to 
(32) since it is not the case that according to Bah Tale II that they are identical. So although 
adopting a different approach to inconsistent fictions, brings Schneider and von Solodkoff’s 
treatment closer to that of (34) as they now agree on Bah tale III, (32) still gives a different 
verdict on identity questions than (34), since they disagree on Bah Tale II. 
 
But Caplan and Muller (Forthcoming) argue that Grounding is no more plausible than the 
following principle: 
 
Grounding*: The nature (and distinctness) of fictional entities must be grounded in 
facts about their stories; unless the story provides sufficient grounds for the 
distinctness of an entity x and an entity y, no such distinctness is constituted 
 
Grounding and Grounding* cannot both be true since this would mean that in the absence of 
the relevant facts about a story, x and y would both be identical and not identical which is 
impossible. So are there reasons for preferring Grounding over Grounding* or vice versa? 
 
First, we should note that not all contexts are symmetric with respect to identity and non-
identity. For, as is well known, the necessity of identity 
 
 NI: x=y ⊃  x=y 
 
can be proved if we assume the modal axiom 
 
K:  (P ⊃ Q) ⊃ ( P ⊃ Q) 
 
with appropriate axioms governing identity, whereas the necessity of distinctness 
 
 ND: x≠y ⊃  x≠y 
 




B: ~P ⊃ ~◊P.67 
 
The converses of both NI and ND follow if we assume the modal axiom 
 
T: P ⊃ P. 
 
This shows that for a given operator, , the principle 
 
NI*: (x=y) ≡ ( x=y) 
 
can be derived in a weaker logic than the principle 
 
ND*: (x≠y) ≡ ( x≠y). 
 
Now we should note that NI* is similar to (32) whereas the contrapositive of ND*, is similar 
to (34). So perhaps the asymmetry between our modal principles concerning identity carries 
over to an asymmetry between (32) and (34). 
 
We can support this suggestion by noting that, in effect, (32) and (34) embed identity claims 
within epistemic contexts, contexts which are taken to be factive with respect to identity 
claims (at least in the consistent case). Because of this, we can read off identity facts from 
identity claims made within the story. But what we cannot do is read off identity facts from a 
lack of non-identity claims within a story. That is, where K is a knowledge operator, KP ⊃ P 
is valid, whereas ~K~P ⊃ P is invalid. So it seems as if Grounding is in better shape than 
Grounding*. More needs to be said given fictions which are inconsistent with respect to 
identity facts, but I think a case can be made for preferring Grounding over Grounding*. 
 
Nevertheless, I think that we can see that none of the approaches above are adequate 
treatments to the identity of fictional characters, because we ought not to take identity claims 
embedded within story operators as factive. All of the approaches thus far assume that it is 
                                                          
67 Williamson (1996a) also provides a proof of ND from NI using principles governing a rigidifying actuality 
operator instead of B, but we can safely ignore this in what follows. 
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identity and distinctness claims within a fiction which ground the identity and distinctness of 
fictional characters. But given the account of fictional characters sketched in the last chapter, 
it is really not obvious why this should be so, and so we need to look at the issue afresh. 
 
As we have defined it, the constitutive claim of realism is that there are fictional characters. 
Everett’s claims about indeterminacy do not follow from this realist principle. Similarly, the 
constitutive claims of creationism and authorial creationism do not entail the premises that 
Everett requires in order to raise the indeterminacy objection in the first place, nor the 
alternative principle suggested by Schneider and von Solodkoff. So Everett’s challenge can 
only get started by attributing the creationist more than she need be committed to, and more 
than we embraced in Chapter 3. 
 
Everett assumes the following ontological principle 
 
(35) If the world of a story concerns a creature a, and if a is not a real thing, then a is a 
fictional character. 
 
Without such a principle, it does not follow that for the creationist Bahrooh and Bahraah are 
fictional characters, let alone that the creationist is committed to any ontic indeterminacy. 
(35) does not allow that some fictional names correspond to no character, and so, it may be 
overly strong. The creationist could, perhaps, maintain that in writing stories similar to those 
above Everett has created no fictional character. But plausibly this is just an accident of the 
example. Suitably developed, the creationist would be committed to fictional characters such 
as Bahrooh and Bahraah. It will not do to simply deny that when we have these 
indeterminacy cases, there is no fictional character, since there can be as much reason to posit 
fictional characters in these cases as in others. In any case, we decided in Chapter 3 to adopt 
thin realism about fictional characters for convenience, so we must grant that the creationist 
is committed to (35). 
 
Apart from the caveat just noted, (35) is a very weak realist claim since it does not say that 
there is a one to one correspondence between characters and names, and so it allows both that 
some fictional characters will correspond to multiple names and that some fictional characters 
correspond to no names, perhaps corresponding only to descriptions, demonstratives or 
pronouns. Further, note that the principle does not say that the name as used in the fiction 
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refers to the fictional character. This is the case on some creationist views, but not on the 
creationism defended here. More importantly, the principle is sufficiently weak that nothing 
follows from it concerning the identity conditions of fictional characters. So the bare 
ontological commitments of the creationist cannot lead to the worries about indeterminacy 
that Everett presses. 
 
Neither does Everett’s objection get a foothold from considering general principles 
concerning identity. Identity is the relation each thing has only to itself. Following Wiggins 
(2001) we offer no definition of identity, but rather elucidate it by providing constitutive 
conditions on the identity relation. First, it is constitutive of identity that it is an equivalence 
relation, that is, it conforms to the following three principles: 
 
Reflexivity: ∀x x=x 
Symmetry: ∀x ∀y (x=y) ⊃ (y=x) 
Transitivity: ∀x ∀y ∀z (x=y & y=z) ⊃ (x=z) 
 
Second, again following Wiggins, we take it that identity conforms to the unrestricted version 
of 
 
Leibnizian Community: ∀x∀y (x=y ≡ ∀F (Fx ≡ Fy)) 
 
The right-to-left direction of Leibnizian Community is the identity of indiscernibles, which is 
trivial if ‘F’ is unrestricted, so as to include ‘is identical with x’. The left-to-right direction 
yields 
 
Leibniz’s Law: ∀x∀y (x=y →∀F (Fx ≡ Fy)) 
 
which is employed by Evans (1978) in his proof of the impossibility of indeterminate 
identity. Given that we are taking it that Leibnizian Community is constitutive of identity, it 
is not open to the realist about fictional characters to block Evans’ and hence Everett’s 
argument against realism by denying Leibniz’s Law. In any case, as Wiggins puts it “How if 
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a is b could there be something true of the object a which was untrue of the object b? After 
all, they are the same object” (1967: 5).68 
 
But Everett’s claims of indeterminacy do not follow from these constitutive conditions on 
identity, nor from the combination of these conditions and creationist metaphysical and 
ontological commitments. 
 
As we have seen both Everett and the consistent realist proposals discussed above accept that 
facts about the identity of fictional characters are grounded in facts about the relevant 
fictions. And they all accept that 
 
(36) If an appropriate story says of two fictional characters a and b, that a=b and does not 
say that a≠b, or that it is indeterminate whether a=b, then a=b. 
 
But as should be clear by now, this is not a commitment of either realism or creationism as 
we have construed it, nor a corollary of the metaphysics we outlined in Chapter 3. So what 
can be said in favour of (36) and should the creationist accept it? Note that we do not accept a 
generalized version of (36), 
 
(37) If an appropriate story says of a fictional character a that Fa and does not say that 
~Fa, or that it is indeterminate whether Fa, then Fa 
 
That is, we do not ordinarily think that it follows from it being true according to the Conan 
Doyle stories that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, that the corresponding fictional character is 
a detective. Moreover, not only is there no entailment, the claim that the fictional character is 
a detective is false. As has often been noted, being a detective is a concrete entailing 
property, in the sense that ∀x (λy. y is a detective <x>) ⊃ (λz. z is concrete <x>).69 
 
                                                          
68 Even if the realist were to reject Leibniz’s Law, they would face the challenge that Wiggins presses against 
those who claim that identity is relative: if it is not Leibniz’s Law that licenses the validity of the 
intersubstitutability salva veritate of x and y, where it is valid, then what principle does license this substitution? 
69 Some realists say that although no fictional characters instantiate the property of being a detective, some do 
encode this property, and more generally that (37) holds for encoding. But Evans’ and hence Everett’s 
arguments concern the instantiation of properties; there is no problem with a fictional object encoding the 
property of being indeterminately identical with itself. 
126 
 
It might be replied, however, that whereas no fictional object has a concrete entailing 
property, they do have properties which do not entail being concrete, such as being self-
identical. Moreover, the realist might, despite not being a Meinongian, follow Parsons (1980) 
or Zalta (1998), and distinguish between two types of properties of fictional characters. 
Certain properties, such as being a detective, characterize a fictional character, whereas 
others, such as self-identity, constitute it. And we should only embrace principles like (37), 
for constituting properties. 
 
But this response will not help save (37), since it is subject to counterexample. A story may 
say of a particularly well-crafted fictional character created by a Mr. Smith, that it is not well-
crafted and not created by Mr. Smith. But it would not follow in this scenario, and indeed 
would not be true, that our character was not well-crafted and not created by Mr. Smith. 
 
In general then, we do not export claims made within a fiction, to extra-fictional reality. It 
might be replied, however, that the creationist at least must accept that identity claims (and 
existence claims – see 2.2 below) are special since authors are responsible for the identity 
(and existence) of their fictional characters, according to creationism. This latter claim is true, 
but does not help the standing of (36). In addition to being in control of a character’s identity 
(and existence), authors control whether their characters are well-crafted or not (assuming 
they have the requisite ability), which stories they appear in, and who created them. But this 
control is not exercised by making the corresponding claim within a story: we do not accept 
the pronouncement of a novel, if it says of itself that it is the novel Ulysses written by James 
Joyce! Indeed, Fargo opens with the words "This is a true story. The events depicted in this 
film took place in Minnesota in 1987. At the request of the survivors, the names have been 
changed. Out of respect for the dead, the rest has been told exactly as it occurred." But as the 
Coens have admitted, this is not true.70 71 
 
Schneider and Solodkoff (2009: 139) note that “It is hard to see what truths in a fiction might 
ground the identity or non-identity of fictional entities, if not truths about identity”. But the 
                                                          
70 http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1499898/rewind-separating-fact-from-cinematic-fiction.jhtml 
71 None of this is to deny that authors can control the properties of their fictions and fictional characters by 
making claims within a story, but only that they do not do so by making the corresponding claim within a story. 
An author makes a novel interesting or complicated by the claims made within the story, but not by saying ‘this 
story is interesting/complex’. 
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creationist can agree with this, arguing that the identity and non-identity of fictional 
characters are grounded by truths about fiction not truths in a fiction. 
 
Some account like this is needed to account for true inter-fictional identity claims such as that 
the Odysseus of Odyssey and the Ulysses of Tennyson’s Ulysses are the same fictional 
character. Appealing to truths within the relevant fictions will not ground this identity claim 
since neither is it the case that according to the Odyssey, Ulysses is Odysseus nor according 
to the Odyssey and Ulysses (combined), Ulysses is Odysseus. 
 
One might think that what determines the identity of fictional characters is the intention of 
the author; the fictional character a = the fictional character b iff an author intends for the 
fictional character a to be identical to the fictional character b. And presumably, an author’s 
intentions are usually reflected by the relevant truths in fiction, although this need not be the 
case. But we should note that authors do not always control the identity of their creations in 
this way. As Caplan and Muller (Forthcoming) note, an author might not intend either that 
a=b nor that a≠b, indeed, not having a grip on the Evans proof, they might intend the 
impossible, namely that a to be indeterminately identical to b. 
 
But regardless of whether an author has an intention for two characters to be the same, he 
may do something intentionally which means that they are identical or distinct. As we argued 
in Chapter 3, what is important for the identity of abstract individuals is proper reproduction. 
If an author reproduces an existing fiction, he does not create a fiction, but rather the fiction 
he produces is identical to some pre-existing fiction. It is only when an author entertains or 
expresses a sequence of propositions in the way characteristic of fiction, which are not the 
result of proper reproduction of an existing fiction, that he creates a new fiction. And the 
same goes for fictional characters. 
 
The creationist might propose the following criterion of identity for fictional characters 
 
(38) a=b iff a results from the same creative act that b results from. 
 
But whilst the left-to-right direction of (38) is fine, the right-to-left direction is suspect. This 
is because an author might take an existing fictional character and split it into two. This 
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single creative act would then result in two distinct fictional characters, thus showing that 
sameness of creative act is not sufficient or identity. The creationist could instead try 
 
(39) For all fictional characters x, y, x=y iff for some tokens u and v, u is an instance of x 
and v is an instance of y, and either u is reproduced properly from a chain containing 
v, or v is reproduced properly from a chain containing u 
 
Unfortunately, this won’t do for the initial introduction of a fictional character. Such a 
character when initially created is not a reproduction of anything, but is self-identical. I do 
not propose to try to refine (39) in order to provide a counterexample-free criterion of 
identity. We have already said enough to show that the worry that Everett raises is not well-
founded. The facts that ground the identity and persistence of fictional characters will be facts 
concerning the fiction and the creative process. At least assuming thin realism what a fiction 
says about the identity of its characters does not determine when and how they are created, 
and so do not determine their identity in the way that Everett and his interlocutors imagine. 
Of course, if there are substantive constitutive conditions on the creation of fictional 
characters, then perhaps truths within the fiction do bear upon how and when fictional 
characters are created. But even on such a picture this will not be in the straightforward 
manner presupposed above. In any case, it cannot be that indeterminate identity claims within 
a fiction lead to the creation of an indeterminate number of fictional characters. At best such 
facts might lead to the constitutive conditions for the creation of a fictional character not 
being satisfied. 
 
Now that we have seen why Everett’s challenges to realism concerning the identity of 
fictional characters fails, we can quickly discuss the two remaining types of indeterminacy 
advertised at the beginning of section 2, starting with Everett’s challenge from indeterminate 
existence. 
 
2.2 Indeterminacy of Existence 
 
Consider Tatyana Tolstaya’s recent novel The Slynx. Now in the end, I 
think, it is pretty much left open whether or not there really is a Slynx in 
Tolstaya’s novel. It seems to be an indeterminate matter as to whether the 
world of that novel contains a Slynx. But then, given [(35)], it follows that it 
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is an indeterminate matter as to whether there is such a fictional creature as 
the Slynx (Everett 2005: 630). 
 
Just as with (25), Everett wants (35) to preserve indeterminacy (2005:630 n15). There are 
three points to note about the details of Everett’s presentation. First, because (35) is a 
conditional not a biconditional, nothing whatsoever follows from it given The Slynx. (35) tells 
us what is the case if a novel concerns a, but not what follows if it does not concern a or if it 
is indeterminate whether a novel concerns a. What Everett should have appealed to is the 
biconditional version of (35): 
 
(40) The world of a story concerns a non-real thing a iff a is a fictional character. 
 
Second, we have already given reason to reject both directions of (40). The right-to-left 
direction is undermined by the creation of fictional characters outside of fictions, who are 
never used in fictions, as the case of Jerry Cornelius discussed in Chapter 3 shows. The left-
to-right direction is subject to counterexample if we abandon thin realism, and say that there 
is more to creating a fictional character than pretend reference. In any case, let’s leave these 
objections to one side. 
 
Third, just as in the case of indeterminate identity, what Everett’s example shows is that a 
story can leave something open, but this is not the kind of indeterminacy which, if 
transmitted by (40) yields any problems for the realist. So in fact what Everett needs is 
 
(41) If it is left-open whether in the world of a story there is a thing a, then it is 
indeterminate whether there is a fictional character a. 
 
But this is not supported by (35). Nevertheless, as Schneider and Soldokoff note, the realist 
still has to decide whether there is the fictional creature the Slynx or not. Now Schneider and 
Soldokoff take it for granted that according to The Slynx either the Slynx is a creature living 
in the woods or the Slynx is a mythical creature, and so either way, according to The Slynx 
there is a Slynx. But this is not true. Of course there could be stories which leave it open 
whether an entity is concrete or abstract, but this is not what The Slynx is doing, it is leaving 
it open whether there is a Slynx or not: saying the Slynx might be mythical is a way of saying 
that it does not exist. It only follows that according to The Slynx the Slynx exists, if realism 
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about mythical characters is true according to the story, but this cannot simply be assumed. 
So the realist cannot simply appeal to claims about what is true in the story to ground what is 
true in reality in the way in which Schneider and von Solodkoff do. But as we saw above, she 
need not. Whether or not there is a fictional character corresponding to the Slynx of the story, 
is determined by whether or not the author created one, and not by claims of existence within 
the story. 
 
So we can see that the challenges raised by Everett based on indeterminacies within fictions 
do not undermine realism in the slightest. So there is no need, as one prominent realist has, to 
withdraw from the ontological and metaphysical elements of the default view. Howell was 
simply incorrect to think that Everett’s challenges “are fundamental problems that appear to 
show that [Howell’s form of] realism is untenable” (2010: 161). 
 
 
2.3 Indeterminacy of Number 
There is a final type of indeterminacy regarding fictional characters not pressed by Everett 
(2005), although it is mentioned in passing by Kroon and Voltolini (2011) and discussed by 
Schneider and von Solodkoff (2009). Consider the following hypothetical cases, which could 
have been extracts from works of fiction 
 
(42) As I approached the bridge, I saw some men. I decided to play it safe and turn back. 
(43) Lord Merlington gathered an army of over ten thousand to attack the township. 
(44) Only one of Jake’s brothers could be said to be tall. The others were all under 5ft 7. 
 
In each of these examples, a fiction talks about an indefinite number of people. But there 
cannot be a corresponding indefinite number of fictional characters in reality. A fiction can 
leave it open how many brothers Jake has, but the world cannot leave it open how many 
fictional characters there are corresponding to Jake’s brothers, or so the thought goes. 
 
The realist has three options in these cases: (i) there is no fictional character, (ii) there is a 
single fictional character, or (iii) there are multiple fictional characters. Of course, the realist 
need not give the same answer in each case. Faced with such cases Schneider and von 




had better withdraw from admitting fictional Fs merely because some story 
has it that there are Fs. What is needed for a fictional entity to exist is not just 
any general existential claim within a story, but some more specific one: the 
story must contain quasi-reference to an individual entity, for a corresponding 
fictional entity to exist. Such a quasi-reference can be achieved by the use of 
a proper name, a definite description, or some other device that is in non-
fictional contexts suitable for the introduction of a particular object into 
discourse. Whether a story involves quasi-reference to some object is to be 
settled by the best interpretation of the story. 
 
So we can now state our proposal about the existence-conditions for fictional 
entities: 
 
Existence. If a story T involves quasi-reference to an entity a, which is neither 
a real thing nor a fictional entity originating in another story, then the 
fictional entity a exists (because of T). 
 
A final note: the fictional realist may still say that some fictional entities exist 
because of non-specific existential statements within stories. But not (a) 
fictional species-member(s), but rather a fictional species itself or, 
alternatively, a fictional group. Just as there are fictional characters, 
corkscrews and countries, there can be fictional kinds, species and groups. 
These are not kinds, species and groups, and they do not have instances or 
members (Schneider and Solodkoff 2009: 147). 
 
Schneider and Solodkoff’s answer is fine, as far as it goes but it gets things wrong in an 
important way. It is not quasi-reference per se that leads to the creation of fictional 
characters, since characters can be created outside of fictions with no quasi-reference (see 
below). So once again, we need to take home the lesson that we cannot read off our ontology 
from claims within a fiction, or even from quasi-reference within a fiction. The number of 
fictional characters in a fiction depends on the creative acts of authors. These will often go 




So we can see that indeterminacy, in any of the forms we have considered, does not threaten 
realism about fictional characters. 
 
 
3. Brock’s Argument Against Authorial Creationism 
Brock’s argument against creationism neither rests on controversial claims about non-
concrete objects, nor about the indeterminacy of fictional characters. Rather, Brock (2010: 
342) argues directly against the characteristic creationist claim that fictional characters are 
created (by authors). Regardless of whether or not fictional characters have a spatial location 
 
if fictional objects are created, they do have a temporal location, and, in 
particular, there must be a moment at which the character comes into 
existence for the first time. One problem for the abstract creationist, then, is 
specifying when fictional characters are brought into existence by their 
author. When, exactly, does life begin for a fictional character? (Brock 2010: 
355) 
 
One might think that the same worry arises for concrete artefacts as Brock concedes: 
 
Answering questions about the first moment of a contingent entity’s existence 
is difficult for philosophers of every stripe. This is true even when 
considering paradigmatically concrete objects. … Metaphysicians worry 
about when a statue comes into existence. Does it come into existence at the 
same time as the lump of clay from which it is composed? If so, why do we 
say the artist created the statue from the lump of clay? If not, does this show 
that two different objects—a lump of clay and a statue—can occupy the same 
region of space-time? (Brock 2010: 355-356) 
 
If this is correct, then although there is a question for creationism about fictional characters, 
there is not an especial problem here, unless we are happy to deny the existence of complex 
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concrete objects on the same basis, and I am here assuming that we are not.72 But Brock 
thinks this is not the correct way to look at things: 
 
But it is important to realize that the difficulties expressed here [in the case of 
complex concrete objects] aren’t really problems about how such entities are 
created. They are instead worries about the nature and identity conditions of 
such individuals. Once we have determined what it is for something to be a 
person, and once we have accounted for any differences between a statue and 
a lump of clay, there will be no further mystery about when such individuals 
come into existence for the first time. The same cannot be said for fictional 
characters if they are indeed abstract artefacts (Brock 2010: 356 my 
emphasis). 
 
But here Brock seems to be changing the question. The initial problem Brock poses for the 
creationist is to specify when a fictional character comes into existence. And this problem has 
parallels in other metaphysical discussions. Brock responds by saying that in the case of 
fictional characters, but not in the case of concrete objects, there is a further how-question: 
how are fictional characters created? 
 
Brock claims that creationists are either silent on the question of how fictional characters are 
created, or else follow John Searle’s account (1974-75: 73): “By pretending to refer to people 
[better: objects] and to recount events about them, the author creates fictional characters and 
events.” So here we see that Searle provides an answer to Brock’s how-question. But Brock 
argues that Searle’s answer is unsatisfactory because it conflicts with commonsense. Brock 
thinks that no matter how we understand Searle’s notion of pretend reference, Seale’s answer 
to the how-question allows us to infer when a fictional character is created, and that any of 
these inferred answers to the when-question conflict with common sense. 
 
In order for Brock to substantiate his claim that there is a disanalogy between concrete 
objects and fictional characters, the same argumentative strategy would need to fail in the 
case of any concrete objects we are willing to countenance. But Brock has not shown or even 
attempted to show this. Moreover, it is far from clear that this argumentative strategy does 
                                                          




not generalize. For example, ‘via certain biological processes’ is not an implausible answer to 
the how-question ‘how do people come into existence?’ But when we try to be more precise 
about what we mean, we run into trouble. If we say that the relevant biological process is the 
one where a sperm fertilizes an egg, we give up on psychological persistence conditions for 
people which seem very natural in the face of Lockean thought experiments. On the other 
hand, if we say that the relevant biological process is one which invariably leads to 
consciousness, then we have to deny the commonsense claim that I was once an embryo, 
since some embryos never develop into conscious creatures. The difficulties in precisifying 
our answer to the how-question in the case of the personal identity debate, and the problems 
with the inferred answers to the when-question, does not lead us to reject the existence of 
people. So despite Brock’s protestations, it has not been established that there is an 
asymmetry here between fictional characters and objects that both irrealists and realists about 
fictional characters are happy to admit into our ontology. In any case, for the purposes of 
argument, I shall assume that the creationist should, or at least would be in a much better 
position if she could respond to Brock’s argument. 
 
Before considering Brock’s argument in detail, we should pause to note immediately that it 
fails to establish its advertised conclusion. Brock argues that “if there are fictional characters, 
they are not created by authors” (2010: 342) and that “The basic idea is that no matter how 
the creationist identifies where, when, and how fictional objects are created, the proposal 
conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters” (Brock 2010: 339). 
But Brock is not entitled to his conclusion. This is because Brock argues for his claim by 
considering only three answers to the following question: what is pretend reference and 
which acts of it count in answering the how-question? But Brock has done nothing to 
establish that the three accounts of pretend reference he considers are the only plausible 
options for the creationist. Without this, Brock’s argument by elimination simply does not 
establish his conclusion. Rather what Brock has shown, at best, is that three ways of 
answering the above how-question fail, in virtue of the inferred answer to the when-question.  
We should see Brock’s argument, therefore, not as a knock-down argument against 
creationism, but rather as a request for more information from the creationist. If we agree 
with Brock that the creation of fictional characters is a mysterious affair, we should view 
Brock’s discussion as posing an explanatory challenge to the creationist. But there is no in-
principle impossibility to creationism established by Brock. And, as Brock himself notes, the 
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realist should not be overly concerned with Yagisawa’s argument that realists about fictional 
characters cannot account for fictional negative existentials, as 
 
Yagisawa has found fault with two popular ways to paraphrase negative 
existential claims. But, for all Yagisawa has said, there may be other more 
acceptable paraphrases available to the creationist (Brock 2010: 345). 
 
But what is good for the goose is good for the gander. 
 
In any case, let us focus on Brock’s discussion of the three potential precisifications of 
pretend reference that he considers. Then we shall be in a better position to tell whether there 
is anything to Brock’s contention that the creationist faces a problem in answering the how-
question. 
 
The first answer Brock considers is that the pertinent notion of pretend reference occurs 
whenever an author uses a fictional name within a fiction. The problem with this answer, 
Brock thinks, is that it overgenerates fictional characters. For example, not only would a 
fictional character be created when Conan Doyle first introduces Sherlock Holmes, there 
would also be a fictional character created on each subsequent use of ‘Holmes’ by Conan 
Doyle. As Brock (2010: 357) puts it “Presumably no one would want to say that he [Conan 
Doyle] created a new fictional character each time he [pretended to refer using the name 
‘Holmes’]. The account must therefore be rejected.” 
 
Brock is correct that this suggestion intuitively overgenerates, although it is not clear how 
much of a problem this overgeneration is per se. Of course, we do not always track these 
other Sherlock Holmes characters, but perhaps they are none the worse for that (cf. Lewis 
(1986) on universalists regarding composition). Moreover, it seems that we often do want to 
distinguish between various Sherlock Holmes’s: the Holmes of a Study in Scarlet, the post-
Reichenbach Falls Holmes, the Holmes of the canonical works. The proposal under 
consideration might be thought to allow for this possibility. As long as the creationist has an 
abstract artefact that allows her to straightforwardly account for sentences such as 
 




she might think that this is good enough. If she has additional Holmes characters too, this is 
unexpected, but perhaps not that damaging. 
 
If the creationist were to take this route, it would be something of a cost. But in addition to an 
unintuitively large ontology, this response needs to account for the fact that we need a single 
Holmes character which corresponds to all the uses of the name ‘Holmes’ by Conan Doyle. 
That is, as well as accounting for the truth of (45), the creationist needs a Sherlock Holmes 
character to account for the truth of 
 
(46) Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes in 1887 and continued to develop him until 
1927. 
 
which intuitively requires that there be a single Holmes character developing over those forty 
years.73 Now it is consistent with this desideratum that whenever Conan Doyle uses ‘Holmes’ 
he creates an additional character, but this would be a strange view. Even if the creationist 
can explain away the overgeneration problem, he has to provide an account of how it is that 
all uses of a denotational expression create a fictional character, whilst still corresponding to 
a more all-encompassing character which accounts for the truth of sentences like (46). 
Furthermore, if we have an explanation of how the various uses of ‘Holmes’ correspond to a 
single character, then we shall likely have a response to Brock’s how-question. And although, 
as mentioned above, we do often distinguish between various Holmes characters, these do not 
appear to correspond to the plethora of Holmes characters created on this view. 
 
In addition to this overgeneration problem, the current proposal also faces an undergeneration 
problem, since, as we have seen, it seems that some fictional characters are introduced not by 
names but by other potential denoting expressions such as demonstratives, pronouns and 
descriptions. Indeed, some fictional characters are nameless.74 The obvious fix to the 
undergeneration problem is to allow all denoting phrases into the account and not to privilege 
names. But Brock (2010: 359) counsels against this move since, although this amendment 
solves the undergeneration problem, it does so only by making the overgeneration problem 
worse. 
                                                          
73 Appearances here can be deceptive, however. As we shall see in Chapter 5, anaphoric dependence of the kind 
exhibited in (46) does not require co-reference. Still it is not clear that denying co-reference in this case allows 
us to account for the truth of (46). 




In order to avoid such massive overgeneration perhaps we should say that not every use of a 
name by an author pretending to refer creates a fictional character, but only that the first such 
use of a name does. This is the second answer that Brock considers. But Brock rejects this 
answer as it still overgenerates fictional characters, albeit not on the scale of the previous 
proposal. For example, this proposal has it that in Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde we have two fictional characters – Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde – whereas Brock 
thinks intuitively there is only one. Brock, then, thinks that the creationist must look for 
another account. 
 
Whatever we want to say about the Jekyll and Hyde case in particular, Brock is surely correct 
that there is an overgeneration problem, as an author can use distinct expressions for the same 
character, for instance by pretendedly referring to the same person. The problem ramifies 
once we allow for expressions other than names to be used by authors to pretendedly refer, 
which we need to do in order to avoid the undergeneration problem noted above. (Whether 
we have the converse problem of ‘the same name’ being used to pretendedly refer to distinct 
people depends on how we individuate names). 
 
Now a realist of a certain stripe could respond to Brock as follows. “[T]he author is only 
pretending to refer on the first occasion of utterance; every subsequent use involves a genuine 
case of reference to the fictional character created at an earlier time” (Brock 2010: 357). The 
suggestion is that when Stevenson pretendedly refers, using ‘Jekyll’ for the first time, he 
creates a fictional character, but subsequent uses of ‘Jekyll’ simply refer to the fictional 
character and since these are acts of reference and not of pretend reference they do not 
generate further fictional characters. Moreover, uses of distinct words, such as ‘Hyde’, only 
result in further fictional characters when they are used in an act of pretend reference, not 
when they are used to refer to pre-existing fictional characters. 
 
We have already committed to rejecting this response, however; on our account an author’s 
use of a fictional name within the scope of a fiction fails to refer to a fictional character 
(except in special circumstances).75 In any case, as we have stressed, it is not plausible that 
authors are, as a matter of course, referring to their creations in their storytelling. This is what 
                                                          
75 See the discussion of how a fictional character gets into a fiction in Chapter 3 and our discussion of Everett’s 
case of πιγλετ in Chapter 6. 
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Sainsbury (2009: 122) gets right when he says that this type of realist conflates a 
representative vehicle with what is represented. Fictional characters conceived of as abstract 
artefacts represent, but what an author writes about is what is represented. (What’s more, as 
we shall see in Chapter 6, such realist accounts have trouble with accounting for singular 
negative existentials). So we must agree with Brock that this second suggestion for which 
acts of pretend reference create fictional characters is to be rejected. 
 
The third answer Brock considers is that a fictional character is created whenever an author 
intends to create a new fictional character and pretends to refer to it or otherwise uniquely 
identify it. But Brock provides three types of putative counterexample to this proposal. 
 
Brock’s first objection to this account is that it undergenerates. To show this, Brock presents 
a case which he thinks contains no act of pretend reference, on this third construal, but where 
intuitively there are many characters by the realist’s lights. Brock asks us to consider an 
author who not only does not believe in abstract objects – she is a nominalist – but also 
abhors the idea of abstract objects. So when she writes stories she neither intends to bring 
into being nor believes that she is bringing into being abstract fictional characters. But if the 
creationist is correct, then she is bringing into being such abstract objects. If so, the current 
suggestion cannot be correct since we have fictional characters being created without the 
appropriate intention. 
 
Brock considers the following objection to this case 
 
The existence of fictional characters supervenes in a complex way upon the 
intentional states of the author and the work of fiction he or she creates. We 
cannot at present give a precise account of when and how a fictional character 
comes into being. But this is true for many other entities whose existence we 
accept and which we take to be created in virtue of changes to the domain upon 
which their existence supervenes. So, for example, some nations and 
universities are founded at distinct times by declarations or charters, but others 
arise gradually, as people come together in certain complex relationships that 
are difficult to articulate. The point is well taken. But I suspect the problem of 
specifying precisely when and how universities, nations, and other social 
institutions are created derives from the fact that the terms used to pick them 
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out are both ambiguous and vague. ... My suspicion is that once these sources 
of ambiguity and vagueness are resolved, there will be no remaining mystery 
about when and how such social institutions are created. The same is not true 
of fictional characters (2010: 362-363 n12 my emphasis). 
 
But Brock offers nothing more than his suspicion that there is a disanalogy between fictional 
characters and other abstract artefacts. 
 
Now we can accept that an author may create a fictional character without having a 
transparent intention to create a fictional character, that is, they may create a fictional 
character when they could rationally reject the claim that they intended to create a fictional 
character. But this does not mean that he does not intend to create a fictional character in the 
sense of doing something intentionally which creates a fictional character. But this raises the 
question of what it is that authors intentionally do that creates fictional characters? 
 
So Brock has considered three answers to the how-question and has rejected them all because 
they given unsatisfactory answers to the when-question. That is, they all provide answers to 
the when-question which undergenerate fictional characters, overgenerate fictional characters 
or both. But as I mentioned at the outset this is not enough to secure Brock’s conclusion. 
Indeed, the creationist can provide an answer to the when-question which avoids the 
problems that beset the answers above. I shall now lay out this answer before considering 
Brock’s other two putative counterexamples to the answer to the how-question just rejected, 
as these are of independent interest. 
 
At the outset, we should note that we can ask Brock’s questions with respect to novels and 
other repeatable artworks as well as with respect to fictional characters. For example, we can 
ask: how are fictions created?; when are fictions created? 
 
An obviously unsatisfactory answer to these questions is the following: novels are created 
every time an author entertains or expresses a proposition. This answer will not do because it 
would expand the domain of fiction to encompass serious assertion. Although entertaining / 
expressing a proposition is necessary for the creation of a literary fiction, it is not sufficient. 




What seems important in the case of storytelling is that the author has the relevant attitude of 
pretence: a fiction is created when an author considers or puts forward propositions in a 
certain way, in an act of storytelling. But a fiction isn’t created whenever an author does this. 
An author does not create a new fiction whenever he tells a story, for sometimes he re-tells a 
story. What we need is some way of distinguishing the telling of new stories, which 
constitute a creative act, from the re-telling of old stories which do not. Similarly, an author 
does not create a fictional character every time he uses a name corresponding to a fictional 
character, for sometimes the name corresponds to a pre-existing fictional character. 
 
In the case of fictions we might propose the following answer to the how-question: a fiction 
is created when and only when an author considers or puts forward propositions in a certain 
way, in an act of storytelling, for the first time. But this answer cannot be correct for two 
reasons. Firstly, Author B may re-tell Author A’s story, but he has not thereby created a new 
fiction. This is not to deny that Author B could put forward exactly the propositions Author A 
did, in exactly the same order and thereby create a fiction – the identity of qualitative 
indiscernibles does not hold for fictions. Second, Author A could, improbably, put forward 
the same propositions in exactly the same order, as he has done before without re-telling his 
earlier story. This would be the case when Author A suffered from severe amnesia and the 
qualitative identity of the two stories was sheer coincidence. 
 
So in general we distinguish between the re-telling of a story and the telling of a qualitatively 
identical one, and this distinction cannot be captured by the novelty of the collection of 
propositions put forward. Rather, the difference between the telling of a story for the first 
time and the re-telling of a story lies in the idea of reproduction. When we re-tell a story, 
whether we authored the story or not, we take a certain story as an input which we process 
and then give that input story as an output. This process of reproduction is an everyday one. 
For instance, when I report what someone else said. But when we tell a story for the first time 
we do not reproduce something. This is not to deny that there are inputs which are processed 
that result in a story, but only denies that in this case the inputs are identical to the output. So 
an author creates a fiction whenever he puts forward some propositions in an act of pretence 
characteristic of storytelling, where he is not properly reproducing some pre-existing fiction. 
 
Similarly, when I re-tell a Holmes story, I do not create a new fictional character every time I 
use the word Holmes. I am simply utilising a pre-existing story and characters. But to note all 
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of this is not yet to provide an answer to Brock’s questions.  For we have not yet considered 
intra-fictional uses of fictional names, and so have not given an answer to the when question. 
Moreover, we have not addressed Brock’s how-question. 
 
Now just as author can modify a story, an author can modify a fictional character. And this is 
what happens whenever an author pretends to refer using a name corresponding to a fictional 
character already created. As the Holmes’ stories unfold we learn more and more about 
Holmes, and as such the fictional character Holmes changes, he becomes more well-
developed. And just as other artefacts need not have had the life that they had, the character 
Holmes, the abstract object, need not have had the life it had. If Conan Doyle had not brought 
back Holmes after the Reichenbach falls, this character would have still been Holmes, albeit 
with different properties from the ones it in fact has. Such modal variation in properties is not 
mysterious. The properties of an artefact, we ordinarily think, are neither temporally or 
modally rigid. So as well as reproducing artworks, authors can change them too. So we can 
say, at least to a first approximation, that an act of pretend reference is creative iff an author 
pretends to refer to an object and in doing so is not thereby reproducing or modifying an 
existing fictional character.  
 
Now we might worry that the above account in terms of pretend reference cannot be 
complete for three reasons. First, an author can create a fictional character before writing a 
story, and perhaps in such cases there need not be pretend reference. An author, seeing the 
success of the Harry Potter stories might think I need to write a story about a wizard and then 
jot down a series of characteristics for his wizard. This process seems as if it could be 
sufficient for creating a fictional character and also that there need be no pretend reference: 
the act of thinking I need to write a story about a wizard no more involves pretend reference 
than does thinking I want a sloop. 
 
Second, an author may, in telling a story pretendedly refer in passing, never re-using the 
name. If thick realism about fictional characters is true, then this is not sufficient for the 
creation of a fictional character. 
 
Finally, in the Sherlock Holmes stories Watson is (usually) the narrator. It seems here that it 
is Watson who appears to make reference to Sherlock Holmes, Moriarty and the Baker Street 
Irregulars. Conan Doyle’s apparently referential acts are, in the first instance at least, to 
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Watson. Of course, there is no Watson who is pretending to refer to Holmes but the case still 
raises the question of whether Conan Doyle was pretending to refer to Holmes when he 
pretended to refer to Watson whom he pretended referred to Holmes? The fact that Watson 
does not exist is incidental to the case. In telling a story an author may refer to a real person 
whom she pretends referred to someone, someone who in fact did not exist. But it is not clear 
that the storyteller thereby pretends to refer to someone who does, in fact, not exist. If I say 
that Quine said quotation has a certain anomalous character, then it does not follow that, in 
the relevant sense, I said that quotation has a certain anomalous character. So saying that is 
not transitive or transparent in this way. By the same token it might be thought that if Conan 
Doyle pretends to refer to Watson, who, as part of the pretence, refers to Holmes, it does not 
follow that Conan Doyle pretended to refer to Holmes.76 
 
In the light of these difficulties, I do not wish to provide a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for how a fictional character is created. But despite not providing a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, we can allay Brock’s fears as set out above. Uses of 
‘Holmes’ by Conan Doyle after Holmes has been created do not create a new character since, 
presumably, this was a reidentifying use by Conan Doyle, in the sense that he was 
pretendedly referring to the same man that he did on his first use of ‘Holmes’ and thereby 
modifying his pre-existing fictional character. Similarly for distinct names which are 
pretendedly co-referential with Holmes. Whether or not Conan Doyle’s first use of ‘Holmes’ 
created a fictional character depends upon the details of the genesis of Holmes. Had Conan 
Doyle created Holmes before he named him? And whether there is more to the creation of a 
fictional character than the pretend reference? In the first case, the first use of ‘Holmes’ was 
not a creative act either, but rather was a modifying act, one in which Conan Doyle provides 
a name for his fictional character. In the second case, there is no Holmes until the constitutive 
conditions of creation have been satisfied. But whatever the details of the case, Brock’s 
concerns are met. There is neither overgeneration nor undergeneration here, nor is a specific 
realist intention required of Conan Doyle. 
 
As I mentioned above, Brock offered three objections to the ‘appropriate intention’ 
creationist account, only one of which has been discussed. The other putative 
                                                          
76 Perhaps Conan Doyle is pretending that he is Watson and is thereby pretending that he is referring to Holmes. 




counterexamples are of interest even once we have jettisoned that account in favour of the 
current proper reproduction account. So let us see if the current account can meet Brock’s 
remaining objections. 
 
Brock asks us to consider a case where there is a single act of pretend reference but where 
intuitively there are two fictional characters. Brock’s thought experiment concerns a situation 
where Conan Doyle intended to write a fifth Holmes novel, The Strange Case of Dr. Watson 
and Mr. Holmes, in which he would reveal that Watson and Holmes are one and the same. 
But before commencing work on the novel, Conan Doyle dies. The problem this case raises 
for the ‘appropriate intention’ creationist account is that this answer rules that there is a single 
fictional character, Holmes-Watson, whereas, Brock claims, intuitively Holmes and Watson 
are two distinct fictional characters. 
 
As he gives it, Brock’s case is underspecified. Brock could mean that Conan Doyle’s 
intention had been all along, that Holmes and Watson were one and the same. In this case, 
then after the creation of the character, all subsequent uses of ‘Holmes’ or ‘Watson’ would be 
pretendedly referring to the same man, although it would not seem that way to the reader. On 
the other hand Brock could mean that it was only once Conan Doyle had created Holmes and 
Watson, that he hit upon the idea that they were one and the same. 
 
I think what Brock has in mind is the first spelling-out, as the second spelling-out is 
structurally identical to a case of Brock’s that we discuss below. Brock’s case then should be 
read as Conan Doyle having the intention all along that Holmes and Watson were one and the 
same. But if this is the case, then surely it is intuitive that there is a single character. Conan 
Doyle creates a single character with two names just as we are assuming (see above) 
Stevenson in fact did with Jekyll-Hyde. The only difference is that Stevenson revealed this 
fact and Brock’s counterfactual Conan Doyle did not have the chance to. But why should this 
make any difference? 
 
One reason for joining Brock in thinking that there are in fact two characters is that we have 
been presented with what appear to be two distinct characters, since nowhere are we told that 
Watson is Holmes. But we cannot draw a metaphysical conclusion from this epistemic fact as 
our discussion of Everett’s cases of indeterminate identity show. And this is something that 
we know independently of considerations to do with the metaphysics of fiction. Consider, for 
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example, Frege’s puzzle. The Ancients were presented with what they took to be two distinct 
heavenly bodies, and they thought of these bodies as distinct. But this epistemic fact belies 
the astronomical one that there is in fact only one heavenly body, namely Venus. Someone 
who was in the state of knowledge of the Ancients would have two mental files, one for 
Hesperus and one for Phosphorus. Upon learning the relevant celestial facts, however, they 
would merge these files into a single mental file concerning Venus. So we can explain any 
intuition that we might have that Watson and Holmes are distinct, as simply reflecting our 
relatively impoverished epistemic state. Moreover, once we learn about Conan Doyle’s 
intention it is clear, I think, that we do think of Holmes and Watson as the same character, 
although in the actual novels of Conan Doyle, it seems as if Conan Doyle is writing about 
two distinct men, just as at the beginning of Stevenson’s novel, it seems as if he is writing 
about two distinct men. 
 
If the following supervenience claim were correct 
 
(47) Facts about fictional characters supervene on facts about the stories in which they 
appear, 
 
then Brock would be right in thinking that there is a problem for the creationist. The question 
then is whether (47) is correct? One reason for thinking not is that it seems that fictional 
characters can be created before there are any stories about them, as our discussion of Jerry 
Cornelius showed. So on its face (47) seems false and we have given no reason to believe it. 
It seems then that Brock’s putative counterexample lapses and the creationist will not be 
moved by it. This leaves Brock with one final allegedly problematic case for the creationist. 
 
Brock imagines a case where he thinks we have two appropriate acts of pretend reference but 
intuitively only one character. Of course, we have abandoned a creationist account purely in 
terms of pretend reference, but Brock’s point carries over to the present proposal: we have 
two creative acts but intuitively, Brock thinks, a single character. Brock’s case is as follows. 
When initially writing The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Brock has it that 
Stevenson had Jekyll and Hyde as distinct characters, that is, there were two creative acts. 
But later Stevenson amends the last two chapters of the story giving us the version we know 
where Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde. Brock thinks that the appropriate intention view is committed 
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to the claim that Stevenson created two fictional characters but intuitively, Brock claims, 
there is just one, since Dr Jekyll is Mr Hyde. 
 
Presumably, Brock thinks there is a single fictional character here because it is true according 
to the fiction that Dr Jekyll is Mr Hyde. And this truth in fiction allows us to infer a truth 
about fictional characters in extra-fictional reality. But as we have seen already in our 
discussion of Everett’s claims of indeterminacy, we do not generally read off facts about 
fictional characters from truths in fiction. There are truths about Jekyll and Hyde according to 
Stevenson’s novel that are not true of the fictional characters Jekyll and Hyde. Further, as we 
argued above there is no reason to think that identity facts are privileged in this way. What is 
relevant to the identity of Stevenson’s fictional characters are not the identity claims 
embedded within a fiction, but the creative acts of Stevenson. So it is simply not clear that in 
Brock’s case, Stevenson’s creation Jekyll is identical to Stevenson’s creation Hyde, since 
such facts are not transparent. Any intuition we have that Jekyll is Hyde can be explained by 
the truth in fiction that Jekyll is Hyde. So, prima facie, Brock’s case poses no more of a threat 
to creationism than Everett’s cases of indeterminate identity. 
 
But there is a way of reading Brock’s case that is of more interest. One obvious response to 
Brock’s case is to reply that Stevenson amalgamates the two characters in the final two 
chapters. In this case there are three creationary acts - the initial creation of the Hyde 
character, the initial creation of the Jekyll character, and then the fusion of these two 
characters, into a third, distinct character. Brock, however, thinks this is counterintuitive: “we 
don’t suppose that Stevenson created two characters and then in a further creative act fused 
the two into one” (2010: 361).77 
 
Before assessing Brock’s claim, we should distinguish between two versions of the response. 
The first version has it that Stevenson created two distinct characters at time t1 and then fused 
these characters at time t2 so that they become identical. On such a view, the fictional 
                                                          
77 Brock (2010: 361) continues “We don’t suppose that Stevenson created two characters and ascribed to these 
distinct individuals the impossible property of being identical to one another”. On the version of creationism 
endorsed here, the sense of ‘fictional character’ in which Stevenson created fictional characters is not the sense 
in which he ascribes properties to fictional characters. But this aside, as the discussion of Everett above shows, 
there is no incoherence in Stevenson saying that Jekyll is Hyde even if the fictional characters are distinct. 
Stevenson is pretending that these two men are identical, just as an author may pretend that Napoleon is 
Charlemagne. But whether these identities hold in extra-fictional reality is not determined in a straightforward 
way by the corresponding truths in fiction. 
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characters are temporarily (non-)identical. The coherence of such a view has been defended 
by both endurantists (Gallois: 1998) and perdurantists (Lewis: 1986). But one need not appeal 
to such a revisionary metaphysics in order to make sense of the fusion response to Brock. The 
second version of this response has it that Stevenson created two fictional characters and then 
fused them into one, thereby creating a third, distinct, fictional character. This version of the 
response requires no appeal to temporary identity. 
 
In any case, whichever version of the fusion response we plump for, it is not at all clear that 
the fusion response is counterintuitive in the way Brock suggestions. We are familiar with 
cases of fusion in other domains. For example, we can take two equally sized balls of clay 
and press them together with our hands until they form a single, distinct, ball of clay; or we 
take two trains of carriages and fuse them into a single, distinct train of carriages; or we can 
take three crowns and form them into a distinct fourth crown. And here, just as with 
Stevenson fusing two fictional characters to form a third, we are taking entities of type F and 
fusing them together to make another entity of type F. (Of course this is not essential to such 
fusions. We could take a spoon and a knife and fuse them together to make a double-ended 
piece of cutlery; or some portions of food stuffs to make a cake-mix). So there is nothing 
objectionable in principle to such cases of fusion. 
 
Moving closer to the present case, we would, I think, say that artworks such as novels, novel 
chapters, pieces of music, films and the like, were fused in analogous situations. Indeed as 
Brock himself notes 
 
it appears the novel [Middlemarch] resulted from Eliot fusing (at least) two 
partly written stories she had originally conceived of as independent works. It 
thus seems natural here to talk of Eliot creating two works and then fusing 
them to create Middlemarch. If this way of talking is respectable, we should 
have no trouble accepting that Stevenson created two characters and then fused 
them to create a third (Brock 2010: 361 n11). 
 
The plausibility of this response, Brock thinks, turns on how analogous fictional characters 
are to other artworks, and in particular to novels. All Brock (2010: 361 n11) says in response 
is that he has “stressed what I take to be crucial disanalogies”. But nowhere, in his 2010 at 
least, does Brock discuss any putative (dis)analogies between fictional characters and fictions 
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(or indeed other artworks). What he offers are some arguments to the effect that creationism 
cannot be true. If successful, these arguments would have shown that there was a disanalogy 
between fictional characters and fictions, on the assumption that fictions are created. But as 
we seen these arguments fail. As a result, this fusion response to Brock’s last alleged 
problematic case stands. Moreover, I have stressed the analogies between fictions and 
fictional characters in Chapter 3, and so if we think that fictions can be fused, there is no 
barrier to thinking fictional characters can likewise be fused.78 
 
But it seems that on the fusion interpretation the creationist faces the following problem. The 
creationist is committed to claiming that Stevenson created one object Hyde, a second object 
Jekyll and a third object the fused Hyde-Jekyll. But surely, the objection goes, the fictional 
character Jekyll corresponding to Stevenson’s use of the name ‘Jekyll’ at the end of the novel 
is identical to the fictional character corresponding with Stevenson’s of that name at the 
beginning of the novel. Likewise for Hyde. But the two characters corresponding to the 
earlier uses are not identical, and so we have a contradiction. 
 
This objection takes the following form: 
 
(48) The later Hyde = The later Jekyll 
(49) The early Hyde = The later Hyde 
(50) The early Jekyll = The later Jekyll 
(51) The early Hyde ≠ The early Jekyll 
 
By the transitivity and symmetry of identity, (48)-(50) give The early Hyde = The early 
Jekyll but this contradicts (51). 
 
At this point the creationist could opt for the temporary identity view of what happens when 
Stevenson fuses his characters. This is not the approach recommended here, however. 
 
 
                                                          
78 One disanalogy between fictions and fictional characters is stressed by Friend (2007:149), namely that 
whereas we deny the existence of fictional characters we do not deny the existence of fictions. The explanation 
for this defended here is that the names of fictional characters, and the term ‘fictional character’, are 




The correct creationist response is that although Stevenson originally had one kind of story, a 
story involving two characters, Jekyll and Hyde, he changed his mind about the plot of the 
story, and thereby changed the story and its ontology. As a result, the story Stevenson ends 
up with after fusing his two characters involves just a single character Hyde-Jekyll character 
throughout. This story, like Stevenson’s actual story, appears to start off with two distinct 
characters, Jekyll and Hyde, but this appearance belies the fact that both Stevenson’s actual 
story, and our hypothetical story with the fused Hyde-Jekyll, contain only a single Jekyll-
Hyde character. Of course we could have a case where an author starts off with two 
characters and publishes a part of a story in a magazine. But after some of the initial episodes 
have been published, changes his mind about the plot and fuses his two characters, using a 
single character in the subsequent episodes. In that case, what has gone on is that the 
audience started reading the beginning of one story and ends up reading the end of another. 
From within the pretence, the early part of the second fiction is indistinguishable from the 
early part of the first, so it is easy in one’s make believe to take oneself to be reading a single 
continuous story. But as we have argued fictions do not obey the identity of qualitative 
indiscernibles, so there is no problem with that. 
 
We have not provided a full answer to Brock’s how-question. But nevertheless we have 
answered his challenge to creationism about fictional characters. Brock’s challenge was that 
however the creationist answers the how-question, this has, as a corollary, an unsatisfactory 
answer to the when-question. But as I have argued, whatever the precise details of the 
creationist process, the creationist does not face this problem, since the creationist is not 
committed to the claim that uses of a fictional name associated with a fictional character, do 
themselves create further fictional characters. Rather they are uses which correspond to 
modifications of a pre-existing fictional character. And so, Brock’s challenge lapses. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have here considered and diffused three types of metaphysical objection to creationism. 
These objections arose in the first place from a misunderstanding of what fictional characters 
are, and how they are created. On the metaphysics of repeatable artworks sketched in Chapter 
3 and further elucidated here, we can see that there is no reason to think that fictional 
characters cannot be created or change their properties; that truths about them can be read off 
in a straightforward way from truths in fiction; or that the creationist has nothing to say about 
the creative process which does not lead to an inadequate ontology. So the creationist 
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metaphysics of the default view is left intact. It still remains, however, to defend the default 
view against the claim that the ambiguity of fictional names it posits is implausible, and that 





Chapter 5: The Systematic Polysemy of Fictional Names 
 
We argued in Chapter 3, that part of what we take to be the default view about fictional 
characters, is that fictional names are ambiguous. That is, within the scope of a fiction, 
fictional names are empty, but that (usually) outside the scope of the fiction, fictional names 
refer to abstract artefacts. This us allows us to agree with the irrealist that sentences such as 
 
(1) Sherlock Holmes is a detective 
 
are best construed as involving an empty name, the whole sentence being false, assuming it 
expresses a thought, but true within the relevant game of make-believe. This way we avoid 
having to claim with the crude realist, that in sentences like (1) we are talking about and 
misdescribing an abstract artefact. 
 
On the other hand, sentences like 
 
(2) Sherlock Holmes was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
 
cry out for a realist treatment. Here we depart company with the irrealist and say that in such 
sentences ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to an abstract artefact and so this sentence is 
straightforwardly and literally true. In this way we do not need to say with the irrealist that 
we extend the pretence licensed by the Sherlock Holmes stories beyond its proper limit, 
encompassing what looks like thought and talk about the world. 
 
So here we have what seems like a well-motivated ambiguity, allowing us to provide a 
satisfactory account of both types of sentence. If our thought and talk about fiction were 
limited to sentences like (1) and (2), then the realist would have an account of all fictional 
discourse. Unfortunately, this is not the case. As well as having sentences which seem to 
concern perspectives internal to the fiction, such as (1), and sentences which involved taking 
up a perspective external to the fiction, like (2), there are sentences which seem to mix both 
perspectives. In the light of this, some irrealists have argued that that realism of any form is 
untenable, and that, in particular, the thesis that fictional names are ambiguous faces 
particular difficulties. I set out these objections below, but argue that we see similar patterns 
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elsewhere, and so the phenomena pointed to in the case of fictional names is not problematic 
for the thesis that fictional names are ambiguous. 
 
 
1. Mixed Perspectives 
As noted, we treat (1) and (2) in very different ways. One of the ways in which we do not 
treat them alike is common to most realists. (1) is made within the scope of a fiction, in a 
game of make-believe, whereas (2) is a serious use made outside the scope of the fiction, with 
the purposes of describing the world. But Friend (2007) and Pelletier (2003) have argued that 
whilst fine for sentences such as (1) and (2), this division of perspectives is implausible. That 
is, it is alleged that realists of all stripes face a problem in trying to maintain what Friend 
(2007: 151) calls an “unsustainably sharp distinction between the internal and external 
perspectives”. 
 
Commenting on the realist proposal that the role of pretence be restricted to perspectives 
internal to the fiction, Friend (2007: 151-152 my footnotes) responds that this proposal 
 
does not seem consistent with critical practice, however, which typically 
involves a mix of perspectives. Critics are often concerned with the 
interpretation of fictional content ... Even when critics acknowledge the 
fictionality of characters, they rarely drop the pretence entirely. In his lecture 
on Austen, A. C. Bradley writes, ‘In all her novels, though in varying degrees, 
Jane Austen regards the characters, good and bad alike, with ironical 
amusement, because they never see the situation as it really is’.79 In the book 
section of the Guardian, we discover that Mr Darcy was recently voted ‘the 
fictional character women would most like to invite to a dinner party,’ which 
leads the critic to reflect that ‘women are swooning over a fictional character 
who is the epitome of the dominant patriarchal male’.80 
 
                                                          
79 Bradley, A. C. ‘Jane Austen: A Lecture.’ Emma: A Norton Critical Anthology. Ed. S. M. Parish. New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1993. 354–7. Originally published in Essays and Studies by Members of the English 
Association 2 (1911): 7–36. 




And as Pelletier has argued, the same mix of internal and external perspectives is not limited 
to criticism, but is also present in fiction. For example, consider the following passage from 
Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones: 
 
As we have now brought Sophia into safe hands, the reader will, I apprehend, 
be contented to deposit her awhile, and to look a little after other personages, 
and particularly poor Jones, whom we have left long enough to do penance for 
his past offences. (Quoted in Pelletier 2003: 199, his italics) 
 
Fictions then can treat fictional characters as fictional characters without ‘stepping outside the 
pretence or breaking the rules of fiction’ (Pelletier 2003: 199). That is, as Friend (2007: 152) 
notes, “the metafictional claim that Sophia is a fictional character (a personage) can be 
embedded within the pretence of the novel”. 
 
We seem then, to be able to slide between the two perspectives without any effort or 
recognition of the fact that we are doing so. If the present realist proposal is to be satisfactory 
we must have some explanation of this fact. Let us start to provide this explanation by 
distinguishing three grades of lexical ambiguity. 
 
Mere Homophones / Homographs / Homonyms: Some words which differ in 
meaning nevertheless happen to share the same pronunciation and/or spelling. For 
example, to/too/two are homophones, desert (arid region) / desert (leave) are 
homographs and bear (animal) / bear (carry) are homonyms, that is, both 
homophones and homonyms. In these cases, the different meanings are unrelated to 
one another and it is an accidental fact that they happen to be vocalized or written in 
the same way. 
 
Polysemes: The distinct meanings of some homonyms are, however, related and it is 
not at all accidental that the meanings are vocalized and written in the same way. For 
example, milk (verb) / (noun), wood (material) / (collection of trees) and head (part of 
body above the neck) / (person in charge of an organization) are all polysemes. One 
type of polyseme is a metonym in which a thing or concept is not called by its own 




Systematic Polysemy: Some polysemes arise not through mere contiguity of their 
semantic values or uses, but in a systematic, transparent and wholly predictable way. 
 
If fictional names were mere homonyms, then the mix of perspectives highlighted by Friend 
and Pelletier would be a problem for the realist. If a conversation started off concerning 
financial institutions but ended up focussing on river banks we would notice the change in 
subject matter. What we have in the case of fictional names, however, is an often 
unnoticeable switch of perspectives. So the realist must instead say that fictional names are 
polysemes. Moreover, since when we read a novel we automatically learn the name of the 
abstract artefact, there is an especially tight connection between the two uses of fictional 
names. As Sainsbury writes of the realist ambiguity strategy 
 
polysemy is a better option for the realist than [mere] ambiguity. The idea is 
that some doubtless implicit general principle gets us from any one of 
polysemously linked meanings to any other. Normally, coming to understand a 
new word that manifests container/contents polysemy equips one to use it in 
both ways. If I tell you that a jeroboam is equivalent to four normal bottles, you 
should be able to understand both “This jeroboam is made of glass” and “This 
jeroboam is ready to drink.” The close relationship between the meanings of a 
polysemous expression explains how both (or all) of them can be acquired in a 
single act of learning. If the various meanings of names are polysemously 
related, they can be learned in a single act (Sainsbury 2009: 139). 
 
And as Nunberg writes 
 
a speaker would judge that there was nothing deviant about sentences like I ate 
chicken last night, or John has been working for a newspaper, and it is the 
standard collective practice to refer to chicken meat and newspaper publishers 
in this way. At the same time, we feel that these uses of chicken and newspaper 
would be recoverable on first hearing by a speaker who knew the uses of these 
words to refer to birds and publications (Nunberg 1979: 145). 
 
But here we shall argue that there is an even tighter connection between the two uses of 
fictional names than in these cases of polysemy. That is, we shall argue that fictional names 
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are systematically polysemous. To illustrate, let’s consider the following puzzle from 
Elizabeth Anscombe  
 
It is impossible to be told anyone's name. For if I am told 'That man's name is 
"Smith"', his name is mentioned, not used, and I hear the name of his name but not his 
name (Anscombe 1957: 49). 
 
As she notes, the conclusion is obviously false. The puzzle then, is to figure out what is 
wrong with the argument. 
 
On first sight, one might wonder whether there is any puzzle here at all. If I ask ‘who stole 
my tomatoes?’, you may reply truthfully and informatively ‘it was Smith’. I thereby come to 
learn who stole my tomatoes – Smith. In this case, Smith’s name is used, not mentioned, and 
it is by using this name that I come to know something about the referent of the name, in this 
case Smith. And what I learn is that Smith stole my tomatoes. 
 
Similarly, if I ask ‘what is his name?’ and you reply ‘his name is “Smith”’, I thereby come to 
learn what his name is. In this case, as in the case of tomato pilfery above, the name of the 
referent you acquire knowledge of is used, not mentioned, and it is by using this name that I 
come to know something about the referent of the name. And what I learn is that ‘Smith’ is 
his name. So in general it is by using the names of things that I come to learn about the things 
named, so when I want to learn about the name of something, whether this be a person or a 
linguistic item, informative statements about it will use the name of it. 
 
All well and good, but this misses the importance of Anscombe’s puzzle. This point can be 
brought about by noting that there is no meaningful analogue of Anscombe’s argument in the 
material mode 
 
It is impossible to be told who anyone is. For if I am told 'That man is Smith’, he is 
mentioned, not used, and I hear his name but not him. 
 
This is for the simple reason that people are neither mentioned nor used in the pertinent 
sense. But in Anscombe’s original argument Smith’s name is mentioned and it is in virtue of 
this that I learn Smith’s name. The difference between Anscombe’s case and the case of 
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tomato pilfery, is that in the latter case I can learn that Smith stole the tomatoes but not know 
who Smith is, whereas in the former case, my knowledge that ‘Smith’ is Smith’s name is, in 
some sense, exhaustive. That is, upon being presented either with Smith or his name, one 
cannot infer which object is the other. But on being presented with the name of Smith’s 
name, we thereby come to know Smith’s name. There is a systematic relation between 
Smith’s name and the name of Smith’s name that we do not find in the case of Smith and his 
name. As has been emphasized before (Recanati 2001) the quoted material is itself presented. 
That is, a token of Smith’s name is produced and attention is drawn to it.   
 
As Anscombe (1957: 52) puts it, there is a “systematic connexion between a name and its 
name such that a person can form the name of the name from mere acquaintance with it, and 
know what name the name of a name is a name of on hearing it. This contrasts with what 
ordinarily holds for objects and their names”. As Tajtelbaum (1957: 53) notes in response to 
Anscombe’s posing of her puzzle, we operate with a tacit convention that “a name and its 
name are denoted by the same word and so the name of a name “tells” us the name”. That is, 
we use a Lagadonian language in the case of linguistic items but not in the case of non-
linguistic objects.81 
 
There was no winner of the prize for solving the puzzle which Anscombe set, although 
Tajtelbaum received an honourable mention. This is because to say what Tajtelbaum said, 
that we operate with a tacit convention that “a name and its name are denoted by the same 
word and so the name of a name “tells” us the name” (1957: 53), does not go far enough. If it 
were just a matter of adopting a convention, then we could just as well have settled on some 
other convention, just as we could have decided to drive on the right instead of the left in the 
UK. But we could not have settled on just any other convention; the convention that we do in 
fact operate with is not arbitrary. Rather, the convention has to be this way. As Cappelen and 
LePore (2009) note that “To understand quotation is to have an infinite capacity, a capacity to 
understand and generate a potential infinity of new quotations.” That is, upon first 
                                                          
81 A Lagadonian language is one where objects and properties can be names for themselves (Lewis 1986: 145). 
In Gulliver's Travels, Gulliver visits the Academy of Science at Lagado where, at the school of languages, there 
is a scheme for abolishing all words. The linguists conclude that “since words are only names for things, it 
would be more convenient for all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express the 
particular business they are to discourse on”. The Lagadonians thought that a "great advantage, proposed by this 
invention, was, that it would serve as a universal language, to be understood in all civilised nations". It is the 




encountering a quotation we can perfectly well understand them and identify their referents. 
If we want to be able to automatically ascend to the metalinguistic level or descend from the 
name of a name to the name it is the name of, we must operate with convention which is 
transparent in the way in which our actual practice is. This transparent systematic connection 
explains why we slip between the two levels so effortlessly, often not noticing when an 
author is mentioning or using a phrase, since we can recover the name of a word from a word, 
or vice versa effortlessly. 
 
It is plausible to suppose that what enables this is that we have a single mental file which 
tracks a word and its name and its name’s name etc. We have a single mental file and a rule 
for ascending and descending through the metalinguistic hierarchy. This single mental file 
would represent a great economy but, together with our convention, allow for the infinite 
capacity for dealing with quotation. Moreover, it is the presence of a single file which enables 
us to track words and their names simultaneously, facilitating our effortless slide between use 
and mention, and also our use/mention confusions. We have a single file which contains 
information both about a word and its name, but sometimes, because this information goes 
hand-in-hand, we do not partition it properly. Sometimes using a word where we mean to 
mention it and vice versa.  
 
This same model is, I suggest, present in the case of fictional names. Just as there a 
systematic, transparent link between a name and its name, and any linguistic item and the 
item that names it, there is a systematic, transparent link between a name used in a fiction 
when the author pretends to refer with that name, and the name of the fictional object she 
creates. Namely, they are given by the same words. And just as when we are presented with 
the name of a name we can infer which name it is the name of, and vice versa, we can when 
presented with an author’s use of a name infer the name of the fictional character created by 
the author, and vice versa. It is this systematic and transparent link which allows us to use 
fictional names in two quite different ways often without noticing. Moreover, that we can 
slide back and forth between different ontological categories in the case of use and mention 
without pause, undermines the worries that were pressed by Friend and Pelletier about the 
way in which we can slip between perspectives internal and external to the fiction. Although 
in both cases we are doing very different things with our words, there is a systematic link 




Similarly, it is plausible that what underlies this productivity is a single mental file which 
stores both information about the Holmes of the story and the abstract object Holmes created 
by Conan Doyle. We open a mental file when reading a fiction and we use this to track both 
what is happening within the story and the representation item. Indeed, we can track what is 
happening in the story by tracking the representational item, the artefact Sherlock Holmes. It 
is no wonder then that, just as in the use/mention case, we slip between and blur perspectives, 
allowing us to employ a word in different ways with a different extension. Once we notice 
the plausibility of this picture, the objection pressed by Friend and Pelletier loses much of its 
force. Indeed, the irrealist herself should accept that we have a single mental file in the case 
of fictional names, which we exploit within both an inner pretence and an outer pretence. The 
difference is that whereas we say we are in addition tracking an object and well as engaging 
in make-believe with this single file, the irrealist says there is no object to track. But as we 
saw in Chapter 3, this view has costs. 
 
This picture is not undermined by the claim that sometimes the name we most often use for a 
fictional character is not the one the author uses when describing the events corresponding to 
the fictional character. For example, in Frankenstein the monster created by Victor 
Frankenstein is given no name, but is referred to with terms like ‘monster’ and ‘wretch’. 
Ordinarily, we use the term ‘Frankenstein’s monster’ or even ‘Frankenstein’ to refer to the 
corresponding fictional character. But we should note that we use this term both for the 
abstract artefact created by Mary Shelley, and within the scope of the fiction when engaging 
in games of make-believe. 
 
Similarly, fictional characters can be picked out in more than one way. For example, it is 
plausible that the fictional character Odysseus is identical to the fictional character Ulysses. 
But there is no systematic and transparent way to get from an author’s use of ‘Odysseus’ to 
‘Ulysses’ as the name of the corresponding abstract object.  This multiplicity of names for an 
abstract artefact is not naturally mirrored in the case of use and mention, since although 
‘Odysseus’ and ‘Ulysses’ name the same abstract object, ‘‘Muhammad Ali’’ and ‘‘Cassius 
Clay’’ do not name the same name. However, we could introduce a term ‘^&’ that names the 
name ‘Cassius Clay’ for which the same lack of transparency and systematicity arises as in 
the case of moving from an author’s use of ‘Odysseus’ to the name of the abstract object 
‘Ulysses’. In neither case, is our knowledge of co-reference given simply by being presented 
with a name: we must be aware of extra facts to know that ‘Odysseus’ and Ulysses’ are co-
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referential, and that ‘^&’ and ‘Cassius Clay’ are co-referential. Moreover, we do pick out 
names using terms other than the transparent name of a name, for we may use a description 
like ‘my favourite name’. 
 
The fact that fictional names are systematically polysemous explains why we can move 
between perspectives internal and external to a fiction. As we shall see, it also explains a 
feature of fictional names which has also been argued to be problematic for the claim that 
fictional names are ambiguous. 
 
 
2. Linguistic Double Duty and Testing For Ambiguity 
The realist has a natural account of sentences such as (1) and (2). In discussing the mix of 
perspectives highlighted above, Everett (2005: 639) notes that critics say things like 
 
(3) The most famous of Conan Doyle’s creations is the great detective Sherlock Holmes 
who lives in Baker Street. 
 
which mixes perspectives internal and external to the fiction. We argued above that such a 
natural mixing of perspectives of is explained by the systematic polysemy of fictional names 
and the associated employment of a single mental file for both tracking within the fiction and 
without. In passing, Everett notes that realists faces the question of how to treat sentences 
such as (3), and in particular, whether they should say that in such sentences ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ refers. 
 
It is clear that the advocate of the ambiguity thesis can neither say simply that ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ refers in (3), since on such a reading ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ is false.82 On 
the other hand, we cannot simply say that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not refer, since on such a 
reading ‘The most famous of Conan Doyle’s creations is the great detective Sherlock 
Holmes’ is false. So it seems that we must say that in (3) ‘Sherlock Holmes’ both plays a 
non-referring role and a referring role. That is, it must do linguistic double duty.  
 
                                                          
82 Although see Chapter 6 for realist strategies which try to deal with this problem. 
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In his (2007), Everett considers this question in more depth, and asks what the realist is to say 
about 
 
(4) Raskolnikov is just a fictional character and consequently Raskolnikov doesn’t really 
exist. 
 
Again, it seems as if the advocate of the ambiguity thesis must say that Raskolnikov does 
linguistic double duty in (4), having both a referring and non-referring role. 
 
Everett (2007) has argued, however, that it is simply not plausible to suggest that fictional 
names do linguistic double duty in this way. Everett argues that when we have words doing 
linguistic double duty, we have cases of syllepsis. That is, where we have linguistic double 
duty in a sentence, the sentence produces a painful or pun-like quality. In other cases, we just 
cannot get the required reading at all. Everett illustrates this with the following examples: 
 
(5) *Sometimes she took counsel and sometimes tea 
 
(6) *The politician’s ratings fell and so did the clumsy rock-climber 
 
(7) *Watson was Holmes’s sidekick and discovered DNA. 
 
But since there is nothing painful or pun-like about sentences like (3), Everett (2007: 59) 
concludes that ‘Holmes’ must have a single semantic value in (3) and so the ambiguity 
posited by the realist must be rejected. 
 
Everett is only entitled to his conclusion, however, if all cases of linguistic double duty are 
cases of syllepsis. If some cases of linguistic double duty are not cases of syllepsis, then it is 
not clear why the naturalness of (3) and (4) would be a threat to the realist’s ambiguity thesis. 
As Everett himself admits, there may be an explanation of why (3) and (4) sound fine. Everett 
(2007: 59 n7) tempers his conclusion claiming that “at the very least we need an explanation 
of why, if [(3) and (4)] really is a case of syllepsis, it lacks the painful and punny feel of [(5)-
(7)]. It is not clear, however, what form such an explanation might take.” Even this more 
modest conclusion is, I think unwarranted. If the realist can show that not all clear cases of 
syllepsis are humorous, and there is no (extant) explanation for this lack of humour, then it is 
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not clear why the realist need provide an explanation for the lack of humour in the case of (3) 
and (4). So at best then Everett’s observations about sentences such as (3) and (4) should be 
taken as posing an explanatory challenge to the realism under consideration here, rather than 
as refutation, but even then, it is not clear that the realist need meet the challenge, if he can 
show that not all cases of linguistic double duty are comical. Below I shall show that this is in 
fact the case. But first we should take a deeper look at linguistic tests for ambiguity, such as 
the one employed by Everett. 
 
Everett’s (2007) employment of (4) in his case against the ambiguity thesis of the realist is, in 
effect, an example of a using a conjunction reduction identity test for ambiguity. For 
example, the following two sentences are ambiguous 
 
(8) They saw her duck 
(9) They saw her swallow 
 
On one reading, (8) and (9) report that some observers saw some woman’s bird, whereas on 
the other reading (8) and (9) report that some observers saw a woman’s action. In the first 
case ‘her duck’ / ‘her swallow’ is a noun phrase, whereas in the second case they are noun 
phrases followed by verbs. It is clear that these sentences have these two readings and these 
two readings arise from the ambiguity of ‘her duck’ / ‘her swallow’. This clear case of 
ambiguity is then used to devise a test that can be used to decide upon less clear cases of 
ambiguity. If we conjoin (8) and (9) to give 
 
(10) They saw her duck and they saw her swallow 
 
we have four readings available depending on whether ‘her duck’ / ‘her swallow’ is read as a 
noun phrase or as a noun phrase followed by a verb. But something interesting happens when 
we delete the second occurrence of ‘they’ so that ‘and’ conjoins not two sentences but two 
subsentential components as in 
 
(11) They saw her duck and swallow 
 
The conjunction reduction from (10) to (11) has eliminated two of our four readings, so that 
we can only get a reading on which ‘her duck’ / ‘her swallow’ are both noun phrases and a 
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reading on which ‘her duck’ / ‘her swallow’ both contain verbs, but we cannot get a reading 
on which ‘her duck’ is a noun phrase and ‘her swallow’ is a verb phrase or vice versa. Such 
‘crossed-readings’ are barred and the hypothesis is that ‘her’ can only play one role in (10). 
In (9) the polysemy of ‘her duck’ and ‘her swallow’, is exploited to allow for four readings. 
But once we only have one occurrence of ‘her’ we can only obtain two readings, and the 
explanation is that ‘her’ cannot do linguistic double duty. It must have the same semantic 
value in combining with ‘duck’ as it does when combining with ‘swallow’.83 
 
Returning to Everett, (4) can be seen as resulting from conjunction reduction as applied to 
 
(12) Raskolnikov is just a fictional character. Consequently, Raskolnikov doesn’t really 
exist. 
 
Now our realist maintains that the two occurrences of ‘Raskolnikov’ in (12) have different 
semantic values, but by the conjunction elimination test, ‘Raskolnikov’ can only have one 
semantic value in (4) (otherwise it would sound funny), but the realist requires that 
‘Raskolnikov’ does double duty in (4) and so the realist position is incorrect. 
 
As Zwicky and Saddock (1975) discuss, the conjunction reduction identity test is one of the 
many tests that linguists use to test for ambiguity.84 Another, similar test is the 
pronominalization identity test. 
 
(13) Harry received a file from Bill and gave a file to Jane 
 
The two occurrences of ‘file’ can take on different semantic values, so that (13) might mean 
that Bill gave Harry a nail file whilst Harry gave Jane a dossier. But this interpretation is not 
available in 
                                                          
83 The way in which conjunction reduction is used as a test for ambiguity is as follows. The test is designed to 
demarcate genuine ambiguity as in ‘they saw her duck’, which does not rule on whether it was a bird or an 
action that was witnessed, from mere unspecificity as in ‘my sister is tall’, which does not rule on whether she is 
older than me or left-handed. If I reduce ‘my sister is tall and my sister is smart’ to ‘my sister is tall and smart’ 
we still get all four readings. That is it is left open whether she is older than me or not and whether she is left-
handed or not and these can be combined in any way. But as we have seen, in genuine cases of ambiguity 
crossed-readings are eliminated. Therefore, according to the test, if crossed-readings are permitted we do not 
have a case of ambiguity. 
84 Zwicky and Saddock (1975) provide a taxonomy of such tests. Not all of the tests detailed by Zwicky and 




(14) Harry received a file from Bill and gave it to Jane 
 
Here the pronoun ‘it’ must refer to the same type of file as the type of file received by Harry 
from Bill. Moreover, ‘it’ must refer to the same token file. It seems then that ‘it’ has its 
reference determined anaphorically according to the initially plausible Principle of Anaphoric 
Reference (PAR) 
 
PAR: An anaphoric term has the same referent as its antecedent.85 
 
But just as conjunction reduction identity tests pose a problem for the ambiguity thesis of the 
realist, so does the pronominalization identity test. According to our realist the two 
occurrences of Holmes in 
 
(15) The most famous of Conan Doyle’s creations is the great detective Sherlock Holmes. 
Sherlock Holmes lives in Baker Street. 
 
have different semantic values. But just as (15) sounds fine, so does the pronominalized 
form (3) 
 
(3) The most famous of Conan Doyle’s creations is the great detective Sherlock Holmes 
who lives in Baker Street. 
 
The anti-ambiguity line of thought is as follows. If our realist is to say that (3), just like (15), 
is true, then again he needs it to be the case that ‘Holmes’ and ‘who’ have different semantic 
values. But this violates the pronominalization test for ambiguity and PAR. So the realist’s 
account of (15) and (3) cannot be correct, and so must be rejected.86 
                                                          
85 Kent Bach (1997, 2000) assumes PAR and uses it to reject Fregean reference-shifting accounts of 
propositional attitudes. 
86 Another identity test for ambiguity is so-reduction. ‘I called her a cab and George called her a cab’ can be so-
reduced to ‘I called her a cab and so did George’. The first sentence has four readings depending on whether the 
occurrences of ‘called her a cab’ are interpreted to mean ‘phoned for a taxi’ or to mean ‘said of someone that 
she is a cab’. The reduced form only has two readings however, the crossed readings now being unavailable. 




We shall show in the next section that both tests for ambiguity implicitly appealed to by 
Everett fail. The realist, then, is free to permit the ambiguity of fictional names which we 
motivated in Chapter 3. 
 
 
3. Anaphoric Connection, Ambiguity and Deferred Ostension 
We noted above that if the pronominalization identity test is to be a good test for ambiguity 
and is to be used to undermine the realism defended here, then the following seemingly 
plausible principle must be true 
 
PAR: An anaphoric term has the same referent as its antecedent. 
 
It is PAR that prevents the realist from accounting for the truth of (3) by positing an 
ambiguity in the semantic values of fictional names and related referring terms. But why 
could the contribution that ‘he’ makes in (3) not be anaphorically determined in some other 
way? Why cannot the anaphoric reference be determined by some relation other than 
identity? There seems to be no in principle impossibility to this being the case, although as 
the pronominalization identity test shows, oftentimes this is not the case. The realist then 
must say that ‘who’ has its contribution determined anaphorically by ‘Holmes’, but is not co-
referential with it. A solution of this type is not ad hoc, as recent work in linguistics shows 
the need for anaphoric dependence without co-reference. 
 
For example, it is plausible that Quine’s (1960) discussion of referentially opaque contexts 
shows that such a thing is possible. Consider Quine’s famous pair 
 
(16) Giorgione was so-called because of his size 
(17) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size 
 
(16) is true and (17) is false despite the fact that Giorgione was Barbarelli. A plausible 
explanation of this is that the contribution that ‘so-called’ makes to the content of (16) is 
anaphorically dependent on the occurrence of ‘Giorgione’ whereas the contribution it makes 
to (17) is anaphorically dependent on the occurrence of ‘Barbarelli’. But the contribution that 
‘so-called’ makes is not identical in the two claims, so it cannot be determined by the referent 
of ‘Giorgione’ / ‘Barbarelli’ as this does not differ. Rather, what happens is that in the first 
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case ‘so-called’ contributes ‘called ‘Giorgione’’ and in the second case ‘so-called’ 
contributes ‘called ‘Barbarelli’’ and it is this difference that explains the difference in the 
truth values of (16) and (17). So here, plausibly, we have anaphoric dependence without co-
reference. 
 
Moreover, we can find the same thing with singular terms. Consider the following groups of 
examples taken from Ken Safir’s book The Syntax of Anaphora.87 
 
Original and Likeness: 
(18) Marlene Dietrich admired herself but thought she ought to have been dressed 
differently. 
(19) Fidel Castro bumped into himself (and broke his arm). 
(20) At the costume ball, Marlene and Fidel kept running into themselves. 
(21) Hitchcock liked himself in that movie. 
 
The set-up is that in (18) and (19), Marlene Dietrich and Fidel Castro are in a wax museum 
where Marlene is admiring a statue of herself, and Fidel is damaging his own likeness. In 
(20), Marlene and Fidel are constantly running into people in Fidel or Marlene costumes and 
in (21) that Hitchcock makes a movie about himself in which he is portrayed by Orson 
Welles, and Hitchcock himself makes a cameo appearance as a man at a bus stop. (21) can 
then be read as claiming that Hitchcock is happy with how he is portrayed by Welles. 
 
As Safir notes 
 
In these cases, the SELF form is not even coreferent with its antecedent 
extensionally, though it is clear that the reflexive allows for an interpretation 
where the referent of the SELF form is clearly dependent on its antecedent, 
such that the identity of the SELF form referent is a function of that of its 
antecedent (2004: 112). 
 
And this is exactly what the realist needs to account for the truth of (3). Examples of this non-
coreferential anaphoric reference multiply: 
                                                          




Author and Work: 
(22) Grisham will be reading himself in Swahili soon. 
(23) Looking up at the scoreboard, Sosa saw himself in second place (the baseball player 
Sammy Sosa is looking at his home run statistics, not at himself). 
 
Representative Vehicle: 
(24) Alice rolled the dice and then moved herself three spaces. 
(25) Patton positioned himself between the Germans and the sea. 
 
And as Safir notes, this phenomena is not limited to reflexive forms as witnessed by the 
following: 
 
(26) As they strolled through the wax museum, Fidel could not help thinking that he would 
have looked better in a uniform, and Marlene could not help thinking that she would 
have looked better without one. 
(27) The masquerade ball was a bit disconcerting. It seemed to Marlene that everywhere 
she looked, either her nose was too long or her chin too weak. 
(28) Hitchcock thought he looked insufficiently bald in that scene (as played by Welles). 
(29) Grisham claims that he is even more suspenseful in Swahili. 
(30) Alice thought she was positioned to win until the Red Queen knocked her into the 
bushes. 
(31) Patton realized that he would be vulnerable to a flanking movement. 
 
So we can see that the assumption about anaphoric reference, PAR, that caused the problem 
for the realist’s account of (3) is false. Note in the above that all the examples involve 
representations and what is represented, and so this parallels the claim made by the realist 
that there is anaphoric dependence without co-reference in the case of fictional characters, a 
representation, and what is represented in a work of fiction. 
 
But the phenomenon is not limited to representation cases. As Geeraerts notes of Nunberg’s 
(1979) example 
 




the item newspaper refers first to the management of or the board of directors 
of the paper, and then to the paper as material object. The perfect 
grammaticality does not allow us to spot any polysemy using the 
pronominalization identity test (Geeraerts 1993: 296). 
 
And as Sainsbury, himself an irrealist, concedes 
 
It might seem easy to refute the alleged polysemy by reflecting on anaphoric 
relations. In 
 
Sherlock Holmes is a detective. He was created by Conan Doyle 
 
it seems that our realist will have to say that “Sherlock Holmes” refers to 
nothing yet that “He” refers to an [abstract] object (to give a straightforwardly 
relational reading of the second sentence). If an anaphorically dependent 
pronoun had to agree in reference with the expression on which it depends, that 
would be a powerful argument. But we can see in other cases that the principle 
is false. For example, in  
 
 He drank the whole bottle and smashed it to the floor 
 
“the bottle” has its contents reading whereas “it” has its container reading. 
There’s been a shift in reference, despite the dependence. So we shouldn’t 
attack realism on the grounds that its commitment to polysemy prevents it from 
giving an adequate account of anaphoric dependence. (2009: 139). 
 
However, this observation does not by itself address Everett’s worry about the felicity of (4). 
As Sainsbury (2009: 98-99) says about such cases “speakers have no conscious awareness of 
ambiguity, and have no problems, or sense of zeugma, confronted with ... what ought to be 
distinct uses of the name” and that this is a reason not to ascribe ambiguity or polysemy.88 89 
                                                          
88 The part cut from the quote is “anaphoric linkages across”. Given what Sainsbury says on p. 139 about 




But Sainsbury’s position is an odd one. Given the similarity between pronominalization and 
conjunction reduction, shouldn’t we expect the latter to fail, if the former does? Moreover, 
presumably non-coreferential anaphoric dependence is possible because the antecedent can 
do double duty? It is the fact that the antecedent can access both meanings that allows the 
pronoun to have a different reading from its antecedent. 
 
Odd or not, we can show that, Sainsbury and Everett are wrong to use conjunction reduction 
against the realist thesis of ambiguity, since just as we can have anaphoric connections that 
do not require sameness of reference, singular terms can do double duty in just the way 
required by the realist. 
 
First we should note that words can often be used to refer to things other than their customary 
referent. Consider the following extensions of the cases considered by Safir 
 
(33) John thought Hitchcock looked insufficiently bald in that scene (as played by Welles). 
(34) I think Grisham is even more suspenseful in Swahili. 
(35) I looked up at the scoreboard and saw Sosa was in second place90 
 
Here ‘Hitchcock’, ‘Grisham and ‘Sosa’ are all being used to refer to things other than the 
men those names ordinarily designate. Here what we have are cases of metonymy, where a 
word which has a customary referent, is used to refer to something else. Such examples are 
familiar in the linguistics literature. As Nunberg (1979: 144) notes “a given term may be used 
to refer to any number of things, by the processes of metaphor and metonymy”. Nunberg 
provides the following examples 
 
(36) The window was broken. (= 'window glass') 
(37) The window was boarded up. (='window opening')  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
89 Sainsbury (2009: 99) offers one other criticism of positing ambiguity. He writes “one would miss out on what 
to me is one of the most attractive features of abstract artefact theory, its ability to explain authorial creation as 
literally bringing something new into existence. It’s authors who do that, not critics.” But this criticism is 
confused. That we take metafictional discourse as evidence for realism does not mean that it is critics who create 
fictional characters. On the present view authors create fictional characters but their uses of names within 
fictions do not refer to them. 
90 This example could be disputed. Perhaps it is equivalent to ‘I looked up at the scoreboard and saw that Sosa 
was in second place’, where the latter claim is a knowledge ascription and not simply a perceptual report. No 




(38) The newspaper weighs five pounds. (= 'publication') 
(39) The newspaper fired John. (= 'publisher') 
 
(40) The chicken pecked the ground. (= 'bird') 
(41) We ate chicken in bean sauce. (= 'meat') 
 
(42) The chair was broken. (= 'chair token') 
(43) The chair was common in nineteenth-century parlours. (= 'chair type') 
 
By itself, such observations of metonymy do not answer Everett’s challenge. But such cases 
allow for conjunction reductions that allow the relevant singular term to do double duty. So 
consider the following examples, adapted from Nunberg (1979), where an item has been 
deleted 
 
(44) The chair you're sitting in was common in nineteenth century parlours. 
(45) The window was broken and then boarded up. 
 
Here we have a singular term playing two roles without any trace of painful syllepsis. In (44), 
‘The chair you’re sitting in’ must play both the token role of (42) and the type role of (43). 
Similarly, in (45), ‘The window’ must play the window glass role of (36) and the window 
area role of (37). Similarly, the following examples require a singular term to do linguistic 
double duty: 
 
(46) The game is very difficult to learn but takes only five minutes to play 
(47) France is a republic with a varied topography 
 
Returning to quotation, a second feature of quotation emphasised by Cappelen and LePore 
(2009) is that quoted words can be simultaneously used and mentioned. The suggestion here 
is that it is because of the first property of quotation, that there is a systematic and transparent 
link between linguistic items and their names, that words can be both used and mentioned 
simultaneously. For example, in 
 




‘has a certain anomalous feature’ is both mentioned and used and we don’t even think about 
this until it is pointed out. It is used as a predicate to complete the sentence and say that 
Quine said that quotation has a certain anomalous feature, but it is also mentioned 
demonstrating the precise way in which Quine made part of his claim. The speaker of (48) 
not only demonstrates the way in which Quine said something, he also performs a distinct 
locutionary act to which the demonstrated words themselves contribute. As Recanati says, “It 
is in that sense that the quoted words can be said to be used simultaneously in saying 
something and performing a demonstration” (2001: 659). So the tight link between quotations 
and their referents explains not only Anscombe’s puzzle but also why we can so readily both 
use and mention words. The suggestion here is that we have a similar phenomenon in the 
case of fictional names. 
 
So we see, contra Everett, that singular terms can do double duty without infelicities, in just 
the way that our realist requires. 
 
Nunberg (1979: 148) observes “that these patterns of multiple word-use show up in what 
Quine has called 'deferred ostension,' as well”. For example, I can point at a copy of a 
newspaper and felicitously say 
 
(49) That was bought by Hearst last week 
 
But what I pointed at was a copy of a newspaper, whereas the referent of ‘that’ needed for the 
intended interpretation of (64) is the newspaper publisher. This leads Nunberg (1979: 150) to 
conclude that the failures of conjunction reduction and pronominalization identity tests for 
ambiguity “arise out of the same process that allows deferred ostension”. 
 
Nunberg’s (1979: 149) conclusion is supported by the fact that “The parallel between 
polysemy and ostension holds even for those specialized uses that a word may have in certain 
contexts”. For example, a waiter may say to a colleague 
 
(50) The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20. 
 




(51) He is sitting at table 20. 
 
In fact, the phenomenon is even more widespread that Nunberg realises. Nunberg (1979: 150) 
notes that the failures of identity or co-reference detailed above can occur where there is 
genuine polysemy, but “they are blocked by real [mere] homonymy”. But in certain contexts, 
this is not the case. As Deane (1988: 345) notes, explicit comparison also allows for 
coordination of homonyms in the way denied by Nunberg. For example in 
 
(52) The bank John had trouble finding was not the one where he had cashed the cheque 
but the one where he had moored the boat. 
 
I do not propose to offer an explanation of how deferred ostension is possible and how 
exactly it underwrites failures of conjunction reduction and pronominalization identity tests 
for ambiguity. But the fact that deferred ostension and the failures of conjunction reduction 
identity tests are so prevalent, rebuts Everett’s argument that the realist’s positing of an 
ambiguity in fictional names is implausible given the straightforward way in which  we 
interpret (3) and (4).  
 
But the fact that linguistic double duty is tied up with our capacity for deferred ostension, 
might lead one to worry about the adequacy of the proposed reply to Everett. First, it might 
be objected, that we cannot have deferred ostension in fictional contexts. On the one hand we 
cannot point to an abstract object at all and on the other hand, on the intra-fiction use, a 
fictional name has no referent. This worry is easily dealt with, however. All Nunberg is 
claiming is that the capacity for deferred ostension underwrites our ability for conjunction 
reduction and pronominalization without co-reference. Once such coordination is possible, 
there is nothing to prevent it from taking place in cases where there is no possibility of 
deferred ostension. Moreover, it is simply false to say that there cannot be deferred ostension 
in fictional cases. For example, I can point at an actor and say ‘he is the Lothario type 
character in this play’. Alternatively, I can point at a concrete inscription of a fictional name 
and say ‘she is my favourite fictional detective’. So the connection between non-coreferential 
coordination and deferred ostension does not undermine my defence of the ambiguity of 






We have seen then, that the well-motivated picture of fictional names as polysemous is not 
threaten by postulating a distinction between what goes on in a pretence and what goes on 
without it. Moreover, by considering further cases of polysemy, we can see that the posited 
ambiguity is not threatened by mixed sentences as such coordination of non-coreferential 
terms is widespread. 
 
In the next chapter we shall see how the ambiguity thesis allow the realist to provide a simple 
and natural account of negative existentials, one which is unavailable to realists who do not 





Chapter 6: Realism about Fictional Characters and Negative Existentials 
 
We argued in Chapter 2 that we can provide an adequate account of singular negative 
existentials, treating ‘exists’ either as a first-level predicate, or as a second-level predicate, 
only if we allow for the intelligibility of empty names. Furthermore, we argued that either 
way of cashing out the account is compatible with a non-Russellian and a broadly Russellian 
account of names. 
 
As we saw, the basics of the account is that an existential claim of the form ‘a exists’ is false 
when ‘a’ is empty, and correspondingly its negation, ‘a does not exist’ is true. This is, 
unsurprisingly, how to account for the truth of singular negative existentials. 
 
As I argued in Chapter 3, we ought to be realists about fictional characters, and as such can 
truly say 
 
(1) Sherlock Holmes exists. 
 
Now as noted in Chapter 3, it is not part of our practice to deny the existence of fictions, 
unless we are in the grip of some revisionary philosophical theory (Friend 2007: 149). 
Moreover, we noted that our ordinary practices seem to commit us to the existence of 
fictions. If I see you reading a copy of Patrick Süskind’s Perfume and I say ‘that is a great 
book’, I am not talking about the particular copy of the novel that you hold, but rather the 
novel of which you have a copy. And for my statement to be true, given The Existence 
Principle, ‘that’ must be referring to a fiction.  
 
There is, however, a problem for realists about fictional characters, which does not arise for 
realists about fictions. Although, we do not ordinarily deny the existence of fictions 
themselves, it is part of our ordinary practice to deny the existence of fictional characters 
(Friend 2007:149).91 This observation is the starting point for an argument against realism 
about fictional characters generally, and so against the kind of realism endorsed here. Let us 
call this the challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters. 
                                                          
91 Although, realists will note that it is also part of our practice to affirm their existence: there are some fictional 
characters who were created only recently. An advantage of the realism propounded here is that it can 
adequately account both for our affirmations and denials of the existence of fictional characters unlike irrealism 




In §1 I outline and defend a response to the challenge from the nonexistence of fictional 
characters as formulated above which is compatible with realism about fictional characters 
which exploits the polysemy of fictional names that I defended in Chapter 5. In §2, I’ll then 
consider a different form of the challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters and 
show how the realist can also meet this. The realist who accepts the polysemy of fictional 
names, therefore, can account for our irrealist intuitions concerning fiction. In §3 I then 
consider how realists who do not accept the polysemy of fictional names have attempted to 
meet the challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters, arguing that these 
alternative realist accounts of fictional singular negative existentials fail. This shows that if 
one wants to admit that there are fictional characters, then one must be a realist who thinks 
fictional names are polysemous in the way that I have argued they are (Chapters 3 and 5), 
rather than a realist who thinks that fictional names (almost always) refer to fictional objects. 
 
 
1. Polysemy and Singular Negative Existentials 
The challenge for the realist about fictional characters is that it is part of our ordinary practice 
to deny the existence of fictional characters. One form of this challenge comes from apparent 
true fictional singular negative existentials. That is, although the realist is committed to the 
truth of (1), our ordinary practice commits us to the truth of 
 
(2) Sherlock Holmes does not exist 
 
What is more, it seems true in exactly the same way that ‘Vulcan does not exist’ is true. So it 
seems that the realism I espoused in Chapter 3 is in tension with the account of singular 
negative existentials I provided in Chapter 2. More generally, if fictional characters do exist, 
how can realists account for the truth of fictional singular negative existentials? 
 
The obvious response for the realist about fictional characters to the challenge from fictional 
singular negative existentials is to say that on the true reading of (2) ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does 
not refer to a fictional character, but is empty. This allows us to maintain a uniform account 
of singular negative existentials, and one which respects the intuition that nonexistence goes 




Such a realist response posits an ambiguity in fictional names. But as we have seen already, 
such an ambiguity is independently plausible, for it allows us to respect the dual-perspectives 
we can have on a fiction, and allows us to capture our realist intuitions about fictional 
characters. We shall now show that it also allows us to capture our irrealist intuitions about 
fictional characters as manifested in our commitment to (2). 
 
The approach recommended here is that the account of singular negative existentials argued 
for in Chapter 2 applies as equally to fictional negative existentials such as (2). That is, 
working within a background negative free logic, regardless of whether we adopt a broadly 
Russellian approach to names or not, the truth of (2) is to be explained by the fact that 
‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ is a simple sentence with an empty name, and as such is false. Its 
negation, represented by (2), is therefore true. The truth conditions of (2) are then provided 
by (3) or (4) depending on one’s general approach to names: 
 
(3) ~[λx. x exists <Sherlock Holmes>] 
(4) ~Really[λx. x exists <Sherlock Holmes>]. 
 
Alternatively, if we are to treat exists as a second-level predicate, still working within a 
background negative free logic, the truth conditions of (2) are given by (5) or (6) 
 
(5) ~[λF. ∃x Fx <=Sherlock Holmes>] 
(6) ~Really[λF. ∃x Fx <=Sherlock Holmes>]. 
 
These truth conditions are compatible with the realism about fictional characters advocated in 
Chapter 3, since, on this account fictional names are polysemous, having one reading on 
which they are empty, allowing us to account for the truth of (2) in the most straightforward 
way, and another on which they refer to fictional characters, allowing us to account for the 
truth of (1) in the most straightforward way. When we wish to describe our realism and 
affirm (1), then we are using the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ to refer to the fictional character 
created by Conan Doyle. On the other hand when we utter true singular negative existentials, 
such as (2), we are using the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as Conan Doyle does when he is 




We should head off one possible misunderstanding, before we consider some objections to 
this account of fictional singular negative existentials. If (2) is uttered from within the 
relevant pretence, as part of the make-believe licensed by Conan Doyle’s writing, then it is 
false. A similar way to make the same point is that 
 
(7) According to the Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes does not exist 
 
is false. On the other hand, if (2) is uttered from outside of the pretence, it is also false, if all 
such uses of fictional names refer to fictional characters. That is, if fictional names are only 
empty when they occur within the scope of a fiction or fictions, then there is no way for the 
realist to account for the truth of fictional singular negative existentials such as (2). 
Therefore, the realist must reject this crude dichotomy. 
 
When we utter a true fictional singular negative existential what we are doing is employing a 
fictional name as used within the fiction, from a perspective without the fiction. We are using 
a fictional name as a fictional name and then, as Wiggins puts it (1995) making a comment 
on the fiction by using the fiction within a reality-invoking mode. That uses of empty 
fictional names are not confined to uses within the various pretences, can be seen by the fact 
that someone may think a story is a work of biography, using the name as the author used it, 
but mistakenly thinking that this name can be uses to make true simple claims about the 
world. In the same way, someone who uses ‘Sherlock Holmes’ when it is empty, cannot truly 
utter (1), but because of this, he can truly utter (2). This then is our realist account of the truth 
conditions of fictional singular negative existentials. 
 
Anthony Everett (2007) raises three objections to the account above. First, as we have seen 
(Chapter 5), Everett rejects our polysemous approach to fictional names because of the 
presence of mixed sentences, where fictional names must play a dual linguistic role. But as I 
argued there, such linguistic double duty is common and unproblematic. So the fact that there 
can be mixed sentences containing fictional negative existential claims such as 
 
(8) Raskolnikov is just a fictional character and consequently doesn’t really exist 
 
where the fictional name has to do double duty – both having a non-empty role to make the 
first half of the sentence true, and an empty role to make the singular negative existential true 
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–  is no objection to the polysemy-based realist approach to fictional negative existentials 
given here. Similarly, given that we can have anaphoric dependencies without co-reference, 
the felicity of sentences such as 
 
(9) Raskolnikov is just a fictional character and consequently he doesn’t really exist, 
 
where ‘Raskolnikov’ has to refer, but ‘he’ needs to empty, poses no threat to our treatment of 
fictional negative existentials. 
 
Second, Everett claims that to postulate an asymmetry between how fictional names work in 
negative existentials and how fictional names work in the sentences which motivate realism, 
is an unmotivated ad hoc manoeuvre. Now if the ambiguity proposed above were posited 
merely in response to the problem of negative existentials, perhaps Everett’s claim would 
have some force, although that is far from clear. Leaving Meinongianism to one side, any 
theorist who wishes to say that there are true fictional negative existentials must allow that 
fictional names in such sentences are empty, or otherwise provide some deviant semantic 
analysis. On the other hand, as Everett notes, there are sentences which seem especially well-
suited to a realist treatment. Such sentences appear “to involve explicit reference to or 
quantification over fictional characters” (Everett 2007: 57), for example 
 
(10) Raskolnikov is a fictional character 
(11) The character of Raskolnikov was created by Dostoyevsky 
(12) Raskolnikov is a more realistic character than Alyosha 
(13) There are fictional characters which could never have been depicted prior to the 
creation of Raskolnikov 
 
Given these two facts then, it seems the kind of ambiguity endorsed here is well-motivated. 
But in any case, the ambiguity of fictional names is motivated independently of questions of 
existence. As noted in Chapter 3, our thought and talk about fiction is distinguished by the 
fact that we can take perspectives internal and external to the fiction. When authors write 
fiction it is not very plausible that they are writing about abstract objects as a matter of 
course. Rather they are pretending92 that there are certain people who do the things described 
                                                          
92 I’m using pretence here as a placeholder for whichever attitude it is that authors have when writing fiction. 
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in the work of fiction. As such they are using names that have no referents. Similarly, when 
we engage with fiction and have emotional responses to fiction, it is more plausible to 
suppose that we are pretending that there are people who have undergone the experiences 
described in the work of fiction, rather than pretending of some abstract object that it has 
properties only people can possess. This is what the irrealist about fiction gets right.  
 
On the other hand, as seen above, the best account of fictional practice and our metafictional 
discourse that motivates realism seems best captured by positing fictional characters. So the 
ambiguity in fictional names posited here reflects the duality of our thought and talk about 
fiction. So, contra Everett, positing ambiguity here is not an ad hoc manoeuvre, but is 
motivated by the facts to which Everett draws our attention. It is only a polysemous account 
that can capture both what the irrealist and the crude realist get right about fiction, and so it 
would appear to be the best account of fictional names. Of course, if this polysemy were 
otherwise objectionable, this would give us a reason to reconsider it. But as argued in Chapter 
5, this polysemous account is not objectionable in the way that Everett thinks it is. 
 
Everett’s final charge against positing an ambiguity in fictional names starts from the 
observation that the referents of nonfictional names do not vary depending on whether they 
occur in negative existential sentences or other contexts. So, for example, the names in (14) 
and (16) both refer to Saul Kripke, whereas the name in (15) and (17) fails to refer. 
 
(14) Kripke doesn’t exist 
(15) Vulcan does not exist 
(16) Kripke is a philosopher 
(17) Vulcan is a planet 
 
So why is it that in fictional negative existentials, such as (2), the name does not refer to the 
same thing that it does in sentences like ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Arthur Conan 
Doyle’? 
 
But it is a contention of the realism advocated here that fictional discourse is special, in so far 
as it exhibits the duality of perspectives noted above. As noted above, it is not that fictional 
names fail to refer in negative existential statements but refer everywhere else. Now, as our 
discussion of Wiggins in Chapter 2 showed, for Russellians at least, we do exploit a kind of 
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fiction, failed presupposition, in making sense of failed reference once we know we have a 
case of failed reference, even in the case of ‘Vulcan’. So in that sense we have a duality of 
perspectives even in the case of failed scientific posits. But all we have here is what Walton 
(1990: Chapter 11) calls betrayals and disavowals of fiction. There are no positive claims 
using ‘Vulcan’, however, that require us to posit an abstract object to which ‘Vulcan’ refers 
in such claims, or so I will argue in a sequel to this thesis. Moreover, theorizing does not 
require that we create a fictional entity, in the way that good fiction requires the creation of 
fictional characters. 
 
In any case, as already argued in Chapters 3 and 5 it is simply not true that nonfictional 
singular terms are unambiguous in way that Everett suggests. As a result we can find pairs of 
sentences with non-fictional singular terms that exhibit variation in reference, just as we do in 
fictional discourse. For example, 
 
(18) Grisham is a popular author 
(19) Grisham reads much better in Swahili 
 
In (18), ‘Grisham’ refers to the US author John Grisham, whereas in (19) it does not. And as 
we argued in Chapter 5, even the singular term ‘I’, which has a special connection to the 
author of an utterance, can have variation in reference similar to that of proper names. So it is 
simply not true that “the current suggestion involves postulating an unattractive and 
otherwise unmotivated asymmetry between the behaviour of fictional and nonfictional names 
in negative existential contexts.” (Everett 2007: 59). 
 
 
2. ‘Fictional Characters’, Quantification, and Polysemy 
The above formulation of the challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters to 
realism was formulated using fictional names. The realism espoused here could respond to 
this challenge given its commitment to the polysemy of fictional names. Employing this 
polysemy allowed us to retain our realism and uphold true singular existential claims, such as 
(1), whilst accounting for our apparent denial of realism encoded in claims such as (2). 
 
But the challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters need not be formulated in 
terms of fictional names. Because of this the response above which relied on the polysemy of 
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fictional names does not offer a general realist response to the challenge from the 
nonexistence of fictional characters. Nevertheless, I think the realist can avail herself of a 
similar strategy, albeit one that does not rest directly on the polysemy of fictional names. 
 
Stuart Brock (2011) considers the following version of the challenge from the nonexistence 
of fictional characters which he attributes to Yagisawa93 
 
(20) According to common sense, fictional characters do not exist. 
(21) Realism entails that fictional characters do exist. 
Therefore, 
(22) Realism is in conflict with common sense. 
 
As Brock notes this argument shows that realists “cannot satisfactorily account for some 
claims commonly made “about” creatures of fiction” (Brock 2010: 345). In order to refute 
realism about fictional characters, this argument would need to be supplemented with some 
claim to the effect that any theory that conflicts with common sense is to be rejected. Of 
course, any such premise is going to be too strong. A more plausible attack on realism would 
note that (22) is a cost of any realist position, and so, ceteris paribus, realism is to be rejected. 
But, as Brock, himself an irrealist, notes, irrealists also have difficulty with claims about 
fiction. Brock thinks that for all this argument shows, realists can “claim that while their 
theory does not provide a uniform treatment of all claims about fictional characters, it is still 
the best theory on balance” (2010: 345). 
 
Ordinarily, one might be wary of replying in the way Brock suggests, since it seems that, 
realism still fails to account for some of the data, and so, ultimately, it ought to be rejected. 
But if realism and irrealism together exhaust logical space, then one of them must be correct, 
and so the realist could reply along the lines Brock suggests: it may be that we have to give 
up on something that we find intuitive. But that we should give up on the claim that fictional 
characters do not exist is a very large cost for realism. I shall argue, however, that the realist 
can endorse the claim that fictional characters do not exist, and so this version of the 
challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters lapses. 
                                                          
93 Brock (2011: 343) formulates the argument as a challenge to creationism rather than realism per se, but 
nothing in the argument turns on distinctively creationist claims. Although Yagisawa (2001) does press the 
challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters, he makes no explicit appeals to common sense as the 




Now what realism entails is that there are fictional characters (Chapter 3). So if this argument 
is to be valid, (20) must be taken as making a universal claim, along the lines of the claims 
that Yagisawa explicitly appeals to: ‘all fictional individuals are nonexistent’ and ‘no 
fictional individual exists’ (Yagisawa 2011: 170).  But it is not entirely clear that the irrealist 
is entitled to make such universal claims. If Napoleon is a fictional character in virtue of the 
fact that Tolstoy writes about him in War and Peace and Napoleon exists, then it seems that 
some fictional characters do exist. Of course, this relies on the assumption that ‘Napoleon’ as 
used by Tolstoy refers to the concrete individual who was emperor of France (See Friend 
(2000) for a defence of this claim). We can avoid this issue in one of two ways: we could 
reformulate the argument with ‘merely fictional’ in place of ‘fictional’, where this is 
understood not to apply to Napoleon, or else by making the irrealist premise an existential 
claim and the realist commitment a universal claim, along the lines of the following 
 
(23) According to common sense, merely fictional characters do not exist 
(24) Realism entails that merely fictional characters exist 
 
(25) According to common sense, some fictional characters do not exist 
(26) Realism entails that all fictional characters exist 
 
But let us leave the precise nature of formulating the challenge to one side, as the nature of 
the challenge seems clear enough: we seem to deny the existence of fictional characters, but 
realism is committed to their existence. 
 
We should note that the irrealist faces a similar challenge, the challenge from the existence of 
fictional characters: 
 
(27) According to common sense, there are fictional characters, for example, Sherlock 
Holmes 
 







(29) Irrealism is in conflict with common sense. 
 
The irrealist could respond by claiming that there is an equivocation: the quantifier phrases in 
(27) and (28) are not duals, and so there is no inconsistency between (27) and (28). There are 
two ways of cashing this out. 
 
First, the irrealist could claim that although the quantifiers in (27) and (28) are of the same 
type, the quantifier in (28) is a restricted version of the quantifier in (27). It is hard to see how 
this strategy can help the irrealist, however. If the quantifiers are construed objectually, then 
the irrealist is committed to there being some fictional characters. As we have rejected 
Meinongianism, this means that the irrealist is committed to the claim that some fictional 
characters exist, and this is the defining claim of realism about fictional characters. Even the 
realist can admit that if we restrict our objectual quantifiers to, say, concrete objects, then our 
quantifiers do not range over fictional characters. If, on the other hand, the quantifiers are 
treated non-objectually, as substitutional quantifiers or as means for generalizing into 
syntactic position, then given that Sherlock Holmes is one of the fictional characters that 
irrealists deny the existence of, this response does not help since we can generalize from 
 




(31) There are fictional characters 
 
and it is (31) that irrealism denies. 
 
The second irrealist response to the challenge from the existence of fictional characters 
claims that the argument employs two different types of quantifier. This irrealist maintains 
that the quantifier in (27) is not ‘existentially-loaded’, perhaps being a substitutional 
quantifier, whereas the quantifier in (28) is a standard non-Meinongian objectual quantifier. 
The tension is resolved since the truth of (27) requires only the truth of (30), which according 
to the irrealist does not require a referent of ‘Sherlock Holmes’. On the other hand, all that 




But note that the realist can also avail himself of these strategies. First, the realist can apply 
the quantifier variance strategy by claiming that the implicit quantifier in (20) or the explicit 
quantifier in (25) are restricted versions of the quantifiers in (21) and (24). But this strategy is 
of no help when faced with the reformulated argument in terms of (25) and (26), since even if 
the quantifier in (25) ranges over a subset of the domain of the quantifier in (26), there is still 
a clash. But note that given our rejection of Meinongianism, the quantifier in (25) cannot be 
read objectually. So this brings us on to the second strategy. 
 
The realist could say that the quantifier denying the existence of fictional characters is not to 
be read objectually, but rather, say, substitutionally. Since the realist agrees that there are 
many true fictional singular negative existentials, indeed all those involving the names of 
merely fictional characters, this underwrites the truth of (20), (23) and (25) when read 
substitutionally 
 
Both the realist and the irrealist then need to say that sometimes natural language 
quantification is non-objectual. The realist must say this in order to capture the truth of 
‘(some) fictional characters do not exist’, whereas the irrealist needs it in order to capture the 
falsity of ‘there are fictional characters’. 
 
We should note, however, that the challenge to irrealism from the existence of fictional 
characters cannot plausibly be explicitly formulated in terms of ‘exist’, but rather has to be 
formulated in terms of ‘there are’, whereas the challenge to realism from the nonexistence of 
fictional characters can be formulated either in terms of ‘exists’ or in terms of ‘there are’. Of 
course, given our non-Meinongian treatment of objectual quantifiers, ‘there are fictional 
characters’ is equivalent to ‘fictional characters exist’. Nevertheless, the challenge to 
irrealism cannot be formulated explicitly in terms of ‘exists’. We might think, then, that this 
constitutes evidence that the quantifier in ‘there are fictional characters’ is non-objectual, 
whereas the quantifier in ‘(some) fictional characters exist’ is the objectual one. If so, this 
would mean that whilst the realist still faces the challenge from the nonexistence of fictional 





I do not think, however, that this is the case. We have already argued that there are good 
reasons for believing in the existence of fictional characters, and these reasons have not been 
addressed here. Moreover the realist can admit, as we have shown above, the intuition that 
fictional characters do not exist. In our ordinary discourse, we are strongly inclined to affirm 
fictional singular negative existentials whilst rejecting fictional singular existentials. It is only 
once we consider fictional characters as theorists, and perhaps as authors plotting our 
fictional works, that we recognize that we are committed to their existence. Similarly, the 
irrealist intuition carries across to general existential statements. We are strongly inclined to 
say that fictional characters do not exist, generalizing from the true fictional singular negative 
existentials. But once as theorists we recognize the reasons for positing fictional characters, 
we are happy to say that fictional characters do exist. 
 
In any case, the irrealist about fictional characters will have to recognize the non-objectual 
nature of some generalizations from singular negative existentials. As Wiggins points out 
 
it is perfectly possible to say, without contradicting oneself, that there are 
all sorts of things that don’t exist – dragons, Vulcan (the putative planet 
postulated by Leverrier), Scylla, Charybdis, for instance (Wiggins 1995: 
96) 
 
And given that ‘there are things which do not exist’ is contradictory if we interpret the 
quantifier objectually, the irrealist is committed to some natural language quantified claims 
being interpreted non-objectually. 
 
Wiggins suggests that what is happening here is that ‘thing’ makes it possible for us to 
quantify over first-level concepts so that we can say that they are not instantiated. Now the 
realist about fictional characters cannot use Wiggins’ explanation to account for the felicity 
of ‘fictional characters do not exist’, since he maintains that the relevant first-level concept is 
instantiated. But similarly, the irrealist about fictional characters cannot appeal to Wiggins’ 
account for ‘there are fictional characters’ since for them the relevant first-level concept is 
not instantiated. But however we account for this non-objectual quantification, the realist 
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about fictional characters can maintain that statements like ‘no fictional character exists’ and 
‘fictional characters do not exist’ are simply more of the same.94 
 
Before examining the adequacy of other realist treatments of fictional singular negative 
existentials, let us examine the quantificational analogue of Everett’s problem of mixed 
sentences for the claim that fictional names are polysemous. Consider the following 
quantified sentence 
 
(32) Some fictional characters exist, whereas others do not 
 
which is the conjunction-reduced form of (33). 
 
(33) Some fictional characters exist, whereas some fictional characters do not (exist) 
 
(33) itself is licensed by sentences such as 
 
(34) Prince Andrei is a fictional character who does not exist 
(35) Napoleon is a fictional character who exists 
 
Now if the first half of (33) is to be interpreted as objectual quantification, then, given that 
the latter half of (33) is not to be interpreted as objectual quantification, then the quantified 
noun phrase ‘some fictional characters’ in (32) must be doing linguistic double duty. It must 
have a role as an objectual quantifier and play a role as a non-objectual quantifier. 
 
The realist could respond by saying that the quantifier is univocally a non-objectual 
quantifier, which is generalizing into the name position of (34) and (35). But it is not clear 
that he need do so. As we saw in Chapter 5 the conjunction reduction test for ambiguity fails, 
and names can do linguistic double duty, although we did not see this in the case of (other) 
quantified noun phrases. So it is possible, for all that we have said, that quantified noun 
phrases cannot do linguistic double duty., and so the suggested realist treatment of (32) is 
implausible. But we can see that the phenomena highlighted by Nunberg (1979) extends to 
quantified noun phrases. For example, from 
                                                          




(36) Snap is a game that takes only five minutes and go is game with simple rules 
 
we appear to be able to generalize to 
 
(37) Some games take only five minutes and others have simple rules 
 
And all of the following seem fine 
 
(38) Most / Some / All of the orphanage’s windows were smashed and then boarded up 
(39) Most / Some / All games which last only five minutes, are very hard to learn 
(40) Most / Some / All republics have varied landscapes 
 
But in these examples the quantified noun phrases must be doing linguistic double duty, if 
interpreted objectually, since, for example, in order for (39) to be true ‘Most of the 
orphanage’s windows’ has to have one reading where ‘window glass’ is relevant and another 
where ‘window opening’ is. This does not establish, however, that the determiner is doing 
double linguistic duty here as the present realist response requires, but only that the common 
noun is, but such data is indicative of the wide variety of systematic polysemy in natural 
language. It would be no surprise then, if determiners too could be used to do linguistic 
double duty. But as we have said, the realist need not commit to this. 
 
 
3. Other Realist Approaches to Singular Negative Existentials 
So we have seen that the realist about fictional characters who maintains that there is a use of 
fictional names on which they are empty can account for the truth of fictional singular 
negative existentials. Thereby, they can account for the challenge from the nonexistence of 
fictional characters in either its singular or general forms. But what of realists who do not 
endorse the polysemy of fictional names? Can they account for the truth or at least the felicity 
of fictional singular negative existentials? 
 
Yagisawa notes that the realist may try to account for fictional singular negative existentials 
by employing some paraphrase strategy. As Yagisawa conceives of this strategy, the realist 
concedes that fictional singular negative existentials are false, but maintains, nevertheless, 
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that there is some truth conveyed by our utterances of them. Yagisawa puts the point as 
follows: “when we say that Mrs. Gamp does not exist, what we say is not true but what we 
mean to say is true” (2001: 169). There is, however, another way of conceiving of this 
strategy. Instead of conceding the falsity of fictional singular negative existentials, the realist 
may be seen as offering a somewhat surprising account of the truth conditions of fictional 
singular negative existentials. 
 
Before examining particular realist accounts, we should note that either realist approach is 
problematic. First, if the realist concedes that singular negative existentials are false then he 
has already given up a lot, for it seems that it is the truth of fictional singular negative 
existentials that we wish to hold onto. This is why such statements have proven so 
problematic for Russellians. Unlike other felicitous sentences which we want, after 
consideration, to regard as having the opposite truth value to the one they prima facie 
possess, there is no independent systematic explanation as to why the relevant singular 
negative existentials are, despite appearances, false. For example, we have seen already that 
‘Vulcan is a planet’ is better than ‘Vulcan is a detective’, but given The Existence Principle, 
it cannot be true. Its felicity is to be explained not by its truth, but by Le Verrier’s theorising. 
Similarly, ‘you may have salad or soup entails you may have salad and you may have soup’ 
seems initially true, but such an entailment cannot be upheld given certain other 
commitments concerning the logic of permission and obligation (see McNamara (2010: §4.3) 
for a brief introduction to the issues). As a result we need a pragmatic explanation of the 
appeal of such ‘free choice permission’. But in the case of fictional singular negative 
existentials, we have no need to appeal to a pragmatic explanation of what appears to be true. 
Realism per se does not, as we have seen, rob fictional singular negative existentials of their 
truth. And as we have seen our judgments that such statements are true are robust, unlike in 
the case of Vulcan or free choice permission, where once we are asked to reconsider the 
sentences, we are happy to concede that such sentences are not true. 
 
So we should take it as a constraint on theorising about fictional singular negative existentials 
that we preserve the truth of such claims. Thus the realist would do better to offer his 
paraphrases as analyses of existential claims, in the weak sense of providing their truth 
conditions. But such an approach also suffers from a strategic problem. In other cases where 
we offer non-obvious logical forms we are driven to do so in order to capture the correct truth 
conditions or logical relations. For example Davidson (1967) posited a quantified and 
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conjunctive logical form for action sentences such as ‘Lorena cut John Wayne in the bedroom 
with a knife’ so as to account for the obvious truth that this entails ‘Lorena cut John Wayne in 
the bedroom’. Similarly, unless we want to be committed to there being an object which is 
the average mother, we had better not treat ‘the average mother has 2.4 children’ along the 
lines of ‘the current President of the USA is a democrat’ (cf. Melia 1995). But such pressures 
are not present in the case of fictional singular negative existentials modulo our discussion of 
Meinongianism and subject-predicate form in Chapter 2. As we have seen, both the irrealist 
and the realist who accepts the polysemy of fictional names can provide acceptable and 
unsurprising truth conditions of fictional singular negative existentials that match the surface 
form of fictional singular negative existentials (as far as is possible). Moreover, the realist 
about fictional characters who is an irrealist about other putative nonexistents, will be happy 
to accept such treatments of singular negative existentials in non-fictional cases, so wherein 
the difference? As stressed the differential treatment is not licensed by realism per se. In any 
case, leaving these strategic difficulties for realism to one side, we shall see that the realist 
does not get the specifics of their paraphrase treatments of fictional singular negative 
existentials correct, whether construed as providing the truth conditions of fictional singular 
negative existentials or not (I shall not distinguish between these two options below). 
 
If the paraphrase strategy were the only one available to the realist who denies that fictional 
names are polysemous, this would mean that the only acceptable realist treatment of such 
statements on offer, is the one endorsed here. But there is another option available to this 
realist, which invokes a different kind of ambiguity or context-sensitivity to the one appealed 
to in Chapter 5. However, as we shall see in §3.4, this realist account of fictional negative 
existentials also fails. 
 
Yagisawa (2001: 169) suggests that there are two standard realist paraphrase responses to the 
challenge from the nonexistence of fictional characters 
 
According to the first reply, what we mean to say is that there is no such 
woman (or human) as Mrs. Gamp. According to the second reply, what we 
mean to say is that nothing has all the properties ascribed to Mrs. Gamp in the 




Let us call these types of realist response the sortal account and the descriptive 
account respectively. Yagisawa rejects both realist strategies 
 
The first [sortal] reply has counterexamples: e.g., ‘Boojams do not exist’. 
When we deny the existence of boojams on the grounds that they are fictional, 
we need not be able to give a sortal or other kind term to fill the gap in ‘There 
are no such ( ) as boojams,’ except for such an empty kind term as ‘thing’ or 
‘entities’. Since creationists maintain that boojams exist . . . it is false to say 
that there are no such things, or entities, as boojams95. . . . Does the second 
[descriptivist] reply fare any better? ... But that what we mean to say when we 
say ‘Mrs. Gamp does not exist’ in our attempt to contrast Mrs. Gamp with you 
and me is not false if some actual person about whom Dickens was not writing 
happens to have all the properties ascribed to Mrs. Gamp in the story. So the 
second reply does not fare any better. (Yagisawa 2001: 169–70). 
 
Brock (2010: 345) thinks that Yagisawa’s objection, if successful, would show only that 
realists “cannot satisfactorily account for some claims commonly made “about” creatures of 
fiction”. But, as Brock says, and as noted in Chapter 4, irrealists also have difficulty with 
claims about fiction, for example, ‘Mrs. Gamp has been discussed by many Dickens 
scholars’. Brock thinks that for all Yagisawa has said, realists can “claim that while their 
theory does not provide a uniform treatment of all claims about fictional characters, it is still 
the best theory on balance” (Brock 2010: 345). 
 
We should be wary of replying in the way Brock suggests, since it seems that, if Yagisawa is 
correct, realism still fails to account for some data, and so, ultimately, it ought to be rejected. 
But if realism and irrealism together exhaust logical space, then one of them must be correct, 
and so it seems that the realist could reply along the lines Brock suggests: regardless of 
whether realism or irrealism is true, we have to give up on something that we find intuitive. 
But this is, in the relevant sense, a false dilemma. We have argued that the realist who 
endorses the polysemy of fictional names can account for fictional singular negative 
existentials in a straightforward way. Moreover, such a realist can help himself to Walton’s 
                                                          
95 Yagisawa (2001: 170) also objects that the sortal account cannot account for general negative existentials. But 
as argued above, if the realist can account for singular negative existentials it is plausible to say that the case of 
general negative existentials represent no further problem. 
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make-believe account of truths within a fiction, and also account for the truths that irrealists 
have difficulty with, in the most obvious way. The realism endorsed here, then, can provide 
an account of a range of truths about fiction in an obvious way. In any case, as was stressed 
above, that the realist should give up on accounting for fictional singular negative existential 
truths is a very large cost indeed.96 
 
The question for the realist who rejects polysemy is whether Yagisawa’s objections to the 
sortal and descriptivist accounts of negative existentials are decisive, and whether these are 
the only options available to the realist? I shall argue in §3.1 and §3.2 that Yagisawa is 
correct that both sortal and descriptivist accounts of fictional singular negative existentials 
fail. In §3.3 we shall consider and reject a metalinguistic paraphrase strategy not considered 
by Yagisawa, before turning to a non-paraphrase strategy in §3.4, which we shall also show is 
not successful. We then conclude on this basis that the realist about fictional characters can 
only account for fictional singular negative existentials by appealing to the independently 
motivated polysemy of fictional names advocated here. 
 
 
3.1 Sortal Accounts 
A popular realist strategy for handling fictional singular negative existentials starts from the 
observation that when we say things like 
 
(2) Sherlock Holmes does not exist 
 
what we typically intend to convey is, as noted by Yagisawa, that Sherlock Holmes is not a 
(real) person.97 And the realist is certainly correct that this is at least part of what we want to 
get across when we utter (2). Further, it is agreed by all that Sherlock Holmes is a not real 
                                                          
96 Brock (2010: 346) also claims that although realists cannot take negative existentials at face value, neither can 
irrealists. Claims like ‘Mrs. Gamp does not exist’ appear to deny that some individual has the property of 
existing. But, having ruled out Meinongianism, this route is not open to the irrealist, since everything 
whatsoever exists. But as discussed already (Chapter 2) we do not usually distinguish, because we usually do 
not have to distinguish, between negation as a predicate modifier and negation as a sentential operator. Once we 
do so distinguish, it is not clear that singular negative existentials do appear to predicate a property of an object. 
In any case, the account of singular negative existentials given in Chapter 2 and above, which is open to both 
irrealists and realists who accept that fictional names are polysemous is the least revisionary account of singular 
negative existentials that we can have, and so in this regard are superior to the realist accounts we are 
considering here. 




person. So in the case of Holmes, at least, the realist proposal is extensionally correct. 
Yagisawa, however, argues that the account does not generalize. 
 
Yagisawa’s rejection of the sortal account fails in its present form since it relies on the claim 
that realists accept that there are such things as boojams. But this is not a plausible 
commitment of realism, notwithstanding the fact that some would accept this. Sherlock 
Holmes is said to be a man and a detective, whereas he is, in fact neither. So the realist 
commitment to the existence of Sherlock Holmes does not falsify the negative existential 
claims that there are no men and that there are no detectives. Similarly, a commitment to 
fictional characters does not involve a commitment to detectives or boojams. 
 
Nevertheless, we can see the shape that a counterexample to a sortal account of fictional 
singular negative existentials must take. But in order to assess whether the sortal account 
holds in full generality we need a precise statement of what the account is, rather than 
analyzing fictional singular negative existentials in a piecemeal manner. An initially 
promising generalization of this idea, proposed on the realist’s behalf by Everett (2007: 65) is 
 
Sortal 1: An utterance of ‘‘a does not exist’’ can be used to convey the claim that a is 
not a real S, where (i) S is a conversationally salient substance sortal and (ii) a is 
fictionally characterized as being an S in a conversationally salient fiction. 
 
We need to characterize the sortal account in terms of substance sortals rather than just 
sortals, otherwise it fails to capture the intuitive claim with which we started. When we utter 
(2), we do not mean simply to deny that Sherlock Holmes is a real detective. Moreover, if this 
were the account, it would obviously be false, since fictions can mischaracterize extra-
fictional objects. For example, a novel could say of Barack Obama that he is a fireman, but 
this would mean that ‘Barack Obama does not exist’ is true, when in fact it is false. 
 





(41) Fictional objects do not exist.98 
 
Everett (2007: 68) thinks the most natural way of applying Sortal 1 to (41) is as follows: 
 
(42) Fictional objects are fictionally characterized as being S’s but are not real S’s.  
 
But since there is no one S, such that all fictional characters are characterized as S’s, this 
proposal fails. So it seems clear that we must give the sortal wider scope along the lines of 
 
(43) Every fictional object is such that there is some substance sortal S such that the 
fictional object is fictionally characterized as being an S but is not really a S. 
 
Everett (2007: 69) rejects this because whereas (41) makes a generic claim, (43) makes a 
universal claim. Given that generics are not very well understood and their semantics is a 
matter of controversy, it may seem harsh to criticize the realist (or Everett on behalf of the 
realist) for not being able to come up with an adequate analysis of (41) given our current state 
of understanding. In any case, it seems that the following realist paraphrase deals with the 
issue Everett is worried about: 
 
(44) For every fictional object, there is some substance sortal S, such that the fictional 
object is fictionally characterized as being an S. Fictional objects, however, do not 
really fall under the S they are characterized as. 
 
But for (44) to be an adequate paraphrase of (41), and for Sortal 1 to be an adequate treatment 
of fictional singular negative existentials generally, it must be that for every intuitively true 
fictional singular negative existential, ‘a does not exist’, there is some substance sortal such 
that a is characterized as being an S, but is in fact not really an S. Everett doubts whether this 
is the case: 
 
Suppose I wrote a story about Yugo in such a way that it is clear that Yugo is 
a fictional character but the reader is unable to determine whether Yugo is 
likely to be animal, vegetable, or mineral. Despite the fact that I do not 
                                                          
98 The sentence that Everett in fact uses is ‘Fictional characters, though often discussed by literary critics, do not 
exist’ but it is not clear that the realist should accept that this is true, hence the amended version in the text. 
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fictionally characterize Yugo as belonging to any obvious kind, I think it is 
clear that [‘Yugo does not exist’ is true] (Everett 2007: 68). 
 
Now on the account of fictional characters defended in Chapters 3 and 4, that an author uses a 
name in an act of pretend reference does not suffice for the creation of a fictional character. 
Rather, there must be some genuinely creative endeavour, where a character is developed. So 
as long as such development is consistent with not specifying the relevant sortal of Yugo, 
Everett’s objection to the sortal account of fictional singular negative existentials goes 
through. Of course, for Yugo to develop through the course of a fiction, some things must be 
said about him. And perhaps in the saying of those things, it will emerge that there is some 
substance sortal that Yugo is characterized as falling under, even if this is not done explicitly. 
Perhaps it will emerge through the telling of Yugo’s adventures that he is a person or an 
animal, or simply an animate being.99 So if Everett’s counterexample is to go through, he 
needs to flesh out the example a bit more. Perhaps this can be done. But as, we shall now 
show, it does not need to be done in order to show that Sortal 1 is inadequate. 
 
As Everett himself notes, Sortal 1 is subject to possible counterexample when we consider 
fictional characters that it is conceded on all sides do exist. For example, if some fiction 
characterized Napoleon as a robot, this would be sufficient, according to Sortal 1, to 
underwrite the claim that Napoleon does not exist, but such a claim, ignoring issues of tense, 
is false. 
 
Even sticking with merely fictional characters, Sortal 1 is inadequate. Noting the infelicities 
of Yagisawa’s presentation of his objection against the sortal account, Brock offers the 
following on Yagisawa’s behalf: 
 
In The Simpsons, Bart and Homer are real people, but Itchy and Scratchy 
are merely fictional characters. In South Park, Stan and Kyle are boys, but 
Terrance and Phillip are fictional characters. Creationists, then, [of the type 
under examination] will be committed to saying that Itchy, Scratchy, 
Terrance, and Phillip are all ascribed and literally have the property of being 
                                                          
99 ‘Animate being’ is not usually classified as a substance sortal, and under plausible assumptions, it cannot be 
that both ‘animal’ and ‘person’ are substance sortals. Let’s ignore these niceties here. The important point is that 
not just any old sortal will do, even if it need not be a substance sortal. 
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a fictional character. As such these characters present a counterexample to 
the first [sortal] realist paraphrase presented above. When we say that Itchy 
and Scratchy do not exist, presumably we do not mean that there is no such 
fictional character as Itchy or Scratchy (Brock 2010: 345 n5). 
 
Brock’s point relies on the claim that for the realist, fictionally fictional characters, such as 
Itchy and Scratchy, are themselves fictional characters which exist, and are thus on a par with 
fictional characters such as Homer Simpson. This is a claim realists ought to accept, since the 
reason we have for thinking that Homer Simpson is a creation of Matt Groening and his team 
carry over, mutatis mutandis, to thinking Itchy and Scratchy are also creations of Groening et 
al. Interestingly, it seems, Yagisawa does not accept this claim himself. When discussing his 
case of boojams, he writes that “creationists maintain that boojams exist (assuming that 
boojams are indeed genuinely fictional individuals, i.e., they are real rather than fictional, 
according to the relevant story)” (Yagisawa 2001: 169). And Everett explicitly rejects that 
fictionally fictional characters are fictional characters: 
 
Consider a fiction S in which one of the characters C writes stories and so 
creates fictional characters. Now these are not, presumably, real fictional 
characters like Raskolnikov. They are not the real creations of real authors. 
Rather they are merely fictional fictional characters. (Everett 2007: 70). 
 
But why would one think that fictional fictional characters were not the creations of 
authors?100 A fictional fictional character, could, for all that has been said, be more developed 
than any of the other fictional characters in a story, more central to the plot, more loved by the 
public etc. Of course the fictional fictional characters of fictions are not presented as real, 
unlike other fictional characters, but what is the metaphysical import of this? As we saw in 
Chapter 4 when discussing the alleged indeterminate identity of fictional characters, Everett 
seems to be overly impressed by how a fictional character is characterized in a story. But just 
                                                          
100 Everett seems to be assuming that writing a story is sufficient for creating fictional characters “one of the 
characters C writes stories and so creates fictional characters.” But as we argued in Chapter 3, this is not the 
case: one can write a story without thereby creating any fictional characters. If, for example, the outer fiction S 
contains only general descriptions of the story written by C, then, on our account, the author of the fiction didn’t 
thereby create further fictional entities. So just as it can be fictionally the case that there is a man, without there 
being a corresponding fictional character, it can be fictionally the case that it is fictionally the case without there 
being a fictional fictional character. But let us ignore this in what follows. 
194 
 
as with Napoleon and London, how a fictional character really is, is not a matter of how a 
story says it is. 
 
As well as relying on the claim that fictional fictional characters are on a par with fictional 
characters, a Brock-style objection to Sortal 1 also requires that fictional character is a 
substance sortal or equivalent, otherwise his case is irrelevant to Sortal 1. On the creationism 
argued for here, fictional character is, in the relevant sense, not a phase sortal, a sortal that 
something can fall under at one time, but fail to fall under at another. This is not the case with 
Platonic theories of fictional characters, which have it that fictional characters are eternal and 
become fictional once they are selected by authors. Indeed, Platonists appeal to this feature of 
their account to try to explain our creationist talk about fictional characters.101 But on our 
creationist metaphysics, fictional character is a substance sortal: it applies to an object at one 
time, if it applies to it at any time; fictional characters are essentially fictional characters; and 
‘is a fictional character’ is the appropriate answer to the question ‘what is it?’ asked of the 
abstract object Sherlock Holmes (Wiggins (2001: Chapter 1)). So despite Yagisawa’s and 
Everett’s reservations, Brock’s counterexample to Sortal 1 is decisive, and so the realist will 
have to look elsewhere for his paraphrase.102 
 
A different type of sortalist account has it, not that what is conveyed is that the fictional 
character is not of certain sort, but rather that it is of a certain sort. A proposal that Everett 
(2007: 70) considers on the realist’s behalf is 
 
                                                          
101 On Timothy Williamson’s (1998) necessitarianism, necessarily everything exists necessarily, and so 
necessarily everything exists eternally. On such a metaphysics, which allows that the concrete could have been 
non-concrete and vice versa, the notions of substance sortal and essentialism need rethinking. As Williamson 
notes (1996b: 168) although no porcupine is necessarily a porcupine, it is consistent with Williamson’s 
necessitarianism that necessarily every porcupine is a porcupine if concrete. In this sense then, porcupine is a 
substance sortal. It is not clear, however, how Williamson would allow fictional character to be a substance 
sortal, since fictional characters are, in the relevant sense, necessarily non-concrete. Like all eternalists about 
fictional characters, Williamson has to reinterpret our creationist talk about fictional characters. It is not clear, 
however, that this is an extra cost of his theory given that he has to reinterpret our creationist talk about artefacts 
in general. 
102 We are obviously using ‘fictional character’ here, so that Napoleon is not a fictional character, despite the 
fact that he was written about in War and Peace. If Napoleon is a fictional character in this sense, then 
obviously fictional character is a phase sortal and not a substance sortal. There is obviously such a use of 
‘fictional character’, the only question is whether there is a use of ‘fictional character’ which applies to 
Napoleon. The felicity of ‘some characters in War and Peace exist whilst others do not’ indicates, that perhaps 
there is, although the infelicity of ‘some fictional characters in War and Peace exist whilst others do not’ 
indicates that perhaps there is not. 
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Sortal 2: An utterance of ‘‘a does not exist’’ can be used to convey the claim that a is 
a fictional object 
 
Everett rejects this because he thinks that according to Sortal 2, ‘fictional objects don’t exist’, 
“would convey the trivial logical truth that fictional objects are fictional objects” (Everett 
2007: 70), and presumably the thought is that ‘fictional objects do not exist’ is not a trivial 
logical truth. But Everett’s claim does not immediately follow from Sortal 2 unless what is 
implied by a sentence S is also implied by the logical consequences of S. But presumably 
what Everett has in mind is that the natural extension of Sortal 2 to general sentences such as 
‘fictional characters do not exist’ has it that this conveys the trivial logical truth. If Everett is 
incorrect that this is what is intended by our hypothetical realist, then her account is 
incomplete. But as we have shown already, generalizations are not where the action is. If we 
can give an account of the particular case, then it is likely we can give an account of the 
resulting generalization. But consider 
 
(45) The fictional object Sherlock Holmes’s violin does not exist. 
 
The natural extension of Sortal 2 to (45) has it that this conveys the trivial claim that the 
fictional object Sherlock Holmes’s violin is a fictional object.103 But this is not trivial. 
 
 
3.2 Descriptivist Accounts 
The descriptivist account of fictional singular negative existentials has also proved popular 
amongst realists (see van Inwagen (1977 and Salmon (1998: 303–4), Adams and Fuller 
(2007)). The proposal is 
 
Descriptivist 1: An utterance of ‘a does not exist’ can be used to convey the claim that 
nothing has all the properties ascribed to a in the relevant fiction 
 
But this claim is no good for the reason that Yagisawa gave and which was made by Saul 
Kripke in his John Locke Lectures (1974): ‘a does not exist’ is not true if it turns out that 
                                                          




something did have all the properties ascribed to a, since this coincidence is irrelevant to the 
claim made by the singular negative existential. 
 
Similarly, Descriptivist 1 also faces the converse problem. Any story about a real person 
which misdescribes them, would erroneously license the claim that they do not exist. 
 
Finally, as Everett (2007: 72) points out, Descriptivist 1 faces a third problem 
 
(46) Even though Hamlet doesn’t exist there is a real person who had all the properties 
attributed to Hamlet in Hamlet 
 
is not contradictory or infelicitous, but if Descriptivist 1 were true, this would not be the case. 
 
Here, then, are three counterexamples to Descriptivist 1. But this does not show that no 
descriptivist approach can work. Here I consider the two obvious modifications to 
Descriptivist 1. 
 
We saw above that Descriptivism 1 failed in the face of the Kripkean objection, since even if 
something had all the properties ascribed to a, it would not be a. This suggests that the realist 
needs to build λx. x=a into the proposal. Salmon (1998: 303-4) considers such an approach 
 
Descriptivist 2: An utterance of ‘a does not exist’ can be used to convey the claim that 
nothing is both a and has all the properties ascribed to a in the relevant fiction 
 
Everett (2007: 71 n23) notes that Descriptivist 2 avoids the Kripkean objection presented 
above, as a singular negative existential is not falsified by anything satisfying the relevant 
descriptive material, but only by a satisfying the descriptive material. Everett says in passing 
that although Descriptivist 2 is not subject to the first counterexample to descriptivist 1, it is 
subject to the second and third counterexamples to Descriptivist 1. It is hard to see, however, 
how sentences like (46) can create a problem for Descriptivist 2. 
 




(47) Even though Hamlet doesn’t exist there is a real person who is both Hamlet and had 
all the properties attributed to Hamlet in Hamlet. 
 
This sentence, unlike (46), does jar, just as Descriptivist 2 predicts. So Everett (2007: 71 n23) 
is wrong to claim that Descriptivist 2 is just as subject to this criticism as Descriptivist 1. But 
what about the second counterexample to Descriptivist 1, is this problematic for Descriptivist 
2? 
 
Here there is a dilemma for the advocate of Descriptivist 2. Let us say that there is a story in 
which an author writes about a pre-existing fictional character, a. This story could say that a 
was created by its author, is well-crafted, is a fictional character, is talked about by 
philosophers, etc. But if a is in extra-fictional reality all of these things then ‘a does not exist’ 
comes out as false according to Descriptivist 2. Intuitively, I think this is the correct verdict 
as it is akin to novels which write about existent concrete objects. So if the proponent of 
descriptivism agrees, so far, so good, if not, then we can reject Descriptivist 2. But now let us 
say that our story misdescribes a slightly. According to Descriptivist 2, ‘a does not exist’ is 
now true. But our intuitions do not track the accuracy of how this realist says the abstract 
fictional object is portrayed. If we get ourselves into a mind-set where we reject the negative 
existential when the story is accurate, then we shall think the negative existential false, even 
if the object is misdescribed. Of course the realist will say that, there is a sense in which we 
are mistaken in thinking that a does not exist, but again this goes for fictional characters 
across the board; this case is not something special. Any account which delivers the verdict 
that fictional singular negative existentials track the accuracy of representations is inadequate. 
So if a story like the one sketched above is possible, and we have seen no reason why it is 
not, Descriptivist 2 is to be rejected. As noted above, the presence of a story about a non-
fictional existing object which misdescribes it, is not sufficient for the corresponding negative 
existential. But why should it be in any different in the case of fictional objects which are 
ontologically on a par with non-fictional objects? In any case, Descriptivist 2 is no better at 
handling the second objection to descriptivist approaches than Descriptivist 1. 
 





Descriptivist 3: An utterance of ‘a does not exist’ can be used to convey the claim that 
nothing has all and only the properties ascribed to a in the relevant fiction. 
 
If, coincidentally something has all and only the properties ascribed to a by a fiction, then this 
would still be irrelevant to the negative existential, unless one of the properties ascribed were 
λx. x=a since this object would not be a. Similarly, if a fiction misdescribes an existing 
object, say, President Obama, this does not suffice for the object’s nonexistence, by 
hypothesis. How a novel says Obama is, and how Obama is are two quite different things. 
Finally, 
 
(48) Even though Hamlet doesn’t exist there is a real person who had all and only the 
properties attributed to Hamlet in Hamlet 
 
is just as acceptable as (46), and so Descriptivist 3 cannot be correct. 
 
But is it possible, even in principle, for an object to have all and only the properties ascribed 
to a by a fiction? Let’s say the relevant fiction ascribes the bundle of properties B to an a, and 
that some object x instantiates B. Clearly x has all the properties ascribed to a by the fiction, 
but it does not have only those properties, for it has the property of being ascribed B, and 
even if this were in B, then x would have the property of being ascribed being ascribed B and 
so on. So in order for x to have only the properties ascribed to a, a would have to be ascribed 
a property which ensured that all a’s properties are closed under ascription. 
 
The final descriptivist proposal merges Descriptivist 2 and 3: 
 
Descriptivist 4: An utterance of ‘a does not exist’ can be used to convey the claim that 
nothing is both a and has all and only the properties ascribed to a in the relevant 
fiction. 
 
Like Descriptivist 2, Descriptivist 4 addresses the Kripkean concern and Everett’s third 




(49) Even though Hamlet doesn’t exist there is a real person who is both Hamlet and had 
all and only the properties attributed to Hamlet in Hamlet 
 
jars as much as (46). 
 




3.3 Metalinguistic Accounts 
I argued in Chapter 2 that the Meinongian and the realist are, in some ways, semantically 
conservative, but that they contravene the tight link between singular negative existentials 
and failures of reference. This observation paved the way for Russellian metalinguistic 
approaches to singular negative existentials that we argued were inadequate. But realists 
(Thomasson 2003; van Inwagen 2000, 2003) about fictional characters have also given 
metalinguistic accounts of singular negative existentials, and so this is a paraphrase strategy 
overlooked by Yagisawa. I shall argue, however, that these accounts are as unsuccessful as 
the Russellian’s. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Donnellan’s (1974 23-25) proposal is: 
 
If N is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements with the intention to 
refer to some individual, then ‘N does not exist’ is true if and only if the history of 
those uses ends in a block, where a ‘block’ is defined thus: when the historical 
explanation of the use of a name (with the intention to refer) ends … with events that 
preclude any referent being identified, I will call it a ‘block’ in the history. 
 
Thomasson’s realist metalinguistic approach is that 
 
‘‘Holmes does not exist’’ is true just in case the historical chain of use of the 
name does not lead back to a baptism of a person, but instead (only) to a 
                                                          
104 Given that there are non-fictional nonexistents, descriptivist proposals also face the worries discussed in 3.4. 
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story, myth, or similar representation (what Keith Donnellan calls a ‘block’) 
Thomasson (2003: 141). 
 
As Everett (2007: 73) notes, it is not clear that appealing to a Donnellan-style block helps the 
realist since it is perfectly possible that the historical chain of use associated with our uses of 
a fictional name does identify a referent, namely the fictional object. Everett suggests the 
realist could avoid this problem by arguing that fictional names are empty when initially 
introduced by the author, but that they subsequently come to refer to the fictional character. 
But Everett points out that this manoeuvre will not help the realist: 
 
there could be cases where a name initially referred to nothing when first 
introduced but then underwent a reference shift so that it came to refer to a 
nonfictional object. The name ‘‘Smadagascar’’ might, for example, be 
initially introduced as the name of a fictional place in a story but through a 
process of mistakes and misunderstandings it might end up referring to a real 
African island. In these sorts of cases, at least if we adopt Donnellan’s 
account of negative existentials, we would not want to say that the history of 
use associated with the name ‘‘Smadagascar’’ ended in a block just because 
the name lacked a referent when initially introduced. For if we did, then given 
Donnellan’s account of negative existentials, we would have to count 
‘‘Smadagascar doesn’t exist’’ as true whereas it would be false. (Everett 
2007: 73-74) 
 
In any case, Thomasson’s notion of a block is not quite the same as Donnellan’s, so perhaps 
the realist can avail herself of this distinct notion. But this proposal too faces a version of 
Everett’s objection above. Since ‘Smadagascar’ originates in a fiction, ‘Smadagascar doesn’t 
exist’ is incorrectly counted as true. 
 
The realist, however, could respond to Everett by distinguishing between different names:  
‘Smadagascar1’ is initially introduced in a fiction and does not refer or refers to a fictional 
character, whereas ‘Smadagascar2’ refers to a real place. Only ‘Smadagascar1’ can be traced 
back to a block, and so only ‘Smadagascar1’ can be used in true negative existentials. But in 
order to be plausible, the realist would have to deny that reference-shifts of the type Everett 
describes are impossible, and that the scenario that Everett describes is properly described as 
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the introduction of a new name. This could be defended by appealing to the slogans ‘different 
meaning different name’, and ‘different referent different meaning’. 
 
This response rules out allowing that fictional names initially fail to refer and then come to 
refer to a fictional character later on, although it does allow that fictional names are 
ambiguous, which is the proposal defended in Chapters 3 and 5. So to be offering a 
distinctive proposal, the realist who responds in this way is committed to fictional names 
referring to fictional characters period. This realist could then appeal to Thomasson’s notion 
of a block and provide a metalinguistic account of fictional singular negative existentials. 
Everett’s Smadagascar case would not provide a counterexample since it would involve a 
distinct name. 
 
Everett points out that Thomasson’s notion of a block is independently problematic, however, 
since “stories may introduce new names for real people and places. Robert Musil’s The Man 
Without Qualities introduces the name ‘‘Kakania’’ to refer to Austria and David Lodge’s 
novels introduce the name ‘‘Rummidge’’ for Birmingham”. (Everett 2007: 74). 
  
The obvious response is for Thomasson to amend her account to block such counterexamples. 
Everett (2007: 74) suggests the following on her behalf: 
 
Everett Block: The history of use associated with a name counts as ending in a block 
if that name was (i) introduced in a story or myth, (ii) didn’t refer to anything when it 
was introduced, and (iii) didn’t change reference. 
 
But as we noted above, in order for the realist to overcome Everett’s Smadagascar 
counterexample, they had to maintain that fictional names do refer to something when 
introduced, namely the corresponding fictional character. So the realist can adopt Everett’s 
proposal if she is to avoid both types of counterexample. 
 
Before we consider how this type of realist will respond to Everett’s observation about names 
introduced in fiction for existing non-fictional objects, we should pause to look at why 
Everett thinks that Everett Block is no good for the realist. Everett rejects Everett Block 





Suppose, for example, I wrote a story and introduced the name ‘‘πιγλετ’’ 
for one of my characters, directly stipulating that it is to refer to piglet. Now 
the abstract object theorist is committed to regarding piglet as a genuine 
object. And I introduced the name ‘‘πιγλετ’’ to refer to piglet. So on the 
current suggestion the abstract object theorist seems committed to holding 
that the history of use associated with ‘‘πιγλετ’’ does not end in a block but 
is rather rooted in a real object. So, given the truth conditions Donnellan 
suggests for negative existentials, ‘‘πιγλετ does not exist’’ will be counted 
false. But since piglet does not exist we will presumably want to count 
‘‘πιγλετ does not exist’’ as true. And the current suggestion does not allow 
us to do this. (Everett 2007: 74). 
 
Now as stated, Everett Block provides only a sufficient condition for a block, and not a 
necessary condition, so it is open to the realist supplement Everett’s suggestion, but let us 
ignore this in what follows. 
 
We should note, before considering Everett’s objection, that the conditions for resulting in a 
block are the conditions satisfied by empty fictional names as considered in Chapters 3 and 5. 
On our view the names of merely fictional characters, when introduced in a fiction are empty 
and do not shift reference. Given the account of fictional negative existentials defended 
above, we are committed to saying that 
 
(50) πιγλετ does not exist 
 
is false. That is, the fictional names that are used in true fictional negative existentials are 
ones that are empty and are introduced in fictional contexts. So if Everett is correct that this is 
the incorrect verdict, Everett’s πιγλετ example is a counterexample to our proposed treatment 
of fictional singular negative existentials.105 
 
                                                          
105 Note that if a realist allows that a fictional name refers to a fictional character and wants to appeal to Everett 
Block, then he must allow that fictional names are ambiguous, which is the view that we defend. As such it does 
not represent a distinctive view, although the metalinguistic account of fictional singular negative existentials is 
distinct from our proposal. 
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Everett’s argument is based on the contention that we ought to count (50) as true. Now 
Everett is conceding, for the sake of argument, that fictional characters, conceived of as 
abstract objects do exist, and that ‘πιγλετ’ refers to such an object. So it is hard, given this set 
up, to deny that (50) is false. What is true is that we do think that singular negative 
existentials such as ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ are true, but this is importantly different 
from (50) on the present account, since ‘πιγλετ’, but not ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to an 
object. In this sense then, (50) is similar to 
 
(51) Napoleon does not exist 
 
And is even more like 
 
(52) Kakania does not exist 
 
which are both false. Of course, someone like Everett who does not believe that there are 
fictional objects would think that (50) was true if presented with it, but someone who did not 
believe in the existence of numbers would think that ‘π does not exist’ is likewise true. So 
Everett’s objection fails. 
 
One way of helping to see this, is by considering the distinct ways in which a fictional 
character can get into a fiction that we delineated in Chapter 3. There we noted that one way 
in which a fictional character can get into a fiction, is the same way that ordinary objects get 
into fictions, namely by being referred to. This is not the usual case to be sure, but it is 
possible. Everett’s example exploits this way a character can get into fiction. But once we 
notice that this is exactly the same sense in which Napoleon is a character in War and Peace 
we should not accept (50). 
 
Returning to the realist who denies the ambiguity of fictional names. Such a realist, I noted 
above, cannot appeal to Everett Block if they want to avoid Everett’s Smadagascar 




Everett Block*: The history of use associated with a name counts as ending in a block 
if that name was (i) introduced in a story or myth, (ii) referred to a fictional character 
when it was introduced, and (iii) didn’t change reference. 
 
But Everett Block* is no good because it gives the verdict that ‘πιγλετ does not exist’ is true. 
Note that, for the realist who thinks that fictional names always refer to fictional characters, 
the reason for denying the truth of this negative existential is not the same as I gave above for 
those who accept the polysemy of fictional names. Rather, they must reject that πιγλετ does 
not exist since it is stipulated that ‘πιγλετ’ refers to piglet. This is unlike the usual case where 
fictional names come to refer to fictional characters through the writing of fictions. If we 
stipulate that ‘πιγλετ’ refers to piglet, then once we are aware of the stipulation, we would 
not be inclined to accept the negative existential, just as, if we stipulate that our use of ‘ip’ in 
a fiction is to refer to pi, we would not accept ‘ip does not exist’. 
 
Our realist then must distinguish between fictional names that name pre-existing fictional 
objects, and those fictional names that do not. This suggests the following 
 
Everett Block**: The history of use associated with a name counts as ending in a 
block if that name was (i) introduced in a story or myth, (ii) referred to a fictional 
character which did not pre-date its use, and (iii) didn’t change reference. 
 
Everett Block**, is, I think, extensionally correct. However, it is quite complicated and our 
route to it was even more complicated. It is simply not plausible that it is either the 
proposition expressed or a proposition conveyed by a fictional singular negative existential. 
The realists’ search for extensional adequacy has robbed his claim to plausibility, and so a 
metalinguistic account based on Everett Block** is to be rejected. (Also remember the 
strategic problems with denying the truth of fictional singular negative existentials or offering 
deviant truth conditions for them). 
 




If N is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements with the intention to 
refer to some entity of ontological kind K then ‘‘N does not exist’’ is true iff the 
history of those uses does not meet the conditions for referring to an entity of kind K. 
 
But this account is no good for the realist either. Let’s distinguish two readings of 
Thomasson’s proposal. On the first reading, intention takes narrow scope, so that 
Thomasson’s proposal requires that there be some entity of kind K which is the intended 
referent of N. This reading yields the wrong results when I use ‘Obama’ picked up from my 
politically aware friends, under the misapprehension that it refers to a mountain. In such a 
case ‘Obama does not exist’ is false, in virtue of the existence of the man, despite the history 
of ‘Obama’ not meeting the conditions for referring to a mountain. 
 
This is the type of case Everett has in mind when rejects Thomasson’s account as inadequate:  
 
suppose that I introduce the name ‘‘w’’ to refer to Conan Doyle but you think 
that it refers to one of his fictional characters and you use ‘‘w’’ in predicative 
statements with the intention of referring to that fictional character. If 
[Thomasson] were correct then it would be appropriate for me to correct you 
by uttering ‘‘w does not exist’’ and in making such an utterance I would 
count as having said something true. However surely the opposite is the case 
(Everett 2007: 75). 
 
On the second reading, intention takes wide scope, so that one intends to (refer to some x of 
K kind), with K featuring in the content of the intention. But this reading is also subject to 
counterexample. Suppose I own a plant which I suppose mistakenly is an artefact, and I call it 
Boris, intending thereby to pick out an artificial plant. Thomasson’s account would seem to 
make true the claim that Boris does not exist. But this is not true. What this brings out is that 
Thomasson is falsely assuming that being correct about the kind of an object is a precondition 
of reference to it (Campbell (2002)). 
 
Moreover, neither authors nor (most) others using fictional names are trying to refer to 
anything of a salient ontological kind. When Conan Doyle used ‘Sherlock Holmes’ he was 
not trying to refer to a man, but rather was pretending to refer to a man. The same goes for 
you or I. Most people realize that fictional names, on the intended interpretation, are empty, 
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and so are not trying to refer to anything, and so a fortiori not to anything of kind K. 
Thomasson would have been better off formulating her condition in terms of pretend 
reference and without the reliance on intention. But then Thomasson will face the problems 
of the sortalist. That is, when an author uses a fictional name, ‘a’, to pretendedly refer to a 
fictional character, the revised version of Thomasson’s suggestion will erroneously predict 
that ‘a does not exist is false. 
 
The obvious metalinguistic accounts are extensionally inadequate or too complicated to be 
plausible, as was the case with the other paraphrase strategies we have considered. But there 
is a non-paraphrase strategy that the realist can employ. As such it is not subject to the 




3.4 The Varying Extension of ‘Exists’ 
On the construal of fictional names defended in Chapters 3 and 5, fictional singular negative 
existentials are ambiguous, having a true reading when the fictional name is empty, and 
having a false reading when the fictional name refers to a fictional character. The realist who 
rejects the polysemy of fictional names cannot help herself to this strategy to account for true 
functional singular negative existentials. But we should note that there is another way in 
which such negative existential sentences could be ambiguous or vary in truth value, namely, 
if ‘exists’ is itself ambiguous or varies in extension. And the realist who rejects the polysemy 
of fictional names can help herself to this way of accounting for true fictional singular 
negative existentials. Both the account of Chapter 5 and this proposed realist strategy say that 
there are two readings of fictional singular negative existentials due to the varying extension 
of one of the terms in the sentence. The difference is that where we trace the variation in 
extension to the fictional name, the present realist account traces it to ‘exists’. 
 
The first realist strategy along these lines claims that ‘exists’ is ambiguous, so that 
 




has both a false reading, where it says of the abstract object Sherlock Holmes, that it does not 
exist1 and a true reading where it says of the abstract object that it does not exist2, where to 
exist1 is to be one of everything and to exist2 is to be explicated in different terms. 
 
On this strategy, the realist sees (2) as akin to 
 
(53) Goldman Sachs is not a bank. 
 
(53) has a false reading, where to be a bank1 is to be a particular type of financial institution, 
and a true reading, where to be a bank2 is to be appropriately situated with respect to a body 
of water.106 
 
The second realist implementation of this strategy is similar in that it takes the extension of 
‘exists’ to vary, but this time the variation is due to context-sensitivity, rather than ambiguity. 
On this model (2) is analogous to 
 
(54) Peter is not over there 
 
which can have a false reading, if ‘there’ specifies a location at which Peter is at, and a true 
reading if ‘there’ specifies a location where Peter is not present. 
 
Everett argues that either realist strategy faces the same kinds of problems as the realist who 
takes fictional names to be ambiguous. As we saw in Chapter 5, however, Everett’s claims 
about syllepsis are overblown, since the test for ambiguity which he in effect employs, is not 
decisive. Moreover, the realist has a nice explanation of why we have systematic polysemy in 
the case of fictional names. So, at the outset, we should be wary of Everett’s claims that the 
realist strategies under consideration here are problematic. But let us examine Everett’s 
argument and see if it fails in the predicate case as it did in the singular term case. 
 
Everett asks us to consider the following seemingly true claim 
 
                                                          
106 The ambiguity in (53) is mere homonymy. The realist is not committed to saying the same about the 
supposed ambiguity in (2); they could take the ambiguity to be polysemy or mere homonymy. Indeed, given 
Kripke’s (1977) test for ambiguity, we have reason to think ‘exists’ if ambiguous is polysemous since we would 
not expect to find the different senses of ‘exist’ to be lexicalized in different ways in some languages. 
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(55) Bush exists but Raskolnikov doesn’t exist, 
 
and its VP-elision, which also sounds true: 
 
(56) Bush exists but Raskolnikov doesn’t. 
 
Everett claims that if ‘exists’ is ambiguous, then the elided version, (56), should sound forced 
or humorous like the contractions 
 
(57) *Sometimes she took counsel and sometimes tea 
(58) *The politician’s ratings fell and so did the clumsy rock-climber, 
 
but it doesn’t, and so we should conclude that ‘exists’ is not ambiguous. 
 
Similarly, Everett argues that if ‘exists’ is context sensitive, then ‘exists’ in (56) needs to be 
able to do semantic double duty, but Everett claims that when we elide contextually-sensitive 
VPs, we find they cannot do double duty. For example, Everett notes that the two context-
sensitive VPs in (59) can have different semantic values, corresponding to two different 
groups of people demonstrated 
 
(59) Mary is one of them but Sally is not one of them 
 
But we cannot make the same claim with the elided version 
 
(60) Mary is one of them but Sally isn’t. 
 
That is, in (60), ‘is one of them’ cannot play the dual semantic role that ‘exists’ is required to 
play in (56). 
 
The VP-elision test for ambiguity/context-sensitivity that Everett employs is similar to the 
conjunction reduction test for ambiguity that we considered in connection with singular terms 
in Chapter 5. But just as we can apply the conjunction reduction test to singular terms, we can 





(61) Toronto exists. 
(62) Numbers exist. 
(63) Triadic relations exist. 
(64) Toronto and numbers and triadic relations exist. 
 
Sennet notes that ‘exist’ has been claimed to be ambiguous, but that it does not display the 
syllepsis which the conjunction reduction test for ambiguity predicts for ambiguous terms, as 
witnessed by the felicity of (64). So instead of an elision test, Everett could have argued that 
‘exists’ is not ambiguous on the basis of the conjunction reduction test. 
 
Sennet himself is not endorsing the claim that (64) shows that ‘exist’ is unambiguous since he 
notes that “[i]f a term can be ambiguous but in a way so subtle that people miss it, then the 
zeugma [syllepsis] might not be noticeable”.  And as we argued in Chapter 5 this can indeed 
be the case for singular terms. That is, conjunction reduction fails as a test for the ambiguity 
of singular terms, although we did not consider it as a test for context-sensitivity. It is clear, 
however, that conjunction-reduction fails as a test for the context-sensitivity of singular 
terms. The following cases show that we can have context-sensitive singular terms doing 
linguistic double duty in the case of complex demonstratives and personal pronouns:107 
 
(65) That game is very hard to learn but lasts only five minutes 
(66) They were brought in this morning and were very popular in 17th Century England. 
 
What is hard to learn are the rules of the game, but what takes five minutes is an activity. 
What were brought in this morning were chair tokens, but what was popular are chair types. 
 
But that conjunction reduction fails as a test for the ambiguity or context-sensitivity of 
singular terms does not show that it fails as a test for the ambiguity or context-sensitivity of 
predicates. Similarly, it does not show that the ellipsis test for ambiguity or context-
sensitivity fails. 
 
                                                          
107 It is not clear what the context-sensitivity of names, in the sense of context-sensitivity under discussion, 
would amount to, and so they are omitted from discussion under the topic of context-sensitivity. 
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In any case, we should note that (57) and (58) do not have the same form as (56) and (64), so 
it is not immediately clear what lessons can be learnt from the fact that (57) and (58) sound 
off. But we can construct examples that mirror the structure of (56) more accurately to make 
Everett’s point. Consider the following example adapted from Zwicky and Saddock (1975: 
19). The following has four readings generated from the two meanings of ‘called Jane an 
ambulance’108 
 
(67) Sally called Jane an ambulance but Bob didn’t call Jane an ambulance 
 
But the VP-elided version only has a single reading: 
 
(68) Sally called Jane an ambulance but Bob didn’t 
 
Moreover, even polysemous terms are counted as ambiguous by the VP-elision test as this 
example from Barker (2006) shows 
 
(69) *Bill waved, and the flag did too 
 
Unlike in the case of conjunction reduction for singular terms, we do not have any 
counterexamples to the conjunction reduction and VP-elision tests for ambiguity in the case 
of predicates. But the failure of the conjunction reduction test for ambiguity in the case of 
singular terms demonstrates that the principle behind the VP elision test, that linguistic items 
cannot play a dual role, is false. So it would be hasty to conclude with Everett, that ‘exists’ is 
not ambiguous. Nevertheless, Everett has provided some evidence against the ambiguity 
claim. 
 
What about Everett’s employment of elision tests for context-sensitivity? As Everett himself 
notes, we do sometimes get the ‘sloppy readings’ required by the realist. That is, both 
 
(70) Bill loves his mum and Stan loves his mum 
 
and 
                                                          
108 A joke that has stayed with me since my childhood: A – call this man an ambulance, B – This man’s an 




(71) Bill loves his mum and so does Stan 
 
can be read so as to say that Stan loves Bill’s mum and that Stan loves Stan’s mum, so 
context-sensitive terms can do linguistic double duty. “The question, then, is whether we can 
understand ‘‘exists’’ in an analogous manner and [(56)] as a case of sloppy identity” (Everett 
2007: 61). Everett is sceptical since ‘sloppy readings’ like the available one of (71) involve 
explicitly anaphoric devices in their surface form, where (56) does not. 
 
But this is not essential to the phenomena of ‘sloppy readings’. As the following example 
shows: 
 
(72) John went to a local bar and Bob went to a local bar 
(73) John went to a local bar and so did Bob. 
 
Both (72) and (73) can be read as saying that Bob went to a bar local to John or to a bar local 
to Bob. So here we have an example of a context-sensitive VP which does not employ 
explicitly anaphoric devices which can do linguistic double duty, and so the VP-elision test, 




(74) John and Bob went to a local bar 
 
has two readings and so the conjunction reduction test does not tell against the current realist 
proposal of invoking context-sensitivity. 
 
But Everett has a better argument against the realist’s strategy. Consider 
 
(75) Bush exists but Raskolnikov and the round square don’t 
 
which sounds perfectly felicitous. Now consider the following sentence 
 




(76) admits of a strict reading which says Barry and James did not go to a bar local to John, 
and a sloppy reading which says they did not go to a bar local to themselves. But we cannot 
get a mixed reading which says that James did not go to a bar local to John, whereas Barry 
did not go to a bar local to himself (cf. Zwicky and Saddock (1975: 22). The problem for the 
context-sensitivity of ‘exists’ is that  
 
We cannot take [(75)] as denying the existence of the round square in the 
sense that it affirms the existence of Bush while denying the existence of 
Raskolnikov in some other, contextually determined, sense. Rather we must 
rather [sic] take it as denying the existence of Raskolnikov in exactly the 
same sense that it denies the existence of the round square. Now the round 
square is not a fictional object so presumably [(75)] must deny the existence 
of the round square in the ordinary sense, in the sense that excludes the round 
square from our ontology. Consequently [(75)] must also deny Raskolnikov’s 
existence in this sense, excluding Raskolnikov from our ontology. But [(75)] 
is intuitively true. Hence, it seems, even if we try to understand [(56)] as a 
case of sloppy identity, this will not save the Contextual Thesis (Everett 2007: 
61). 
 
Now the way Everett puts things, actually underplays the force of this argument. For all 
Everett says, we should see the observation concerning (75) and (76) as underlying an 
explanatory challenge for the realist: elucidate a sense of ‘exists’ such that it is true that 
Raskolnikov does not exist and the round square does not exist in this sense. But for any 
sense of ‘exist’ it is plausible that the round square does not exist. Assuming a Russellian 
analysis of definite descriptions, we can illustrate the point as follows. Regardless of the 
extension of ‘E’, the following is true 
 
(77) ~∃x RSx & ∀y RSy ⊃ x=y & Ex 
 
So no matter how the realist elucidates ‘exists’, he can account for the truth of (75), without 




But we should not view the data in this way. The point is that on the intended understanding 
of (75), we are to be taken as saying that the round square does not exist in exactly the same 
sense that we affirm Bush’s existence, that is, it does not exist tout court. If so, then given the 
unavailability of mixed readings, we must be denying the existence of Rasknolnikov in 
exactly the same way, and so the realist’s claim that ‘exists’ is context-sensitive fails. 
 
In addition to conjunction reduction and ellipsis tests for ambiguity, there is also Quine’s 
(1960) contradiction test for ambiguous predicates (See Chapter 5). Since ‘bank’ is 
ambiguous, we can truthfully say 
 
(78) That bank isn't a bank. 
 
That is because the first occurrence of ‘bank’ need not have the same extension as the second 
occurrence of ‘bank’, so (78) need not express a contradiction. But where the extension 
cannot vary, sentences of the form of (78) are contradictory as in 
 
(79) *She is an aunt but she isn't an aunt 
 
So by the contradiction test, if ‘exists’ is ambiguous, then we ought to be able to say 
truthfully 
 
(80) Sherlock Holmes exists but does not exist. 
 
But we cannot. And so, by the contradiction test ‘exists’ is not ambiguous. 
 
Can we use the contradiction test to test for context sensitivity? We can very well say 
 
(81) Simon is her son but not her son 
 
by demonstrating two different women. So the contradiction test predicts context-sensitive 
terms do not result in contradictions.  This is apparently bad news for the realist who claims 
that ‘exists’ is context-sensitive. But note that we cannot say 
 




so the contradiction test fails in full generality as a test for context-sensitivity. And if ‘exists’ 
is context-sensitive, it is presumably more like ‘local’ than ‘her son’, as its extension is not 
determined anaphorically or in a straightforward demonstrative fashion. So the fact that 
‘exists’ results in contradiction, does not tell against ‘exists’ being context-sensitive. 
 
So it seems that the contradiction test tells against ‘exists’ being ambiguous, but not against it 
being context-sensitive. But we should be cautious. When we applied the contradiction test to 
an ambiguous term, we chose ‘bank’. Now the two meanings of ‘bank’ are very different. 
Presumably, the different senses of ‘exists’ are not like that. But when the two meanings of 
an ambiguous term are similar and largely overlapping, it has been claimed that the 
contradiction test, as a test for ambiguity, breaks down. To take an example from Sennet 
(2011) 
 
(83) The police reported that the criminal was apprehended but the police didn't report that 
the criminal was apprehended 
 
sounds contradictory, even though ‘report’ is ambiguous, having both a factive reading and a 
non-factive reading, where the factive reading entails the non-factive reading. Sennet 
explains the contradictoriness of (83) as arising not out of the univocity of ‘report’ but rather 
from the entailment: if the first occurrence of conjunct entails the negation of the second 
conjunct, then (83) cannot be true. I am sceptical of such an explanation, since why could it 
not be that the first occurrence of ‘report’ was the non-factive ‘report’, whereas the second 
occurrence was the factive ‘report’. If so then there is no contradiction in (83). Nevertheless, 
if ‘report’ is genuinely ambiguous, then this shows that the contradiction test for ambiguity 
fails, and so the contradiction test cannot be used to undermine either the claim that ‘exists’ is 
context-sensitive or that it is ambiguous. 
 
In any case, one might wonder whether the realist’s claim that ‘exists’ varies in extension is 
an ad hoc proposal designed purely to tackle the problem of fictional singular negative 
existentials. Is there any independent motivation for positing either ambiguity or context-
sensitivity? In Chapter 3, we saw that positing an ambiguity in fictional names was motivated 
by the dual aspect of our thought and talk about fictional characters. That is, it is the 
systematic polysemy of fictional names that allows us to capture the perspective from within 
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the fiction, from without the fiction, and our easy transition between the two. Relatedly, the 
polysemy of fictional names allows us to do justice to our irrealist and realist intuitions about 
fictional objects. Does the realist who is a referential monist have anything similar to say? 
 
Of course, by claiming that the extension of ‘exists’ varies, the realist is trying to do justice to 
our irrealist and realist judgements, although how far his account goes toward capturing our 
irrealist thought is questionable. But his account is not motivated by broader considerations to 
do with fiction. His treatment of ‘exists’ does not explain our dual perspective on fiction and 
our ability to move between those perspectives. In that respect, then, if no other, our account 
is to be preferred as a better motivated and all encompassing theory. 
 
Nevertheless, there is independent motivation for the view that ‘exists’ is context-sensitive if 
we think of our first-order existence predicate as denoting the concept λx.∃y=x, or else think 
of existence in second order terms. As is well documented (Neale (1990), Stanley and Szabó 
(2000)) the domain over which natural language quantifiers range is contextually determined. 
Given that we need to appeal to contextually determined quantifier domain restriction 
independently of questions concerning existence, then we can employ it in giving an account 
of the varying extension of exists. That is, whilst Sherlock Holmes falls within the range of 
the existential quantifier when this is unrestricted, he does not fall within the range of the 
quantifier when it is restricted so as to exclude fictional objects. In this way, the realist can 
explain why and how ‘exists’ is context sensitive. 
 
Everett raises the following objection to this proposal: 
 
I don’t think the existence predicate can be plausibly understood as a 
quantificational expression at the level of LF since our existence predicate 
cannot be explicitly restricted in the way ordinary quantifiers can. It is 
acceptable to say ‘‘there is beer in the fridge’’ and ‘‘there are books on the 
shelf’’ but odd and infelicitous to say ‘‘beer exists in the fridge’’ or ‘‘books 
exist on the shelf.’’ Indeed the existence predicate cannot, for that matter, be 
implicitly restricted in the way ordinary quantifiers can. Upon opening the 
fridge and finding no beer it is acceptable to say ‘‘there is no beer’’ but 




Everett’s objection is far from decisive, however. It is well known that we cannot always 
substitute co-denoting terms felicitously. As Oliver (2005) notes, the substitution of co-
referring terms within complex referring expressions can yield nonsense. For example, 
replacing ‘Dummett’ with ‘the author of Thought and Reality’ in ‘Professor Dummett has 
retired’ results in the ungrammatical, *‘Professor the author of Thought and Reality has 
retired’. Secondly, co-referring terms differing in inflection cannot be substituted without 
loss: ‘Me’ and ‘I’ can co-refer in a given context and yet ‘I am Alex’ is grammatical, 
whereas, *‘Me am Alex’ is not. Further, counterexamples can be produced with pre-
modifying adjectives: from ‘Clever Clive drank most of the wine’ we cannot move to 
*‘Clever the shopkeeper drank most of the wine’ even though Clive is the shopkeeper. 
Finally, Gazdar et al (1985: 32) note that even though ‘likely’ and ‘probable’ are 
synonymous, ‘probable’ is not substitutable in ‘Alex is likely to leave’, as ‘Alex is probable 
to leave’ is ungrammatical. The differing behaviour of ‘exists’ and existential quantifiers may 
be explained by syntactic rather than semantic differences, and so Everett’s observation does 
not tell against the present realist proposal. 
 
But now the realist does face a challenge. Although Everett’s observation does not tell 
against construing the existence predicate as related to the existential quantifier, it does tell 
against, or at least challenge the view that ‘exists’ is context sensitive in the same way as 
explicitly quantified noun phrases. That is, although the considerations Everett raises does not 
undermine the view that ‘exists’ denotes λx.∃y=x, given that we do not seem to be able to 
restrict the extension of exists in the same way that we can restriction the extension of ‘there 
is’ or ‘some’, the proposed realist explanation of context sensitivity is undermined. More 
generally, just because two phrases are synonymous, does not mean that they can be 
manipulated in the same way. So even if we accept that ‘exists’ denotes λx.∃y=x, it does not 
mean that its quantificational element can be contextually restricted in the same way as ‘there 
is’ can be. So the realist’s thesis is not independently well-motivated, and so seems an ad hoc 








We saw that by exploiting the independently motivated polysemy of fictional names, the 
realism advocated here can help itself to the best account of singular negative existentials to 
account for the truth of claims such as Sherlock Holmes does not exist, its realism 
notwithstanding. Moreover, the realist is not subject to other forms of the challenge from the 
nonexistence of fictional characters. 
 
The realist who eschews the polysemy of fictional names, however, cannot advocate the best 
treatment of singular negative existentials in the fictional case. He must treat fictional 
singular negative existentials differently from the way in which he treats other seemingly true 
singular negative existentials. We have argued that this realist faces strategic difficulties and 
difficulties in the detailed implementation of this strategy. The realist who rejects the 
polysemy of fictional names has to advocate an ad hoc strategy to deal with fictional singular 
negative existentials, whether that be by positing an unmotivated ambiguity or context 
sensitivity in ‘exists’, a deviant logical form when an obvious one will do, or else by giving 
up on the truth of fictional singular negative existentials, when there is a well motivated way 
to accept them as the true claims they appear to be. This then counts in favour of the realist 







We have argued that whatever attitude we take toward whether we should classify empty 
names and non-empty names together, we need to admit that empty names can contribute to 
the expression of thoughts if we want to say that some singular negative existentials are true. 
But once we have done this we open the door to empty names being able to figure in the 
expression of a whole range of thoughts. Such an admission requires a negative free logic, 
and a semantics for empty names can be given in a truth-theoretic setting. Once we accept all 
this, we have a relatively straightforward account of singular negative existentials. 
 
But we also argued that one class of intuitively empty names, fictional names, are associated 
with corresponding entities, fictional characters. We defended this view as compatible with 
our irrealist intuitions and with the best account of singular negative existentials. We also 
outlined and defended a plausible metaphysics of such entities. This account was incomplete 
to be sure, but we have seen off the most prominent objections against this picture. 
 
Empty names can be given a plausible and coherent treatment, but this does not mean that 
where we have intuitively empty names, we should also be irrealists about the putative 
referents of such names. I hope that I have defended one such case where emptiness of name 
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